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Abstract
In these papers I examine efficient financial contracting when incentive problems play a signif-
icant role. In the first chapter (joint with Z. Fluck and S. Myers) we focus on the venture
capital industry. We build a two-stage model capturing moral hazard, effort provision, and
hold-up problems between entrepreneurs and investors. Across multiple financing scenarios we
solve numerically for optimal decision policies and NPV, finding significant value losses from
first-best. A commitment to competitive syndicate financing increases effort and NPV and
benefits all parties. However, syndicate financing raises potential information problems, and
the fixed-fraction participation rule of Admati-Pfleiderer (1994) fails with endogenous effort.
We find that debt financing is often less efficient than equity financing, for while it improves
effort incentives it worsens hold-up and debt overhang problems in later-stage financing.
In the next chapter I turn to the collateralized debt obligation or "CDO" market. CDOs
are closed-end, actively-managed, highly leveraged bond funds whose managers typically receive
subordinated compensation packages. I develop a model of manager trading behavior and
quantify under-investment and asset substitution problems, calibrating to market parameters.
Compared to prior studies, I find similar value losses to senior investors and significantly higher
increases in debt default risk and spread costs. However, for even extremely conservative
effort assumptions, the ex-ante benefit of greater effort incentives outweighs risk-shifting costs,
rationalizing observed contracts. I also analyze the ability of various payout policies and
trading covenants to curtail risk-shifting. Excess interest diversions, contingent trading limits,
and coverage test "haircuts" of lower-priced assets are effective measures and increase allowable
leverage and equity returns.
In the final chapter I examine the empirical relationship between CDO trading, manager
compensation, and fund performance from 2001-2004. Using a large panel data set, I find a
statistically significant relationship between trades which add volatility to the portfolio and the
level of subordinated manager compensation. Worse deal performance increases risk-shifting
behavior so long as subordinate investors are still in-the-money. Tendencies to group trades
and the effect of managerial reputation are also considered.
Thesis Supervisor: Stewart C. Myers
Title: Gordon Y. Billard Professor of Finance, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1
Venture Capital Contracting and
Syndication: An Experiment in
Computational Corporate Finance
(joint with Z. Fluck and S. Myers)
1.1 Introduction
This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with
effort provision, moral hazard, asymmetric information and hold-up problems when contracts
are incomplete and investment proceeds in stages. How much value is lost in the entrepreneur-
venture capital relationship relative to first-best value? How does the value lost depend on risk
and the time-pattern of required investment? What determines whether a positive-NPV project
can in fact be financed? What are the advantages and disadvantages of staged financing? Are
there significant efficiency gains from syndication of later-stage financing?
We argue that these and related questions should not be analyzed one by one, but jointly
in a common setting. Some features of venture-capital contracting may not solve a particular
problem, but instead trade off one problem against another. For example, a study that focused
just on the option-like advantages of staged investment could easily miss the costs of staging,
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particularly the negative feedback to effort if venture-capital investors can hold up the entre-
preneur by dictating financing terms in later stages. (We find many cases where hold-up costs
outweigh the advantages of staged financing and full upfront financing actually increases value.)
A joint analysis of the problems inherent in the entrepreneur-venture capital relationship
does not lead to closed-form solutions or simple theorems. Therefore we embarked on an experi-
ment in computational corporate finance, which is the formal study of financing and investment
problems that do not have closed-form solutions.1 We believe the time is ripe for a compu-
tational model of venture capital. Venture-capital institutions, contracts and procedures were
well documented more than a decade ago. It was clear then that the agency and information
problems encountered in ordinary financing decisions are especially acute in venture capital.
The successes of venture capital have stimulated theoretical work on how these problems are
mitigated. But most theoretical papers have zeroed in on only one problem or tradeoff and run
the risk of missing the bigger picture.
Of course the breadth and richness of a computational model do not come free, and numerical
results are never absolutely conclusive. One can never rule out the possibility that results would
have been different with different inputs or modeling choices. But our model, though simplified,
follows actual practice in venture capital. We have verified our main results over a wide range
of inputs. We believe our results help to clarify why venture-capital investment works when it
works and why it sometimes fails.
The structure of venture-capital financing is known from many sources, including Sahlman
(1990), Lerner (1994), Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995), Gompers (1995), Gompers and Lerner
(1996, 2002), Hellman and Purl (2000, 2002) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003). We will
preview our model and results after a brief review of the features of venture-capital contracting
that are most important to our paper. The review includes comments on related theoretical
work.
1 Computational models are frequently used to understand the value of real and financial options, but their use
on the financing side of corporate balance sheets is an infant industry. The short list of computational papers on
financing includes Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994, 1998), Boyd and Smith (1994), Parrino and Weisbach
(1999), Robe (1999, 2001), Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2002) and Ju, Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach
(2004). These papers explore the tradeoff theory of capital structure and the risk-shifting incentives created by
debt financing.
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1.1.1 Venture capital contracting
Venture capital brings together one or more entrepreneurs, who contribute ideas, plans, human
capital and effort, and private investors, who contribute experience, expertise, contacts and
most of the money. For simplicity, we will refer to one entrepreneur and to one initial venture-
capital investor. Their joint participation creates a two-way incentive problem. The investor has
to share financial payoffs with the entrepreneur in order to secure her commitment and effort.
Thus the investor may not be willing to participate even if the startup has positive overall NPV.
Second, the entrepreneur will underinvest in effort if she has to share her marginal value added
with the investor.2
Sweat equity
The entrepreneur invests even when she puts up none of the financing. She contributes her
effort and absorbs part of the firm's business risk. The difference between her salary and her
outside compensation is an opportunity cost. Specialization of her human capital to the new
firm also creates an opportunity cost if the firm fails.3
The entrepreneur receives shares in exchange for these investments. These shares may not
vest immediately, and they are illiquid unless and until the firm is sold or goes public. 4 The
venture capitalist frequently requires the entrepreneur to sign a contract that precludes work
for a competitor. The entrepreneur therefore has a strong incentive to stick with the firm and
make it successful. In our model, the entrepreneur contributes no financial investment and is
willing to continue so long as the present value of her shares exceeds her costs of effort.
Staged investment and financing
A startup is a compound call option. Financing and investment are made in stages. The stages
match up with business milestones, such as a demonstration of technology or a successful
2 This is an extreme version of Myers's (1977) underinvestment problem.
3This opportunity cost could perhaps be reduced if new ventures are developed as divisions of larger firms.
See Gromb and Scharfstein (2003) and Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2003).
4Employees typically receive options that vest gradually as employment continues and the startup survives.
But our entrepreneur is a founder, not an employee hired later. Founders typically receive shares, not options.
The entrepreneur's shares are fully vested, but additional shares may be granted later. See Kaplan and Str6mberg
(2003).
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product introduction.
We assume that the entrepreneur and venture capitalist cannot write a complete contract
to specify the terms of future financing. The terms are determined by bargaining as financing
is raised stage by stage. If additional investors join in later stages, the bargain has to be
acceptable to them as well as the entrepreneur and initial venture capitalist.
The option value added by staging is obvious, but staging may also serve other purposes.
In Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Nbldeke and Schmidt (1998), staging allows the venture
capitalist to learn the startup's value and thereby induce the entrepreneur's effort. In Neher
(1996) and Landier (2002), the venture capitalist's ability to deny financing at each stage forces
the entrepreneur to exert higher effort and prevents her from diverting cash flows.
Venture capital investors usually buy convertible preferred shares. If the firm is shut down,
the investors have a senior claim on any remaining assets. The shares convert to common stock
if the firm is sold or taken public.5 Ordinary debt financing is rarely used, although we will
consider whether debt could serve as an alternative source of financing.
Control
The venture capitalist does not have complete control of the new firm. For example, Kaplan
and Str6mberg (2003, Table 2) find that venture-capital investors rarely control a majority of
the board of directors. But Kaplan and Str6mberg also find that venture capitalists' control
increases when the firm's progress is unsatisfactory.
Staged financing can give incumbent venture capitalists effective control over access to
financing. Their refusal to participate in the second or later rounds of financing would send
a strong negative signal to other potential investors and probably deter them from investing.6
In practice, the incumbents' decision not to participate is usually a decision to shut down the
firm.
Giving venture capitalists effective veto power over later-stage investment is in some respects
efficient. The decision to shut down or continue cannot be left to the entrepreneur, who is usually
5 The use of convertible securities in venture capital is analyzed in Green (1984), Berglof (1994), Kalay and
Zender (1997), Repullo and Suarez (1998), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Schmidt (2003) and Winton and Yerramilli
(2003).
6The role of the monopolist financier was investigated in Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Cestone
wand White (2004).
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happy to continue investing someone else's money as long as there is any chance of success. The
venture capitalist is better equipped to decide whether to exercise each stage of the compound
call option.
Thus staged financing has a double benefit, at least for the venture capitalist. It can block
the entrepreneur's incentive to continue and it allows the venture capitalist to exploit the
startup's real-option value. But it is also costly if the venture capitalist can use the threat of
shutdown to hold up the entrepreneur and dilute her stake. Anticipated dilution feeds back into
the entrepreneur's incentives and effort and reduces overall value. This is the holdup problem
of staged financing. For a wide range of parameter values we find that the holdup problem is
so severe that the venture capitalist is better off abandoning staged financing and providing all
financing upfront. When later financing stages are syndicated on competitive terms, however,
staged financing is always more efficient than full upfront financing. We will also show that
the holdup problem cannot be solved simply by substituting debt for equity financing. When
contracts are incomplete, stage by stage bargaining enables the incumbent venture capitalist to
extract surplus regardless of the form of financing.
Most prior theory assumes that venture-capital investors retain residual rights of control.
The venture capitalist's rights to decide on investment (Aghion and Bolton (1992)) and replace
the entrepreneur (Fluck (1998), Hellman (1998), Myers (2000), Fluck (2001)) play an important
role in enforcing financial contracts between investors and entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur's
option to reacquire control and realize value in an initial public offering is a key incentive in
Black and Gilson (1998), Myers (2000) and Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2001).
Syndication of later-stage financing
Later-stage financing usually comes from a syndicate of incumbent and new venture-capital
investors. We show how a commitment to syndicate can alleviate the holdup problem by
assuring the entrepreneur more favorable terms in later rounds of financing. This encourages
effort in all periods, which increases overall value.
Syndication of venture capital investments has been explained in several other ways. It is
one way to gather additional information about a startup's value - see, for example, Gompers
and Lerner (2002, Ch. 9) and Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Wilson (1968) attributes syndication to
15
venture capitalists' risk aversion. Syndication may also reflect tacit collusion: early investors
syndicate later rounds of financing, and the syndication partners return the favor when they
develop promising startups (Pichler and Wilhelm (2001)). In Cassamatta and Haritchabalet
(2004), venture capitalists acquire different skills and experience and syndication pools their
expertise. We offer a different rationale: syndication can protect the entrepreneur from ex post
holdup by investors and thereby encourage effort.
Exit
Entrepreneurs can rely on venture capitalists to cash out of successful startups. Venture capital
generally comes from limited-life partnerships, and the partners are not paid until the startups
are sold or taken public. Myers (2000) shows that venture capitalists would cash out voluntarily
in order to avoid the adverse incentives of long-term private ownership.
Chelma, Habib and Lyngquist (2002) consider how the various provisions of venture-capital
contracts are designed to mitigate multiple agency and information problems. Their paper
focuses on exit provisions and does not consider syndication.
1.1.2 Preview of the model and results
We aim to capture the most important features of venture capital. For simplicity we assume
two stages of financing and investment at dates 0 and 1. If successful, the firm is sold or taken
public at date 2, and the entrepreneur and the investors cash out. The entrepreneur and the
investors are risk-neutral NPV maximizers, although the entrepreneur's NPV is net of the costs
of her effort.
We value the startup as a real option. The underlying asset is the potential market value
of the firm, which we assume is lognormally distributed. But full realization of potential value
requires maximum effort from the entrepreneur at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur's effort is
costly, so her optimal effort is less than the maximum and depends on her expected share of the
value of the firm at date 2. The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur negotiate ownership
percentages at date 0, but these percentages change at date 1 when additional financing is
raised and invested.7
7This would be the case if the venture capitalist have decided that certain non-verifiable performance mile-
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We assume that the firm cannot start or continue without the entrepreneur. If financing
cannot be arranged on terms that satisfy her participation constraints, no investment is made
and the firm shuts down. The venture capitalist's date-0 and date-1 participation constraints
must also be met, since he will not invest if his NPV is negative.
The efficiency of venture-capital investment hinges on the nature and terms of financing.
We compare six cases.
1. First-best. If the entrepreneur could finance the startup out of her own pocket, she would
maximize overall value, net of the required financial investments and her costs of effort.
First-best is our main benchmark for testing the efficiency of other cases.
2. Fully competitive. In this case, financing is available on competitive terms (NPV = 0) at
both date 0 and date 1, which gives the highest possible value when the entrepreneur must
raise capital from outside investors. We include this case as an alternative benchmark to
first-best.
3. Monopoly, staged investment. Here the initial venture capitalist can dictate the terms
of financing at dates 0 and 1 and can hold up the entrepreneur at date 1. The venture
capitalist does not squeeze the last dollar from the entrepreneur's stake, however. He
squeezes just enough in each period to maximize the present value of his shares.
4. Monopoly, no staging. In this case, the venture capitalist commits all necessary funds
at date 0 and lets the entrepreneur decide whether to continue at date 1. This means
inefficient investment decisions at date 1, because the entrepreneur is usually better off
continuing, even when the odds of success are low and overall NPV is negative. But
effort increases at both date 0 and date 1, because the venture capitalist can no longer
control the terms of later-stage financing. This case helps clarify the tradeoff between the
real-option value of staged investment and the under-provision of effort because of the
holdup problem.
5. Syndication. In this case a syndicate of additional investors joins the original venture
capitalist at date 1. We assume that the syndicate financing comes on more competitive
stones had not been met.
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terms than in the monopoly case, for simplicity we will focus on the fully competitive
case (NPV = 0). Syndication mitigates the holdup problem, increasing the entrepreneur's
effort and overall NPV.
6. Debt. Venture capitalists rarely finance startups with ordinary debt, but we nevertheless
consider debt financing briefly as an alternative. Debt financing effectively gives the
entrepreneur a call option on the startup's final value at date 2.
We assume that the initial venture capitalist and the entrepreneur are equally informed
about potential value, although potential value is not verifiable and contractible. But financing
terms in the syndication case depend on the information available to new investors. We start by
assuming complete information, but also consider asymmetric information and explore whether
the terms of incumbent venture capitalist's participation in date-1 financing could reveal the
incumbent's inside information.
We solve the model for each financing case over a wide range of input parameters, including
the potential value of the firm, the variance of this value, the amount and timing of required
investment and the marginal costs and payoffs of effort. We report a representative subset of
results in Table 1 and Figures 3 through 12. Results are especially sensitive to the marginal
costs and payoffs of effort, so we vary these parameters over very wide ranges. Our main results
include the following:
1. We find economically significant value losses, relative to first best, even when the dollar-
equivalent cost of effort is a small fraction of required financial investment. Thus many
startups with positive NPVs cannot be financed. Value losses decline as the marginal
benefit of effort increases or the marginal cost declines.
2. Value losses are especially high in the monopoly case with staged investment, where the
incumbent venture capitalist can dictate the terms of financing at date 1. For a wide
range of parameter values, both the venture capitalist and entrepreneur are better off in
the no-staging case with full upfront financing. That is, the costs of the no-staging case
(inefficient investment at date 1) can be less than the value loss due to under-provision
of effort in the monopoly, staged financing case.
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3. Syndicate financing at date 1 increases effort and the date-0 NPVs of both the entrepre-
neur and the initial venture capitalist. The venture capitalist is better off than in the
monopoly case, despite taking a smaller share of the venture. Moreover, staged financing
with syndication always produces higher overall values than the no-staging case. The
combination of staged financing and later-stage syndication dominates the alternative of
giving the entrepreneur all the money upfront.
4. Syndicate financing is most effective when new investors are fully informed. The incum-
bent venture capitalist may be able to reveal his information through his participation in
date-1 financing. However, the fixed-fraction participation rule derived by Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994) does not achieve truthful information revelation in our model, because
the terms of financing effect the entrepreneur's effort. The fixed-fraction rule would lead
the venture capitalist to over-report the startup's value: the higher the price paid by
new investors, the more the entrepreneur's existing shares are worth, and the harder she
works. The incumbent venture capitalist captures part of the gain from her extra effort.
A modified fixed-fraction rule works in some cases, however. With the modified rule, the
incumbent's fractional participation increases as the reported value increases.
5. We expected venture-capital contracting to be more efficient for high-variance investments,
but that; is not generally true. Increasing the variance of potential value sometimes in-
creases value losses, relative to first best, and sometimes reduces them, depending on
effort parameters and the financing case assumed.
6. Debt financing does not solve the holdup problem, because the venture capitalist can still
squeeze the entrepreneur by demanding a high interest rate on debt issued at date 1.
Switching from equity to debt financing does add value in some cases, but not generally.
Efficient use of syndicated debt financing will often require renegotiation between the
entrepreneur and the incumbent venture capitalist - renegotiation after date-i value is
revealed but before the syndicate debt financing is raised. The opportunity to renegotiate
may also be an opportunity for the incumbent to reassert monopoly power over the terms
of later-stage financing. Opportunities for renegotiation also occur in the syndication case
with equity, but with low probability and at low values of the startup firm.
19
We recognize that we have left out several aspects of venture capital that could influence
our results. First, we ignore risk aversion. The venture capitalist and entrepreneur are assumed
risk-neutral. This is reasonable for venture capitalists, who have access to financial markets. 8
It is less reasonable for entrepreneurs, who can't hedge or diversify payoffs without damaging
incentives.9
Second, we do not explicitly model the costs and value added of the venture capitalist's
effort. We are treating his effort as a cost sunk at startup and fixed afterwards. In effect, we
assume that if the venture capitalist decides to invest, he will exert appropriate effort, and that
the cost of this effort is rolled into the required investment.
Third, we assume that final payoffs to the entrepreneur and venture-capital investors depend
only on the number of shares bargained for at dates 0 and 1. We do not explicitly model the
more complex, contingent contracts observed in some cases by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003),1 °
and we do not attempt to derive the optimal financial contracts for our model setup. However,
our results in Section 4 suggest that the use of contingent share awards may facilitate truthful
revelation of information by the initial venture capitalist to members of a later-stage financing
syndicate.
Finally, we do not model the search and screening processes that bring the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist together in the first place. The costs and effectiveness of these processes could
affect the terms of financing.11 For example, if an entrepreneur's search for alternative financing
would be cheap and quick, the initial venture capitalist's bargaining power is reduced. Giving
the entrepreneur the option to search for another initial investor would not change the structure
of our model, however. It would simply tighten the entrepreneur's participation constraint at
of course, the venture capitalist will seek an expected rate of return high enough to cover the market risks
of the startup. The payoffs in our model can be interpreted as certainty equivalents.
9 Perhaps the entrepreneur's risk aversion is cancelled out by optimism. See Landier and Thesmar (2003).
10 Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, Table 3) find contingent contracts in 73% of the financing rounds in their
sample. The most common contingent contract depends on the founding entrepreneur staying with the firm, for
example a contract requiring the entrepreneur's shares to vest. Vesting is implicit in our model, because the
entrepreneur gets nothing if the firm is shut down at date 1. Contingent contracts are also triggered by sale of
securities, as in IPOs, or by default on a dividend or redemption payment. But solving the incentive and moral
hazard problems in our model would require contracts contingent on effort or interim performance, which are
non-verifiable in our model. Such contracts are rare in Kaplan and Str"omberg's sample.
"Inderst and Muller (2003) present a model of costly search and screening, with bargaining and endogenous
effort by both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Their model does not consider staged investment and
financing.
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date 0 and thereby reduce the intial venture capitalist's bargaining power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our model and solves the
first-best case. Section 3 covers monopoly financing with and without staging. Section 4 covers
the syndication and fully competitive cases. Numerical results are summarized and interpreted
in Section 5. Section 6 briefly considers debt financing. Section 7 sums up our conclusions and
notes questions remaining open for further research.
1.2 Model Setup and the First-Best Case
The entrepreneur possesses a startup investment opportunity that requires investments Io and
I1 at dates 0 and 1. If both investments are made, the startup continues to date 2 and the final
value of the firm is realized.
If the investment at date 1 is not made, or if the entrepreneur refuses to participate, the
startup is shut down and liquidated. We assume for simplicity that liquidation value is zero. (It
is typically small for high-tech startups.) This assumption simplifies our analysis of financing,
because the venture capitalist's preferred shares have value only if converted. Thus, we can
treat these shares as if they were common in the first place.
The total payoff at date 2 is P, which is stochastic and depends on the entrepreneur's effort
at time 0 and time 1, xo and x1, and on V2, the potential value of the firm at date 2. Effort
affects the payoff multiplicatively through the effort functions fo(xo) and fi(xl):
P = fofiV 2 (1.1)
Effort generates positive but decreasing returns, that is, f(0) = 0, f > 0 and f" < 0. The
entrepreneur bears the costs of her effort, go(xo) and gl(Xl). The effort cost function is strictly
increasing and convex, that is, g(0) > 0, g' > 0 and g" > 0.
The potential value V2 is the sole source of uncertainty. We define the expected value E1 (V2)
at date 1 as VI and expected value Eo(V2) at date 0 as Vo. The expected payoffs at dates 0 and
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1, assuming that the firm will survive until date 2, are:
E1(P) = El(foflV 2 ) fofE(V 2) = fof1V1 (1.2)
Eo(P) = Eo(Ei(P)) = foEo(fiVllVo)
where Eo(fiVlVo) is an integral that accounts for the dependence of fl on V1. We assume
risk-neutrality and a risk-free interest rate of zero. We use lognormal probability distributions
for V1 and V2, with standard deviation a per period.
Define the effort function f and the effort cost function g as
ft = I - e-ofxt
gAt = 1-~e-~ 0 •ft ~(1.3)
gt = eOxt
for t = 0,1. The effort function f asymptotes to 1, so we interpret V1 and V2 as maximum
attainable values as x -* oc. The degree of concavity and convexity of f and g depends on Of
and 0g. The effort functions are plotted in Figure 1 for several values of Of and 09.
The entrepreneur (M) goes to the initial venture capitalist (C) to raise startup financing.
If he is willing to invest, then she and he negotiate the initial ownership shares a4M and aoc. At
date 1, V1 is observed and there is another round of bargaining over the terms of financing. If the
initial venture capitalist also supplies all financing at date 1, then he can dictate the terms and
his share becomes aC , with a corresponding adjustment in alM. If the initial venture capitalist
brings in a syndicate of new investors at date 1, then the syndicate receives an ownership share
of a s, and a' and ac adjust accordingly. The terms of financing are fixed after date 1.
1.2.1 First-best
In the first-best case, the entrepreneur supplies all of the money, Io + I, and owns the firm
(a M = a M = 1). The entrepreneur maximizes NPV net of her costs of effort. If she decides to
invest, she expends the optimal efforts x and x1. The timeline is:
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t=O t=l t=2
V0 known V1 realized V2 realized
Io, x if NPVoM > 0 1,, x1 if NPV1M > 0 P = fofV 2
The entrepreneur has a compound real call option. The exercise price at date 1 is endoge-
rous, however, because it includes the cost of effort, and effort depends on the realized potential
value foV1. Since we use the lognormal, our solutions will resemble the Black-Scholes formula,
with extra terms capturing the cost of effort.
We now derive the first-best investment strategy, solving backwards. Details of this and
subsequent derivations are in the Appendix. By date 1, the entrepreneur's date-0 effort and
investment are sunk. Her date-1 NPV is
NPV1M = max[O, max(fofi(xl)Vl - gl(xl) - I1)]
x1
The first-order condition for effort is foV1 = , which determines optimal effort x and the
benefit and cost of effort, f(x) and g1(x*).
Define the strike value V1 such that NPV l I (Vi) = 0. The entrepreneur exercises her option
to invest at date 1 when V1 > V1 and NPV1 M > 0. This strike value is similar to the strike
price of a traded option, except that the strike value has to cover the cost of the entrepreneur's
effort gl(x) as well as the investment I1.
At date 0, the entrepreneur anticipates her choice of effort and continuation decision at date
1. She determines the effort level x0 that maximizes NPVo, the difference between the expected
NPV at date I and the immediate investment Io and cost of effort xo.
NPVoM = max[O, max(Eo(NPV M (xo)) - go(xo) - o)]
xo
Eo(NPViAI(xo)) depends on xo in two ways. First, increasing effort at date 0 increases fo, and
thus increases the value of the startup when it is in the money at date 1. Second, increasing
effort at date 0 decreases the strike value V1 for investment at date 1 and makes it more likely
that the startup will continue.
23
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 2. The top payoff line is the date-1 NPV for a call
option with no cost of effort. In this case the value would be V1 and the strike price I1. The
lower payoff line shows the net NPV when the entrepreneur exerts less than the maximum effort
at date 0 (fo < 1). NPV1 is close to linear in V1, but the slope and the level of NPV 1 are
reduced by the cost of effort. We have added a lognormal distribution to show the probability
weights assigned to these NPVs. The two horizontal lines are the date-0 financial investment
Io and the full cost Io + go of investment and effort.
We calculate Eo(NPV 1) by integrating from Vl(xo). Since NPVM(o,V 1(xo)) = 0, the
entrepreneur's first-order condition reduces to
Eo(NPVM(xo)) = go(xo).
From (??) we obtain
Eo(NPVl M(x,>> =))' A; L-f| 1+ r 11, + 09X ) so znOr  +EoV(NiPx 0f(V)VdV - Or fo r JI (V)V1- Or dVI(V) V 1 + Or 1r f
V1 (o) V (o)
where fI(V) is the lognormal density and Or = Of/0g.
We solve for xo analytically, using properties of the lognormal distribution. Then we
evaluate NPVoM(x*) = Eo(NPVM(x)) - - Io. When NPVoM(x*) > 0, the entrepreneur
invests and the firm is up and running.
Table 1 includes examples of first-best numerical results. Start with the first two lines of
Panel A, which report Black-Scholes and first-best results when potential value is Vo = Eo(V2) =
150 and required investments are Io, I1 = 50, 50. The standard deviation is a = 0.4 per period.
The effort parameters are Of = 1.8 and 09 = 0.6, so the value added by effort is high relative
to the cost. Thus the option to invest in the startup should be well in the money, even after
the costs of effort are deducted.
If the costs of effort were zero, first-best NPV could be calculated from the Black-Scholes
formula, with a date-1 strike price of V = 50. But when the cost of effort is introduced, V
increases and NPV declines. First-best NPV is 37.90, less than the Black-Scholes NPV by
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12.13. The difference reflects the cost of effort and the increase in strike value to V = 55.35.12
Panel B repeats the example with higher standard deviation of r = 0.8. Panels C and D
assume lower investment at date 0 and higher investment at date 1 (Io, I = 10, 90). NPV
increases for higher standard deviations and when more investment can be deferred. The first-
best initial effort decreases in these cases, though not dramatically. Panels E and F assume
Of = 0.6, so that effort is less effective, and also back-loaded investment (again, Io, I = 10,
90).13 First-best effort actually increases, compared to panels C and D, but NPV declines
dramatically.
Figure 3 plots first-best NPV for a wide range of standard deviations and effort parameters.
It turns out that only 0r = f/ 0 g, the ratio of the effort parameters, matters, so that ratio is
used on the bottom-left axis. The ratio is 0r = 3 in Panels A to D of Table 1 and Or = 1.0 in
Panels E and F. In Figure 3, Or is varied from 1/11 to 11. The startup becomes worthwhile,
with first-best NPV > 0, for Or slightly below 1.0. NPV increases rapidly for higher values
of Or, then flattens out. NPV also increases with standard deviation, especially when most
investment can be deferred to date 1.
1.3 Monopoly financing and staged investment
Now we explore the monopoly case in which the entrepreneur approaches the venture capitalist
for financing and the initial venture capitalist can dictate terms of financing at both date 0 and
date 1, subject to the entrepreneur's participation constraints. The venture capitalist will not
exploit all his bargaining power, however, because of the feedback to the entrepreneur's effort.
I[n some cases, the venture capitalist is better off if he gives up all his bargaining power and gives
the entrepreneur all the financing upfront. We do not argue that the monopoly case is realistic,
but it is a useful benchmark, and we believe that venture capitalists do have bargaining power,
especially in early-stage financing, and receive at least some (quasi) rents.
12 The effort parameters in panel A of Table 1 are f = 1.8 and 0 g = 0.6. Date 0 effort is xo = 2.4, so fo = 0.99
and go = 4.59. Of course the date 0 effort is sunk by date 1. From (??), fl = 0.978 and g = 3.58. The
breakeven value level V = 55.35 is determined by 0.99 x 0.978 x 55.35 - 3.58 = I1 = 50.
13We do not include panels for equal investment (Io, I1 = 50, 50) and Of = 0.6, because NPVs are negative
in all cases where outside venture-capital financing is required. A startup with these parameters could not be
financed.
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By "terms of financing" we mean the fraction of common shares held by the entrepreneur
:nd venture capitalist at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur's fractional share at dates 1 and 2 is
M, the complement of c. The entrepreneur's share at date 0 is irrelevant in the monopoly
ease, because a monopolist venture capitalist can force the terms of financing at date 1 and is
free to dilute shares awarded earlier. We do assume that the entrepreneur has clear property
rights to her shares at date 2 and that these shares cannot be taken away or diluted between
dates 1 and 2. The division of the final payoff P is enforcable once date-1 financing is completed.
1.3.1 Effort and investment at date 1.
Both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist now have the option to participate at date 1.
There are two derivative claims on one underlying asset. Both must be exercised in order for
the project to proceed.
At date 1 the entrepreneur decides whether to exercise her option to continue, based on
her strike price, the cost of optimal effort gi (x*). But first the venture capitalist sets ac and
acM = 1 - t C and decides whether to put up the financial investment I1. We can focus on
the venture capitalist's decision if we incorporate the entrepreneur's response into the venture
capitalist's optimization problem.
The equation for the entrepreneur's NPV is similar to Eq. (??), except that the second-
period investment I1 drops out and firm value is multiplied by the entrepreneur's share aM.
NPVM (a ) = max[O, max(aMfofl (xl)Vl - gl (xl))] (1.4)
X1
The maximum share the venture capitalist can take is obtained by setting NPV 1M(c C ) =
0. This defines a(max) and aM(min). When acM(min) > aM , the entrepreneur will not
participate. 1 4 The venture capitalist chooses c* to maximize his date-1 NPV, subject to his
and the entrepreneur's participation constraints.
NPVC1 = max [. max (aCfofi(x*)v-I)] (1.5)
14When fo is small or V1 is low, a(min) may be greater than 1, so that continuation is impossible even if
the entrepreneur is given 100% ownership.
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If the entrepreneur's participation constraint is binding, the venture capitalist assigns a c (max).
Otherwise, he assigns an interior value. But in most of our experiments, VC1 , the venture cap-
italist's strike value for the monopoly case, falls in the region ac E [0, ac(max)] where the
entrepreneur's NPV is positive. In these cases the venture capitalist is better off by taking a
share ac < alC(max) in order to give the entrepreneur stronger incentives. Nevertheless, those
incentives are weaker than first-best, because aM*(xo) < 1, which decreases the expected payoff
by reducing xl.
Figure 4 plots values of aC as a function of V1 when Io, I1 = 50, 50; a = 0.4; Of = 1.8, and
09 = 0.6, the same parameters used in Panel A of Table 1. The optimal share aC * is less than
the maximum share alC(max) = 1 -l M(min) for all V1 > VC, the venture capitalist's strike
value at date 1. Thus the maximum share that the venture capitalist could extract is irrelevant.
But notice that the venture capitalist's optimum share increases as the project becomes more
valuable, with a corresponding decline in the entrepreneur's share. This implication of the
monopoly case is contrary to the evidence in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), who find that
entrepreneurs gain an increasing fraction of payoffs as and if the firm succeeds. This suggests
that in practice later-stage venture-capital financing is not provided on monopolistic terms.
Assuming the C(max) constraint does not bind, we compute VC by looking for the pair
V1, clC*(V1 ) that sets NPV1 c equal to zero. Investment occurs if V1 > V1.
1.3.2 Effort and exercise at date 0.
In the first-best case, the entrepreneur anticipates x* and I in her choice of x0. In the
monopoly case, the entrepreneur anticipates the venture capitalist's decisions at date 1. She
then evaluates whether NPVoC(x*) > 0. As in the first-best case, higher effort at t = 0 lowers
the threshold for investment at t = 1 (makes it more likely that both the entrepreneur's and
venture capitalist's options are in the money) and increases the value of the project when the
option is in the money.
The entrepreneur's date 0 value is
NPVoM = max[O, max(Eo(NPVM (xo)) - go(xo))] (1.6)
Xo
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with the first-order condition
Eo(NPV1M (x*))' = I(V 1)NPV M (fo, V1)V1 + g'(x*) (1.7)
Here there are no closed-form expressions. We solve the first-order condition and determine
x0 numerically. Given x0, and assuming that the entrepreneur wants to go ahead (NPVo M(x) >
0), the venture capitalist invests if:
NPVoC = max[O, Eo(NPVC (X)) - o] > 0 (1.8)
Thus two options must be exercised at date 0 in order to launch the startup. The entrepre-
neur picks x to maximize the value of her option to continue at date 1, and then determines
whether this value exceeds her current strike price, the immediate cost of effort g*. The venture
capitalist values his option to invest I at date 1, taking the entrepreneur's immediate and
future effort into account, and then decides whether to invest I.
Monopoly financing can be extremely inefficient. The venture capitalist's ability to claim
a large ownership fraction at date 1 reduces the entrepreneur's effort at date 0 as well as date
-C
1, reducing value and increasing the venture capitalist's breakeven point V1 . For example,
compare the monopoly and first-best results in Panel A of Table 1. The entrepreneur's initial
--C
effort falls by about 50 percent from the first-best level and the date-1 strike value V1 increases
by almost 30 percent. The entrepreneur's NPV drops by more than 90 percent. Overall NPV
drops by more than half. Similar value losses occur in panels B to F. In Panel E, a startup with
first-best NPV of 10.98 cannot be financed in the monopoly case. NPV would be negative for
both the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist.
1.3.3 Monopoly financing without staged investment
The incentive problems of the monopoly case can sometimes overwhelm the option-like advan-
tages of staged financing. All may be better off if the entire investment Io+ I1 is given to the
entrepreneur upfront and she is granted full control thereafter.
In the monopoly, no-staging case, the entrepreneur and venture capitalist bargain only once
at date 0 to determine their ownership shares aM and aC, which are then fixed for dates I and
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2. The entrepreneur calculates her NPV at date 1 just as in the monopoly case with staging,
but her share of the firm a~M is predetermined. Also, she ignores the financial investment II
and continues at date 1 so long as her NPV exceeds her cost of effort, gl(x*). 1 5 The venture
capitalist retains monopoly power over financing at date 0, but loses all his bargaining power
at date 1. He sets aC to maximize his NPV at date 0, taking account of the effects on the
entrepreneur's effort at dates 0 and 1. His maximization problem is identical in appearence
to Eq. (1.8) but the values of xo, xl and ac = aoC are different. The entrepreneur's date-0
maximization problem closely resembles Eq. (1.6) except for the choices of xil and oc = a C.
If both parties' participation constraints are met at date 0 (NPVoC > 0 and NPVoM > 0), the
startup is launched.
The value loss from the holdup problem in the monopoly, staged financing case can be so
severe that it can actually exceed the cost of inefficient continuation in the no-staging case. For
example, note the improvement in the no-staging case in Panel A of Table 1. The NPV to the
entrepreneur more than doubles, compared to the monopoly case with staged investment, and
overall NPV increases from 16.47 to 26.89.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the monopoly NPVs with and without staging. Figure 5 assumes
equal investment in both periods (I, I1 = 50, 50). Here NPV is higher without staging, except
at extremely high standard deviations. Figure 6 assumes back-loaded investment (I0o, I1 = 10,
90), which adds to option value and the value of staging. In Figure 6, a monopolist venture
capitalist would give up staging and provide 100% upfront financing only at relatively low
standard deviations.
1.4 Syndication
The value losses in the monopoly case would be reduced if the entrepreneur could promise
higher effort at date 1, or if the venture capitalist could promise to take a lower ownership
fraction a. Neither promise is credible, however, since effort and potential value are non-
contractible. But suppose that the venture capitalist can commit (explicitly or implicitly) to
bring in a syndicate of new investors to join him in the date-1 financing. Suppose further that
15We do assume that the entrepreneur cannot launch the firm at date 0 and then run off with the date-1 invest-
ment I1. Venture-capital investors typically hold convertible preferred shares and have priority in liquidation.
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the incumbent venture capitalist does not collude with syndicate members and allows them to
dictate the terms of financing. We will show that these commitments are in the initial venture
capitalist's interest. Syndication alleviates the holdup problem and generates extra effort and
value.
Syndication of later stage financing is common in practice. The initial venture capitalist
approaches a group of other venture-capital investors that he has worked with in the past,
or hopes to work with in the future, and offers participation in the financing. We interpret
syndication as a mechanism that introduces competition into date-1 financing and restrains the
initial venture capitalist's temptation to hold up the entrepreneur. We do not know what NPV
syndicates obtain in practice, but it is natural to explore NPV = 0 as a limiting case. (If the
syndicate gets positive NPV, but still less than a monopolist venture capitalist could extract,
there are still value gains relative to the monopoly case.) We start with the full-information
case, where the investors who compete to join the syndicate have the same information as the
incumbent venture capitalist. 16
The results for syndicate financing differ from the monopoly case in at least two ways. First,
the terms of financing shift in the entrepreneur's favor. The new syndicate investors are forward-
looking. They do not care about the value of the existing shares held by the incumbent venture
capitalist and have no incentive to hold up the entrepreneur. The incumbent has no control
over the terms of financing at date 1, so his ultimate ownership and payoff are determined by
his initial share oC and the performance of the startup. The syndicate accepts NPVS = 0
and does not trade off extra NPV against reduced effort from the entrepreneur. Thus the
syndicate's ownership share as will generate lower NPVS than the NPV-maximizing share
1cI* that a monopolist incumbent would set. The entrepreneur suffers less dilution, exerts more
effort, and total value increases. This outcome benefits the initial venture capitalist at date 0.
By delegating the terms of date-1 financing, he solves the incomplete contracting problem that
causes the holdup problem in the monopoly case with staged financing.
Second, under zero-NPV date-1 financing, the initial venture capitalist effectively owns a
call option with a zero exercise price and will always want the investment to proceed at date 1
'
6We doubt that potential syndicate investors really have full information. If they did, then the entrepreneur
could negotiate with these investors directly and possibly hold up the incumbent venture capitalist. This scenario
seems implausible and we do not explore it in this paper.
30
if the project can generate enough value to cover the syndicate's investment. With full infor-
mation, it does not matter whether the initial venture capitalist participates in the syndicate,
because the syndicate's investment is zero-NPV. Of course the initial venture capitalist's par-
ticipation matters if the syndication terms are not fully competitive. The higher the NPV for
the syndicate, the closer is the syndicate case to the monopoly case.
1.4.1 Effort and investment at date 1
For a given share caM, the entrepreneur's NPV and maximization problem at date 1 are the
same as in the monopoly case. We obtain x, fl*, g, and NPVM(a s ) exactly as in Eq. (1.4),
but with aM = M(1 - ). The share given to the outside syndicate, a1S, is determined by
NPV s = 0, that is, by I1 = asfofi(xl)V1. Investment at date 1 occurs for V1 > V1 . We
solve for V1 by finding the value of a1 that maximizes NPV 1, subject to the constraint that
NPVS = 0 for the syndicate. The solution is generally in the region where NPViM(a S) > 0 at
V1 and a, < aM(min).
Figure 7 plots ownership shares against value at date 1 for the syndicate case when I, I1
50, 50, a = 0.4, Of = 1.8 and 0 = 0.6, the same parameters used in Panel A of Table 1.
The top two lines show the syndicate's maximum and optimal shares if the new investors were
given free rein to maximize their NPV. The maximum share is irrelevant, as in Figure 4. The
syndicate's actual share equals its optimal share at the strike value V1 and then declines as
V1 increases. The shares held by the entrepreneur and incumbent venture capitalist therefore
increase as performance improves, consistent with the evidence in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)
and contrary to the pattern in the monopoly case, as plotted in Figure 4.
One might expect the better financing terms from the syndicate to decrease the strike value
V1 from the monopoly case. But V1 is actually higher in the syndicate case - for example,
V1 is 84.9 in Figure 7 and 70.8 in Figure 4. This increase can be traced to the initial venture
capitalist's fixed original ownership share in the syndicate-financing case. When the original
venture capitalist provides both rounds of financing, he picks the share at date 1 that is best for
him at date 1. He may reduce his share to strengthen the entrepreneur's incentives. Unlike the
monopolist, the syndicate cannot reset the venture capitalist's original share c and is there
therefore faced with a free-riding incumbent. Thus the syndicate has a smaller value pie to
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carve up, and a higher threshold for investment.
Thus the commitment to syndicate later-stage financing has two countervailing effects. The
syndicate may require a higher threshold for investment, so that marginal projects will be
rejected more often. On the other hand, syndication provides better incentives for the entre-
preneur, so that low values of foV1 are less likely. Our numerical analysis will show that the
second effect outweighs the first and that shifting from monopoly to syndication always adds
value.
1.4.2 Renegotiation at date 1
Of course a low realization of V1 could trigger a renegotiation between the incumbent and the
entrepreneur to reset of the incumbent's initial share a c before syndicate financing is sought.
The incumbent can transfer ownership to the entrepreneur, retaining aC(R) < aCC *, where
oC(R) denotes the incumbent's renegotiated equity stake. The incumbent may be better off
accepting a reduced ownership share to improve the chance of success for low values of V1 or
-S
to increase continuation for V1 < V1. By accepting a lower ownership share, the incumbent
improves effort incentives for the entrepreneur to the point where enough extra value is added
to support syndicate financing at NPV = 0. Of course the incumbent will give up as little as
possible. In the worst renegotiation case, where V1 approaches a lower bound, the value of the
incumbent's shares approaches zero, just as in the monopoly case.
Renegotiation requires dilution of the incumbent venture capitalist's ownership share. Dilu-
tion could happen in several ways. For example, the incumbent could provide bridge financing
on terms favorable to the entrepreneur. Dilution could also occur in a "down round" - a round
of financing where new investors buy in at a price per share lower than in previous rounds.
But our model says that a down round should dilute the entrepreneur less than the incumbent
venture capitalist. The entrepreneur could be given additional shares or options, for example.
While renegotiation adds value ex post by improving effort and preserving access to financ-
ing, the flexibility to reset shares at date 1 could introduce new problems. Suppose the initial
venture capitalist sets a c at a very high level, knowing that he can renegotiate down to the
monopoly level at date 1, even when the realized value V1 exceeds the syndicate strike value
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V.17 The entrepreneur would then cut back effort at dates 0 and 1 and reduce the value of the
firm. This strategy amounts to a return to monopoly financing. It would reduce date-0 value
to the venture capitalist as well as the entrepreneur.
Thus two conditions must hold in order for syndicate financing to work as we have described
it. First, the initial venture capitalist has to commit at date 0 to syndicate at date 1. In practice
this is not an explicit, formal commitment, but syndication is standard operating procedure.
As part of the commitment, the initial venture capitalist has to limit his initial ownership share
ac to its level in the syndicate case, so that he cannot start with a higher value and bargain
down to the monopoly share a c * at date 1. The commitment is in the venture capitalist's
-interest, because it increases his ex ante value relative to the monopoly case. Second, the terms
of financing in later rounds should be reasonably competitive. In practice they may not be
perfectly competitive, but we believe the terms are materially better for the entrepreneur than
the monopoly terms would be.
It turns out that opportunities for renegotiation are rare in our numerical experiments for
the syndicate case. Therefore, incorporating the benefits of renegotiation would add relatively
little to NPV at date 0. For example, including renegotiation gains would increase the NPVs
reported in Table I by about 2% of the required total investment of Io + I = 100.18
.1.4.3 Effort and exercise at date 0
At date 0, the venture capitalist sets a c and the entrepreneur decides how much effort to exert.
Given ac , the entrepreneur chooses x0 to maximize:
NPVoM (aC) = max[O, max(Eo(NPV 1M (xo(ao), o) - go(xo(a0c)))] (1.9)
x0
17The entrepreneur could retain the upside if she could bypass the incumbent venture capitalist and go directly
to the syndicate for financing. In practice the incumbent could block this end run by refusing to participate in
the syndicate. The syndicate would assume that the incumbent has inside information, and would interpret the
refusal to participate as bad news sufficient to deter their investment.
18We approximate renegotiation gains (holding aC * and xo constant) by solving for (1) the value realization
at which the venture capitalist will start to reduce his share; (2) the new strike value and (3) the integral of NPV
changes over this range. Only a small portion of the renegotiation gains come from more efficient continuation
decisions (V1 (R) < V1 < V). Most of the gains can be attributed to better effort incentives (higher zl) in the
region where the project continues regardless (V > V1). These gains further increase the value advantages of
syndicate financing over monopoly financing.
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The entrepreneur anticipates the syndicate's share aS as a function of date-1 value V1. For a
given a c , date-1 syndicate financing will result in less dilution of her share than in the monopoly
case, so she provides higher effort at t = 0 as well as at t = 1. We cannot express NPV or effort
in closed form, so we compute them numerically.
The venture capitalist anticipates the entrepreneur's reaction when he sets a C. He must
restrict his search to a c (0, caC(max)], where a(max) is determined by
Eo(NPVM (x(oC(max)), ao(max)) - go(x((max)))) = 0 (1.10)
This constraint rarely binds, since at the margin there is almost always value added by leaving
positive value to the entrepreneur. Thus a* is determined by
aC* = arg max (Eo(NPV1C(xo(),o))- o) (1.11)
ac E (O,aC(max)]
If NPV C > O, investment proceeds.
Typical results for syndicate financing are shown in Table 1. Effort and value increase
S
across the board, despite increases in the strike value V 1 from the monopoly case. We find that
syndicate financing dominates monopoly financing with or without staged financing. Syndicate
financing is better ex ante for the initial venture capitalist and also increases overall NPV. This
is true for all parameter values, including values outside the range reported in Table 1. Yet
there are still value losses relative to the first best.
1.4.4 The fully competitive case
Of course first best is never attainable when the entrepreneur has to seek outside financing.
Table 1 shows an alternative benchmark, the fully competitive case, in which all venture capital
investors, including the initial investor at date 1, receive NPV = 0. Fully competitive financing
gives an upper bound on the overall NPV when the entrepreneur has no money and has to share
her marginal value added with outside investors. Solution procedures for the fully competitive
case are identical to the syndication case, except that 4c is set so that NPVoC = 0.
Figure 8 shows date-1 ownership shares for the fully competitive case in the same format as
the syndication case in Figure 7. Two things stand out. First, the entrepreneur's share is higher
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and the initial venture capitalist's lower than in Figure 7, because competitive financing at
date 0 gives relatively more shares to the entrepreneur. Both shares of course increase with the
realized value V1. Second, the strike value V1 is lower in the competitive case, primarily because
the entrepreneur's initial effort is higher. Note also that the fully competitive NPVs, which go
entirely to the entrepreneur, are less than in the first-best case, because the entrepreneur's effort
is lower. There is always some value loss when the entrepreneur has to share the marginal value
added by her effort with outside investors.
1.4.5 Syndication with asymmetric information
So far we have assumed that the incoming syndicate investors and the incumbent venture cap-
italist are equally informed. Now we consider asymmetric information between the incumbent
and new investors.
Both the incumbent and entrepreneur want the syndicate to perceive a high value V1. The
more optimistic the syndicate, the higher the ownership shares retained by the incumbent and
entrepreneur. Reducing the syndicate's share also increases the entrepreneur's effort. Therefore,
mere announcements of "great progress" or "high value" coming from the entrepreneur or
incumbent are not credible.
Credibility may come from the incumbent's fractional participation in date-1 financing.
Suppose the incumbent invests /3I1 and the outside syndicate the rest. What participation
fraction is consistent with truthful revelation of V1? If we could hold the entrepreneur's effort
constant, we could rely on Admati and Pfleiderer's (1994) proof that should be fixed at the
incumbent investor's ownership share at date 0, that is, at ao. This fixed-fraction rule would
remove any incentive for the incumbent to over-report V1. (The more he over-reports, the more
he has to overpay for his new shares. When P/ = cC , the amount overpaid cancels out any
gain in the value of his existing shares).19 The fixed-fraction rule would also insure optimal
investment, since the incumbent's share of date-1 investment exactly equals his share of the
final payoff V2. Admati and Pfleiderer also show that no other financing rule or procedure works
in their setting.
19 The fixed-fraction rule would also remove any incentive to underreport. The more the incumbent underre-
ports, the more he gains on the new shares. But the amount of profit made on the new shares is exactly offset
by losses incurred on existing shares.
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Fixed-fraction financing does not induce truthful information revelation in our model, al-
though a modified fixed-fraction financing works in some cases. The problem is the effect of the
terms of date-1 financing on the entrepreneur's effort. Suppose the incumbent investor takes a
fraction 3 = a c of date-1 financing and then reports a value V1 that is higher than the true
value V1. If the report is credible, the new shares are over-priced. The incumbent does not gain
or lose from the mispricing, because: = {C, but the entrepreneur gains on his old shares at
the syndicate's expense. Since the entrepreneur's ownership share is higher than it would be
under a truthful report, she exerts more effort, firm value increases, and both the entrepreneur
and incumbent are better off. Therefore the incumbent will over-report.
A modified fixed-fraction rule can work, however, provided that / is set above ac and effort
is not too sensitive to changes in the entrepreneur's NPV at date 1. The required difference
between and aoc depends on the responsiveness of the entrepreneur's effort to her ownership
share. In many cases, a constant set a few percentage points above ac removes the incentive
to overreport over a wide range of V1 realizations. But this rule may break down as a general
revelation mechanism in at least three ways.
First, when V1 is very low but exceeds V1, we find situations where the required / exceeds 1.
This would make sense only if the new syndicate investors could short the company, so we must
constrain < 1. This outcome is common in our numerical results, because the incumbent's
initial share ac is frequently above 0.85 or 0.90, and in some of these cases the entrepreneur's
effort is very sensitive to the value of her stake in the firm. There is not much room for to
increase between these starting points and a maximum level strictly less than 1. When/3 hits
the maximum, the modified fixed fraction rule fails to induce truthful revelation.20
Second, the modified fixed fraction rule also fails when V1 falls just below V1. In this
case the incumbent's incentive to over-report becomes very strong, and only extremely high
/s can discipline the incumbent to tell the truth. This problem flows from the discontinuity
of the entrepreneur's effort at the strike value V1. Here the limit of /3 as V1 approaches V1
from below is infinity and no fixed-fraction rule works. This problem can be solved, however, if
the incumbent and the entrepreneur renegotiate their ownership shares when V1 falls between
2 0This failure is less frequent if the entrepreneur has some personal wealth and can co-invest with the venture
capitalist at date 0. The coinvestment reduces the venture capitalist's ownership share and provides more room
for : to increase to a maximum level strictly less than 1.
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the monopoly and syndicate strike values VCand V1. If the incumbent venture capitalist
renegotiates, the lower strike value removes the discontinuity of effort. As the incumbent's
share declines, it is easier to find a 3 < 1 that works. The required 3 approaches 1.0 as V
-C
approaches V1 and the incumbent's share approaches zero.
The third problem arises at high levels of VI. Setting , > aC gives the incumbent venture
capitalist an incentive to under-report V1. The incumbent would gain more from underpricing
the new shares and buying them cheaply than he would lose from dilution of his existing stake.
Revelation works only if this incentive is offset by the impact on the entrepreneur's effort. But
as V1 and l1 increase, effort becomes higher and less sensitive to the terms of financing. As
effort tops out, the incentive to under-report takes over. This could be prevented locally by
allowing 3 to decrease with V1, returning to 3 = a 0o at very high values. But then the almost-
fixed fraction rule fails to induce truthful information revelation, because each participation
fraction would signal two values.
One possible solution, not fully explored here, is to introduce more complex contracts that
allow signalling along two dimensions. For example, the incentive for the incumbent venture
capitalist to under-report at high levels of V could be offset by an incentive contract that grants
the entrepreneur extra shares if the incumbent reports very high project value. With this addi-
tional provision in place, it should be possible to allow : to decrease with 1, reaching: = / c
at high values of V1. This could be one justification for contingent share awards to the entre-
preneurs, as observed in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003). Alternatively, the entrepreneur could
be granted a series of stock options with increasing exercise prices, so that the entrepreneur's
final ownership share increases at high values of V2.
When the modified fixed fraction rule fails, the syndicate investors face the asymmetric
information problem analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984). In the special case of their model
that is closest to our problem here, the firm has no assets in place (no value in liquidation),
so it goes ahead with financing on terms fixed by the new investors' knowledge of the average
value of V1. Syndicate investors would have to infer the average V1 from conditions at date 0,
the entrepreneur's effort functions and the entrepreneur's and incumbent's decision rules, given
the anticipated terms of date-1 financing. But the investors do not know the true value V, so
their new financing is overpriced when V1 is low and underpriced when V is high. This leads to
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more effort when V1 is low and less when it is high, compared to the full-revelation case. But
again there are problems. For example, if V1 is high, the incumbent will be better off cancelling
syndicate financing and providing the date-1 money directly. But if this is allowed, then the
incumbent will have an incentive to claim a high value V1 in order to reclaim monopoly power
over the terms of financing. In addition, if the syndicate investors know less than the incumbent
ad the incumbent is free to finance the investment from his own pocket, then the incumbent
will only raise syndicate financing if the syndicate is paying too much. Therefore a rational
syndicate will not invest.21
Even if the revelation mechanism fails, there may be other ways to convey V1. The value of
the incumbent investor's reputation could generate truthful reports in a repeated game setting,
for example. The syndicate usually includes other venture capitalists that the incumbent has
worked with in the past and expects to work with in the future.
1.5 Summary of Numerical Results
Table 1 illustrates our main results. It shows surprisingly large value losses in most cases,
relative to first-best. (For now ignore the debt-financing entries.) Value losses are greatest in
the monopoly case where the initial venture capitalist provides all financing and dictates the
terms of financing at date 1 as well as date 0. This does not imply that the venture capitalist
extracts all value, leaving the entrepreneur with zero NPV. The venture capitalist wants to
preserve the entrepreneur's incentives to some extent. Nevertheless, the financing terms that
maximize value for the venture capitalist usually leave the entrepreneur with small minority
slice of a diminished pie.
The problem with staged financing is that a monopolistic venture capitalist cannot commit
not to hold up the entrepreneur ex post. Thus NPV can be higher and the initial venture
capitalist better off if staged financing is abandoned and all financing is committed at date 0.
Complete upfront financing is superior for all effort parameters (all values of Or = Of/0g) when
option value is relatively low, as it is for most of the range of standard deviations in Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows that when the option value is high, staged financing is more efficient, despite
21 This is a variation of Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking-order proofs.
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the monopoly holdup problem.
Syndication of date-i financing always makes both the entrepreneur and the initial venture
capitalist better off as long as the the syndicate's financing terms are reasonably competitive.
This key result of our paper is evident in Table 1 and also holds generally. We believe that
our syndicate case, in which the initial venture capitalist can set financing terms at date 0
but not date 1, is a good match to actual venture capital contracting. Of course we observe
syndication in practice, but that observation does not settle whether the terms of syndicate
financing are competitive (NPV = 0) or monopolistic. Our analysis indicates that syndication
terms are reasonably competitive. With monopoly financing terms at date 1, we find that the
entrepreneur's final ownership share is a decreasing function of firm value. With competitive
terms, as in our syndication case, the entrepreneur's share is an increasing function of value,
consistent with practice (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)).
The syndicate case is still inefficient, because it gives the initial venture capitalist the bar-
gaining power to set financing terms at date 0. We believe that venture capitalists do have
bargaining power and receive at least some (quasi) rents in early financing rounds. They have
bargaining power because of experience and expertise, because of the fixed costs of setting
up a venture capital partnership and because of the cost and delay that the entrepreneur
would absorb in looking for another venture-capital investor. But there are obviously efficiency
improvements if and as the terms of date-0 financing become more competitive. The fully com-
petitive case shows the limit where the initial venture capitalist has no special bargaining power
and just gets NPV = 0. Even the fully competitive case falls short of first best, however. The
entrepreneur's effort falls whenever outside financing has to be raised, because the entrepreneur
bears the full cost of effort, but has to share the marginal value added by effort with the outside
investors.
Figure 9 summarizes value losses for the monopoly, no-staging, syndication and fully com-
petitive cases over a wide range of the effort parameter 0 r. Value loss is defined as the difference
between NPV at date 0 and first-best NPV. The four panels correspond to panels A to D in
Figure 1, except for the variation in Or. Figure 10 repeats Figure 9 for a more profitable startup
with Vo = 200.
The value losses plotted in Figure 9 increase rapidly with 0r when 0r is below 1.0, but
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the losses are always less in the syndication case than in the monopoly cases. The losses in
the syndicate case still appear economically significant, however. The only situations in which
losses do not appear significant occur in the fully competitive case when 0r is above 2.0. High
values for 0 r mean that effort generates value at relatively little cost, so that the entrepreneur
is willing to expend close to first-best effort in the fully competitive case, even though the
marginal benefit of effort is shared with outside investors.
Value losses in the monopoly, no staging case increase as standard deviation is increased from
a = 0.4 to 0.8. This is as expected, since staged financing is more valuable as volatility increases.
But value losses may also increase with standard deviation in the monopoly and syndication
cases, at least for the region where Or is about 1.0 and higher. We found this surprising. Our
original intuition was that increased uncertainty would enhance the optionality of investment
and mitigate incentive problems. Instead it can make these problems worse, because more
uncertainty can lead to lower initial effort.22 Compare the bottom-left and bottom-right panels
in Figure 9, for example. The effects of volatility on effort and value can also be seen in panels
E and F of Table 1. In the syndicate case, the value loss in panel E, with a = 0.4, is 10.98 -
1.55 = 9.43. In panel F, with a = 0.8, value loss is 27.72 - 17.5 = 10.22. Initial effort falls from
x0o = 3.05 in panel E to x0o = 2.8 in panel F.
The value-loss patterns in Figure 9 are repeated in Figure 10, where Vo = 200 rather than
150. Fi9nancing is feasible in Figure 10 at lower levels of the effort parameter r. Value losses
are lower for the fully competitive case, but actually increase for the monopoly and syndication
cases. This problem can be traced to the initial venture capitalist's bargaining power at date
0. Consider the monopoly case. Since the marginal product of effort is higher when V0 = 200,
the entrepreneur will put in more effort at date 1. This allows the initial venture capitalist to
tighten the screws and extract a greater ownership share, which in turn feeds back to lower
effort by the entrepreneur at date 0.
The effects of other parameters on our results are generally as expected. NPV increases
when the ratio r = Of/09g increases. The strike value V falls with r, increasing the probability
22 When overall NPV is near zero, the entrepreneur's effort xo increases rapidly with a. The more uncertainty,
the greater chance that the entrepreneur's call option will be in the money and the greater the marginal reward
to effort. But as Or increases and NPV rises, effort eventually declines as increases, because the marginal
impact of effort is less. The difference can be traced to the slope of the cumulative lognormal, which is lower at
the mean when is high.
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that the date-1 option to invest is in the money, and when the option is in the money it is worth
more. Overall NPV increases when a increases (generating more uncertainty in V1 and V2) and
when a greater fraction of investment can be deferred to date 1. These effects are natural for
investments in real options.
1.6 Debt financing
So far we have considered only equity financing, following venture-capital practice. Is equity
financing efficient for venture capitalists? We cannot answer this question without deriving
optimal contracts, a task that we do not attempt in this paper. But it is interesting to consider
the alternative of debt financing. We have interpreted syndicate financing as a device to secure
the entrepreneur's effort by protecting her from ex-post holdup. Could a switch to debt financing
achieve the same or better result? In traditional agency models, debt financing calls forth
maximum effort, because the entrepreneur retains the maximum fraction of the value added at
the margin by her effort. Perhaps we have oversimplified venture-capital practice to the extent
that debt dominates equity as a financing contract.
In this section we show that debt is not superior to equity. When effort and investment
are made in stages, debt financing can actually amplify the hold-up problem and reduce the
entrepreneur's initial effort at date 0. We will show that debt financing could increase efficiency
in some cases, however.
Suppose that the startup firm issues debt rather than equity to venture-capital investors.
'The face value of the debt equals the required investment. Of course, this debt faces a high
probability of default, so the promised payoff at date 2, including interest, is well above face
value. (Safe debt is nearly impossible, given the high variance of most startups and most
entrepreneurs' limited funds available for equity investment.) The promised debt payoff (face
value plus interest) sets a strike value for V2 below which the startup defaults and the investors
receive all of the startup's payoff P. Above this point the investors' payoff is capped and the
entrepreneur receives the residual. Thus debt financing converts the entrepreneur's stake to
a call option, and our discussion of debt financing also applies if the entrepreneur receives no
shares but only options. The implicit call options created by debt financing would probably
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be out of the money, however, because the promised payment to the venture capitalists would
have to exceed total investment by enough to cover the risk of failure and default.
Now we revisit the monopoly case, holding all aspects of our model constant, except that
at date 1 the venture capitalist and entrepreneur negotiate a promised debt payoff K 1 instead
of ownership shares aC and a M. (With debt, oM = 1.) The entrepreneur's NPV at date
1 is her expected residual payout at date 2, that is, Eo[max(O, fofV 2 - K1)]. As before,
the entrepreneur chooses effort to maximize NPV1 M, and the venture capitalist chooses K to
maximize NPV1C. The startup continues if NPV1C > I. At date 0, the entrepreneur anticipates
K and chooses initial effort accordingly. We solve numerically for the entrepreneur's effort,
the promised payoff K and the venture capitalist's and entrepreneur's NPVs. If both parties'
participation constraints are met at date 0, the venture is launched.
Table 1 shows examples comparing debt versus equity financing in the monopoly case. It is
immediately clear that debt is no panacea. When monopoly debt financing is feasible, it can
enhance effort and NPV. In Panels B and D of Table 1, for example, initial effort is higher
and NPVs increase in the monopoly (debt) cases. The resulting NPVs in these cases approach
the fully competitive outcome. But in Panels A, C and F startups that could be financed by a
monopolist venture capitalist with equity cannot be financed with debt. This breakdown occurs
because debt makes the holdup problem worse. At date 1, the venture capitalist is able to set
the promised debt payoff so high that the entrepreneur is left with with a very small slice of
value. The entrepreneur's effort at date 1 is increased, given K1, because the entrepreneur holds
an option and receives all value in excess of K*. But the entrepreneur's date-1 NPV is very
small, and her effort at date 0 is drastically reduced. It appears that linear equity contracts
between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist mitigate the hold-up problem at date 1 and
generate more efficient effort at date 0.
In the syndicate financing case, the venture capitalist negotiates an initial debt level K c
at date 0 in exchange for initial funding. At date 1, if V1 is large enough, new, pari passu
debt with face value K s is issued to a syndicate of investors for zero expected return. The
incumbent venture capitalist and syndicate share in debt payouts at date 2 according to their
KC KS
shares of debt ownership K and s. The entrepreneur makes the same decisions as
in the monopolistic case, but faces the combined debt level K c + K s . As before, the syndicate
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provides date-1 financing on competitive terms.
Introducing debt contracts in the syndication case increases the entrepreneur's initial effort,
but also increases V, the threshold for project continuation. Higher effort increases NPV and
Zhigher V reduces it. If the first (second) effect outweighs the second (first), then syndicated
debt yields higher (lower) NPV. In Panels A to D and F of Table 1, overall NPV falls when
financing is syndicated and debt is substituted for equity. Note the high values for V in Panels
A to D and F. Panel E is an exception, where syndicate financing is feasible with debt but not
with equity.
Syndication in the debt financing case reduces the initial venture capitalist's financial flex-
ibility. Since the syndicate does not allow the initial venture capitalist to hold up the entre-
preneur ex post, he sets the face value of his own date-0 debt higher in order to extract as
much upside as possible. This creates a debt overhang, which translates in turn to higher strike
values (higher Vs) and to lower NPV.
According to Table 1, the initial venture capitalist should abandon syndication and switch
the monopoly debt financing if faced with the parameter values in panels B and D. Why
is syndicate debt financing not better than monopoly debt financing? Syndicated debt should
eliminate holdup problem at date 1. One answer is that Table 1 does not include potential gains
from renegotiation at date 1 before syndicate financing is raised. We discussed renegotiation for
the syndicated equity case, but left it out of our calculations. Opportunities for renegotiation
are rare with equity financing, and syndicated equity is more efficient than monopoly equity
even when potential gains from renegotiation are ignored. With syndicated debt, opportunities
for renegotiation are much more common, because of the high strike values created by the initial
venture capitalist's debt holdings, and potential value gains much larger.
Other things equal, including the date-1 strike value V1, financing on competitive rather
than monopolistic terms at date 1 must improve effort and ex ante NPV. But it is not clear
whether renegotiation is a reliable mechanism to reduce the high strike values that we have
calculated for the debt syndication case. Frequent opportunities for renegotiation may also
mean frequent opportunities for the incumbent venture capitalist to reassert his monopoly
power. The incumbent could force renegotiation even when the startup is performing well and
'V1 > V1. The syndicate investors, who are unlikely to be fully informed about V1, have no
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particular reason to object to renegotiation, since their investment is zero-NPV in any case.
These issues, which we leave as a topic for further research, are probably second-order with
equity financing, because opportunities to add value by renegotiation are rare and only occur
at low values of V1, for example in down rounds. These issues may be much more serious with
syndicated debt financing.
The syndication results in Table 1 may shed some light on why venture capitalists choose to
hold equity when later-stage financing is syndicated. In Panels A through D and F, syndicate
financing with equity rather than debt increases both overall NPV and the NPV to the original
venture capitalist. Hence, if the choice of financing can be dictated by the venture capitalist at
time 0, then he would maximize his NPV by offering equity financing to the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur does better with debt, but cannot bribe the venture capitalist to change to debt.
Even if the entrepreneur had independent wealth to finance a bribe, no deal could be struck,
because the change from equity to debt would decrease overall value. Panel E is the exception
where a switch from equity to debt would make both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist
better off.2 3
We summarize our findings on debt versus equity in venture capital as follows. First, debt
does not eliminate the holdup problem when incumbent venture capitalists can dictate the terms
of later-stage financing. Second, debt financing is not generally more efficient than equity. Even
in the fully competitive case, switching from equity to debt sometimes adds value (in Panels C,
E and F of Table 1) and sometimes reduces value (Panels A, B and D). Third, debt financing
for high-risk startups is equivalent to compensating the entrepreneur exclusively with options
rather than shares. We think that the most efficient contract will be a mixture of shares and
options for the entrepreneur - or equivalently, a combination of an initial share award plus
additional shares conditional on high realized value for the startup. Kaplan and Str6mberg
(2003) document such contingent payoffs in practice.2 4
23We have not explored differences between debt and equity over all possible parameter values. Thus we
cannot rule out cases where a switch from equity to debt in the syndication case increases overall NPV at the
venture capitalist's expense. In such cases the entrepreneur could compensate the venture capitalist for the
switch, providing she has sufficient wealth. If her wealth is not sufficient, the alternative is to offer the venture
capitalist some extra shares, options or warrants at date 1. But then we have a mix of debt and equity financing,
which would affect effort and value. For the use of equity securities in debt renegotiation, see Kalay and Zender
(1997) and Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001).
24Contingent payoffs are implicit in our model, at least in the syndication and the fully competitive cases,
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Contingent compensation for the entrepreneur should also help reveal the startup's value to
potential syndicate investors. Recall our discussion of the modified fixed-fraction rule, in which
the incumbent venture capitalist's participation in date-1 financing can negate his incentive to
over-report the value of the startup. We noted that that options or contingent share awards to
the entrepreneur may be necessary to prevent a breakdown of revelation at high values of V1.
An investigation of optimal contracts for venture capital will have to address (1) the mix
of shares, options or other securities given to the entrepreneur and venture capitalists, (2)
bargaining and renegotiation between incumbent venture capitalists and the entrepreneur before
additional financing is raised and (3) information revelation. We believe that these three issues
are interconnected. We leave them for further research.
1.7 Conclusions
As far as we know, this paper is the first to combine the main features of venture-capital con-
tracting in a consistent formal model. As we expected, the model has no closed-form solution,
except in the first-best case, so we embarked on an experiment in computational corporate
finance. We show how multiple contractual provisions that are common in venture capital con-
tracts affect the moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and holdup problems in
the entrepreneur-venture capital relationship. Venture capital contracting does not solve these
problems indvidually but trades them off. For example, staged financing induces more efficient
investment decisions in later stages but creates a potential holdup problem. A commitment
to later stage syndication can alleviate the holdup problem between the entrepreneur and the
initial venture capitalist but introduces information revelation problems between the incumbent
venture capitalist and members of the later stage syndicate.
Venture capital financing comes with efficiency losses. We find significant underinvestment:
many positive NPV-projects cannot be financed. For projects that can be financed, there can
be large value losses due to under-provision of effort, even for relatively small effort costs. A
commitment to syndicate financing in later stages reduces the entrepreneur's underprovision of
effort, increasing overall efficiency. Syndication increases the NPVs of both the entrepreneur
because the entrepreneur's share of the firm increases as date-1 value increases. See Figures 7 and 8.
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and the initial venture capitalist. The venture capitalist's profits increase despite taking a
smaller share than in the monopoly case.
Syndicate financing is most effective when the incumbent venture capitalist's inside informa-
tion is revealed through his participation in financing. However, the fixed-fraction participation
rule derived by Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) does not work as a revelation mechanism in our
model, because the terms of financing affect the entrepreneur's effort. A modified fixed-fraction
rule, in which the incumbent's fractional participation increases as the reported value increases,
can work in some cases. We suggest that a combination of the modified rule with additional
contingent share awards to the entrepreneur should work generally, although a full analysis of
asymmetric information and revelation will remain a topic for further research.
The startups that venture capitalists invest in are compound call options. Therefore we
expected strong option-like behavior, for example a strong dependence of strike values and
NPVs on the variance of final payoffs. But this expected behavior was attenuated or over-
ridden by agency and incentive problems. We noted how increased uncertainty dampens the
entrepreneur's effort, for example. This feedback is not a result of risk aversion, because the en-
trepreneur is assumed risk-neutral. It arises because increased uncertainty reduces the marginal
value added by effort when potential value is sufficiently high.
The option-like properties of venture capital investments are also attenuated because fi-
nancing is feasible only for startups that are well in the money, from a purely financial point
of view. They have to be well in the money to overcome incentive problems and costs of effort.
That is why all the numerical results presented in this paper assume expected potential value
of Vo = 150 or 200, versus total investment of only 100. Even with these prospects, financing
may not be feasible, even with competitive syndicate financing. Note the negative NPVs in
panel E of Table 1, for example.
Of course numerical results are never conclusive. One can never rule out the possibility that
results would have been different with different inputs or modeling choices. But we verified our
results over a wide range of inputs. Our model, though simplified, follows actual practice in
venture capital. Our only judgment calls were the choices of the lognormal distribution for the
startup's value and of exponential functions for the value added and cost of effort. We believe
these assumptions are reasonable, but further research could explore alternatives.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Appendix 1. Solving the optimization problems.
First-best.
Date 1: The entrepreneur's date-1 NPV is
NPV1M = max[0, max(E1P(x1) - gl(xl) - 11)]
X1
with first-order condition for effort foV1 =- 
function values
This implies the first-best effort level and
x = ln(OrfoV)
fj = 1 - (OrfoVi)-lf/ 0
91 = (Or foV) 9g/0
letting 0 = Of + Og, 0, = Of/Og. Substituting f1 and g into (1.12) yields
NPV" = max[O, foVl - (fol) 0 9/ - I]
letting = r + or
Investment procedes when NPV1M > 0.
is calculated numerically from
Let V1 be such that NPVM(V1) = 0.
II = fov 1 - O(foVi)9l/ 0
Then V1
(1.15)
Date 0: The entrepreneur's date-0 NPV is the difference between her expected date-1
NPV and the t = 0 costs of investment and effort:
NPVoM = max[O, max(EoNPV 1 M (xo) - go(xo) - o)] (1.16)xo~ ~ X0 o(X)-I)
The NPV expectation is taken by weighting each possible NPV1M realization (Eq. (1.14)) from
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(1.12)
(1.13)
(1.14)
V1 onwards
oo oo oo
EoNPViM(xo) = fo II(V)VdV - fog/ n(V)V'gdV-I1 fl(V)dV (1.17)
Vi(xo) V (xo) V (xo)
where Il(V) is the lognormal density. Since NPV 1M(xo,Vl(xo)) = 0, the entrepreneur's first-
order condition for effort reduces to
Eo(NPVM (x*))' = g(x)
with Eo(NPV 1M(xo))' taken from (1.17)
Eo(NPVM(xo))'= fo (V)VdV - O fo-0 f/O J (V)V /° dV (1.18)
V (xo) V (xo)
Change of variables on the lognormal establishes that
oo
(·V)VdV = e(22+, )N(0,1) ± + ka (1.19)
a
where = E(ln V), a2 = Var(ln V), and N(o,1) is the standard normal cdf. Using this property
the entrepreneur's first-order condition simplifies to
ox ( 1 _ 2 _f -
- 0 VoN(o,l) ° -e ¢ ( ) o VO fo N(0 ,o) + 20 (1.20)
letting n = l v. We solve numerically for x; since 0 (Vl(x*)). A calculation whether
NPVM(x4) > 0 determines whether the initial Io + go investment will be made.
Monopolist case.
Date 1: The entrepreneur's date-1 effort and NPV are similar to Eqs. (1.12)-(1.14). Firm
value is multiplied by the entrepreneur's share of the project acm = 1 - ac and I1 drops out of
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.her NPV term, yielding
NPViM(aoc ) = max[O, max (aMEiP(xl) - g (xl))] (1.21)
Xl
X1* = ln(OraM foV)
fl = I - (rC foV1)-OIf/ (1.22)
91 = (oraQfov) g/0
NPV1M(fC) = max [o0, ov1 ofoVlll O9/] (1.23)
The venture capitalist chooses act* to maximize his date 1 NPV, equal to his share of the
firm value decreased by time 1 investment costs. Plugging in fl* from (1.22) yields
- max [0, max (C (1-C) -0 )]
The venture capitalist operates subject to the entrepreneur's participation constraint of
NPVM (c~a) > 0. The maximum ctC share he can take is obtained by setting the last term in
(1.23) equal to zero. This yields
ac (max) = 1-l(min)=1-o (1.25)foVl
the limit point for cC in (1.24). The unconstrained first-order condition for aj is:
(OrfoV1)°I / = (1 -oC*) - Of/l (1 - 0aC*) (1.26)
If aclC* E [0, a1c(max)] , the venture capitalist chooses the unconstrained value; if not, he assigns
,C{(max) 25
25This follows because NPVC is concave in Cal. c (min) may be greater than 1 if fo is small or the V1
realization is low. Liquidation would ensue.
49
However, in most parameterizations the constraint never binds. That is, V1, the continu-
ation point, is typically high enough that the entrepreneur's participation constraint is always
slack. For large V1, c c * grows more slowly than ~C (max), so it is only for small V1 (which result
from small I) that the constraint may bind. For realistic parameterizations, the entrepreneur
enjoys positive NPV everywhere past (and including) V1.26
Since the venture capitalist typically hits his participation constraint first, his NPV deter-
mines V1. We compute V1 by looking for the pair (V, a C* (Vi)) that sets NPVlC = 0.
This pair solves, from Eq. (1.24),
I1 = aC (C) foV- (foV ) /oa C* (c) (r (1- (* (V ))) - Of (1.27)
and from Eq. (1.26)
(Orf ( ( )) ( a,* ( )) (1.28)
Solving this system of equations implies
-C =1 (1- (V ) (1.29)
of o (c* (C))2
after first solving for * ( ) numerically from(V)1
_;~ . aI*((1 i))I (= - ( ( .30)
( a C (VC)) (1±/f)
26 0ne can look at the entrepreneur's positive NPV intuitively or mathematically. Intuitively, the venture
capitialist is better off when the entrepreneur has a higher incentive to provide effort. caC(max) is generally very
high, and venture capitalist does better by taking a smaller than maximum share.
Mathematically, the continuation point V1 is determined by the venture capitalist's NPV because of the
additive investment cost function. Since I does not affect FOCC or FOCM, by altering I1 one alters the venture
capitalist's profitability without changing the optimal a C* and the entrepreneur's profitability. Reasonable I is
high enough to make the venture capitalist's NPV surpass 0 without causing the entrepreneur's to fall below 0.
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-CInvestment occurs if V1 > V1.
Date 1: The entrepreneur's date 0 value is
NPVoM = max[0, max(EoNPV M (xo) - go(xo))] (1.31)
x0
with first-order condition
Eo (NPVM (xo))' = II () NPV1M (fll (x(1.32)
To compute (NPVM(xo)) ', we need the formula for _ or ac * ' . Using the implicitaxo
function theorem on Eq. (1.26) yields
Cl f(1 a)( - aC*) (1.33)
fo (2- _ c*)
Deriving entrepreneur value (Eq. (1.23)) with respect to initial effort, taking its expectation
over all possible V1 realizations from V1 onwards, and using (1.33) yields the left-hand side
term in (1.32):
(NVA 1(V), dV - 11°OO (V) (aV) dVEo(NPV, (x(,)) = o b | (V) (20 ° _ ( 'i(XO .'(X0)[v1(xo) ( - ) V1 (xo) (2 - 9f)JE
(1.34)
The middle term in Eq. (1.32) is evaluated as follows. NPV1M is found plugging V1 and
1c* (V c ) from Eq.s (1.29) and (1.30) into Eq. (1.23). II (V1 ) is taken from the lognormal
distribution. For V 1 , the implicit function theorem on Eq. (1.29) and a*' from Eq. (1.33)
yield
---c
fVoa = fo~(1.35)
We solve numerically for x from Eq. (1.32). We evaluate the integrals point-by-point,
ending the summation at 6 times the standard deviation of V1. Given x*, and assuming that
the entrepreneur wants to continue, i.e. NPVoM (x) > 0, the venture capitalist decides whether
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to invest. His option is worth
NPVC = max[O, EoNPVlc(x*) - o]
with
EoNPVF (xo)
fo * fl(V)cC*VdV
f /O9 /O loV1 (e)f ld
--I f/fo* °/ f n(V)aC*(1- aC*)-/0Vg/ dV - I f (V)dV
V (x) V (X;)
(1.37)
If NPVoC > 0 the venture capitalist will provide funding.
Monopolist case, no staging.
Date 1:
that aM
Denoting
The entrepreneur's date-1 NPV and effort is determined as in Eqs. (1.21-1.22) except
the manager's date 1 project share, has already been negotiated and set at date 0.
this as acM = aoM*, the manager's date-1 NPV simplifies to
NPV 1M = max [0, o *f0o 1 -O(fo0M )09/l]
Because all funding (Io + I) has
any decisions to make at t = 1.
that V1, the continuation point, is
been supplied upfront, the venture capitalist no longer has
The entrepreneur now makes the continuation decision, so
found by setting NPV1M = 0. This yields
VM =
aM*fo
(1.39)
Letting ac = ac*, the venture capitalist's NPV (1.24) simplifies to1 0ig 
1 C(foV - C*(fo V)09/0 (Or (1 - aC*))-f/ONPVC = %Cfo  1 - %c*(oV1)/° ( r (  - %c))-o/o
-Mif V < V
if V >V
(1.40)
Date 0: At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his ultimate project share a0c * and the
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(1.36)
(1.38)
entrepreneur decides how much effort to exert.
NPVoM (ac) = max[0, max(EoNPV1 M (xo(a), a c ) - go (xo((ao))]x0 (1.41)
The expectation of the entrepreneur's date-1 NPV is found by weighting (1.38) over possible
V1 realizations. Again letting M = aoM and using the strike value from (1.39), we obtain
EoNPVlj(xo(oac), aoC) = -afo Jrn(v)
-MV
Change of variables on the lognormal (as in the first-best case) establishes that
EoNPVjM(o(aoc), CoC) aomfoVoN(o,1) ( +
-eQ9 ) (4fO ~0)0/ N(o,i) +or 2 0 )
leading to the entrepreneur's first-order condition for effort
eVN 
0,
1 ) 0 OM 9 N(0,
-) - , 2 (oaVo)g/UI0fo/0 (o,1)(+ a 20
(1.44)
letting = ln VM Again we solve numerically for x~.
The venture capitalist anticipates x(aoc) when he sets c. He must restrict his search to
a c E (0, aoC(max)], where aoC(max) is such that
EoNPV 1M (xo (aoC (max)), aoC (max)) - go (x (aoC (max))) = 0
This constraint rarely binds, and a c * will be chosen to maximize
NPVoC = max 0, max[L (max)>oC EoNPV1c(x (c), ao
C)
Taking the expectation of (1.40) and using x from the entrepreneur's maximization and the'~,,;~F+I,,,,,cc;, C 1 n\ ,1 .,,,+ ,, cl,,c,,,,,t,,,,;:,+:, ,~0~
53
VdV - 0(afo)0/
00
fV n(v)v1 9 d V
V1
(1.42)
1 ) (1.43)
(1.45)
- Io - I (1.46)
For a given a, the entrepreneur's value is
strike value from (1.39), we obtain
oo
EoNPVC(xo(c), c) c= fo H(V)VdV (1.47)
V-
00
-oC(1 - C)-o/fo /O -Of /O i(V)V/O91OdV
- ~0 - J0 r
V 1
= a foVoN(o,l) (0 + 2a)- (1.48)
o0 (r(1 - aC)) / (foVo) g /' N(1) + 2f o e so f02 N(o,l) 2l , se
again using change of variables and letting = In -i. We solve for oc* numerically, since
fo = fo(x*(ao)). If NPVC > 0 investment will proceed.
Syndicate case.
Date 1: At date 1, for a given share a M, the entrepreneur's NPV and maximization problem
are the same as before. We obtain x, f, g*, and NPV 1M(l s ) exactly as in Eq.s (1.21)-(1.23),
but where M = cO (1 - aLs). The share given to the outside syndicate, cs, is determined by
setting NPVjs equal to zero, which yields
1 = asfof(as)V1 (1.49)
= af foV - alS(1 - aS) -°/ (foVl)'g/ (oraoM)-OM/f (1.50)
after substituting f. This is solved numerically for a s .
We solve for V1 using the same procedure as in the monopolistic venture capitalist scenario.
As previously, V1 may imply that NPVM(V 1 ) > 0 or that NPViM(V 1 ) = 0. Again, for
realistic values of I1 the entrepreneur's participation constraint is always slack. Therefore we
identify V1 by finding the point where the maximum value to the syndicate is zero. At this
point the value of als implied by the syndicate's zero-profit condition (1.49) is equal to the value
implied by the syndicate's hypothetical maximization problem. The syndicate's hypothetical
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FOC1s is:2 7
(OrafoV1) 0 f /0 = (1 - aS*) -f/ - 1 (i - -gaS
We solve for V1 by finding the pair (V1, S (V)) such that a1S
compute arS (V1) numerically from
(1.51)
(Vs) -= aS* (). We
o -- (s (-VS))2 (1_ - aS (V 1))j
(1 - (Vfs))1+ 0/ 0f
Using FOCS (Eq. (1.51)) once again, we compute V1 as
vrs r 1 (1- oS (Vf))V -
(1.52)
(1.53)
These two expressions are nearly identical to
monopolistic venture capitalist's breakeven point.
presence of aM, the entrepreneur's initial project
This lowers as (V), implying a higher V1 than in
-Investment at dat  1occurs forVInvestment at date 1 occurs for V1 > V 1.
Eq.s (1.29) and (1.30), pertaining to the
The sole difference in the expressions is the
share, on the left-hand side of Eq. (1.52).
the monopolistic venture capitalist scenario.
Date 0: At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his project share acC * and the entrepreneur
decides how much effort to exert. For a given a C , the entrepreneur's value is
NPVoM(a c ) = max[0, max(EoNPV 1 M (xo(aoC), oC) - go (xo(aoC))] (1.54)
27In general there will be two solutions to the zero-profit equation, a and s . 5 is the maximum share
which can be given to the syndicate and still return NPVS = O; aS is the minimum share. For c s C (as, 1S),
the syndicate enjoys positive expected profits (indeed these two values can be thought of as bounds for the
profit-maximizing share). When V1 = V1, then cas = a * = as. We use as in all computations.
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\
Using the solutions for f]i, g, and als from Eqs. (1.22) and (1.49), we get
EoNPV M (xo(ac), cac ) o fo
00
I(V)V(1 - as)dV
00
/
In(V)(V(l - aS))9/odV
Vl (xo(o),ao)
We solve for xz(c C ) numerically, exactly as in the monopolistic venture capitalist case, only
using the lower aS share in the entrepreneur's NPV term.
The venture capitalist anticipates x(ao c ) when he sets ac.
ac E (0, fc(max)], where aC(max) is such that0 0 0)*O\"Q~1
He must restrict his search to
EoNPV1M (x*(co(max)), ao(max))-(max))) - 0go((a(max))) =
This constraint rarely binds, and %c* will be chosen to maximize
NPVoC = max [0, max
lo <aC (max)
EoNPVC(x(a{), c) -
Using the solutions for fi, gl, and cas from Eq.s (1.22) and (1.49), and x* from the entrepreneur's
maximization, we obtain
EoNPVC(x (c4C), aoc )
00
lo I(V)V(1 - ao)dV
-aC (1 - a)-of//fo O/°O[°//
00
/
nI(V)(V(1 - ))-1/0dV
V 1 (X o(ec),{c)
We solve for a c * numerically, again evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the sum-
mation at 6 standard deviations of V1. If NPVoC > 0 investment will proceed.
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(1.55)
(1.56)
lo] (1.57)
(1.58)
Vl(xo(oc),tac )
fo=a o
Vl(xo(coC),ao )
1.8.2 Appendix 2. Syndicate Financing: Asymmetric Information.
The Case of no effort at t = 1.
Consider a project where there is no date 1 effort, only the I1 cost. In expectation the project
is worth (letting fo = I for simplicity) P = V1- I1. The original venture capitalist's exposure
is
NPVC = v1W -3I1 (1.59)
where
ac = ac + s(3 - ac ) (1.60)
If the truth is reported in equilibrium, then
a -= = a1 (1.61)
To make the capitalist indifferent between telling the truth and lying about V1, we take the
derivative of Eq. (1.59) with respect to V1 and set it equal to zero which yields
V1 aaV = Ii (1.62)
&v1 OP
or, using &f~1 = I1,
V1(3 -- I +11 - - I = I1 a (1.63)
The only solution is 3 = ao. Similarly, we can derive the solution when 11 can vary (for
instance if I1 influences the probability of favorable V2 realizations).
The Case of t = 1 effort by the entrepreneur.
When we have endogenous effort,
NPVFC = ocfiV 1 - /11 (1.64)
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and
S 1- = II : S (1.65)
1 fiVi f1V1 (1.65)
Differentiating by Vl, we obtain V0 f f1- --I10/
.V [f Ia v + a0C a'I 1= i1 avl (1.66)
or
-I 1 I f 0 &fi ofl [l a + L= (, - aC) + .1 + lal = 11 (1.67)Vl f, WIv, 1 --~1 - ai1 V-1
Enforcing V1 = V1 and using a s flV 1 = I1, this reduces to
1i O (V a- C)oS) ViozOofa( 0C )a = - a (Vio - V1 (O - a0)oa J) =Ovl V1af' (1.68)
that is
C - c V1 Of1a1 - 0- (1.69)
First we note that if the effort did not change with V1, the right-hand side would equal zero
requiring again that c = c or ac c . However when fl > 0, ac must be greater than
ac in order to prevent overreporting of V1. The gap between c and a c is responsible for the
under-reporting motive, because for high V1 realizations the venture capitalist can increase his
share of the project, relative to a cg, on an NPV > 0 basis.
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1.8.3 Appendix 3. Debt Financing
Monopolist debt financing.
Date-2: The final payouts in the debt financing case are options on final firm value:
NPV 2M = max(0, fof V 2 - K1 )
NPVC = foflV 2 - max(0, foflV 2 - K1 )
(1.70)
Let V2 identify the point at which the entrepreneur begins receiving cashflows or
-V =K 1
fofl (1.71)
Date-i: The entrepreneur's date-1 effort and NPV must be solved for numerically with
debt financing. The entrepreneur's NPV is the probability weighted expectation of her t = 2
payouts past V2. That is
(1.72)NPVM (Kl, x) = fo I(V)fK (V)(x)VdV - K (V)dV - gl(xi)
V2(x1) V 2(Z1)
Change of variables on the lognormal establishes that
NPVM (Al) = max[0, max (foflvlN(0,l) ( + - K1N(ol) (- ) -g1(xl))] (1.73)
z1 2 1 2s
where N(o,1) is standard normal cdf and ' 1 In v We solve numerically for x1 since
,:= (V2(xl)).
The venture capitalist chooses K* to maximize his date 1 NPV, anticipating fji(K 1) from
the entrepreneur's maximization. The venture capitalist's NPV is derived similarly to the
entrepreneur's, yielding
NPV1C = max[0, max (fofV1 (1- N(o,1) ( + 2) KN(l ( ) Ii)]
K1 G(O,K1 (max) 2
(1.74)
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As before, the venture capitalist operates subject to the entrepreneur's participation con-
straint of NPV 1 M(K 1) > 0. The maximum K1 level he can take is obtained numerically, as is
K. If K E [0, Ki(max)], the venture capitalist chooses the unconstrained value; if not, he
assigns K1 (max).
Since we impose that NPVM(K 1 ) > 0, we solve for the continuation point V1 by setting
-C
the venture capitalist's maximized NPV from (1.74) to zero. Investment occurs if V1 > V1 .
Date-O: The entrepreneur's date 0 value is
NPVoM = max[0, max(EoNPV 1 M (xo) - go(xo))]
x0o
(1.75)
where
EoNPVM (xo) =
00
fo n(V)fiVN(o,1) ( + 2) dV
vl
00 00
- J fl(V)K*N(0,1) (O - ') dV - ]f(V)gldV
I I~~~~~~~~~
Recall that each V1 realization implies K*(VI), f1*(KI(Vi)), and O(V2(K*, f)). We solve for
x* numerically, evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the summation at 6 times the
standard deviation of V1.
Given x*, and assuming that the entrepreneur wants to continue, i.e. NPVoM (xo) > 0, the
venture capitalist decides whether to invest. His option is worth
NPVoC = max[O, EoNPVC(x4) - Io] (1.78)
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(1.76)
(1.77)
with
EoNPVC(xO) f o 7 (V)ftV (- N(0,1) (+ 2)) dV (1.79)
-C
V1
+ -/f(V)K*N(o,1) (q-2) dV - n(V)IdVo
vc ~~vc
If NPVoC > 0 the venture capitalist will provide funding.
Debt financing with date-i syndication.
Date-2: At t = 1 a syndicate of investors provides I, purchasing a pari passu debt issuance
on competitive terms. Denoting this debt level as K s , and defining K as the total debt due
or K = K + K s , final payouts are
NPV2M = max(O, foflV 2 - K)
NPV 2 = K fof1 V 2 - max(0, -fofV 2 - K C ) (180)
KS KSNPV = K1 fofV 2 - max(0, -' fof1V2 - KS)
Let V2 identify the point at which the entrepreneur begins receiving cash flows or
-s K
2 fofi (1.81)
Date-1:
At date 1, for a given combined debt level K, the entrepreneur's NPV and maximization
problem are the same as before. We obtain x1(K), f(K), g(K), and NPV 1M(K) from Eq.
(1.73), but using K = K + K s rather than K*.
The face value of debt issued to the outside syndicate is determined by setting NPV1S equal
lo zero. Taking the expectation of his t = 2 payouts from (1.80) and using change of variables
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yields
NPV(K) = fofV 1 (1 - N(, + + K 0,1)
where = I n . This implies1 V2
I1 = K fof1J (i - N(o,i) (+2 + K1N(o,1) (0-2 ) (1.83)
Substituting f(K) from the entrepreneur's maximization, this is solved numerically for K s .
We solve for V1 using the same procedure as in the monopolistic venture capitalist scenario,
finding the point where the maximum value to the syndicate is zero. There are two differences
in the syndicate's and monopolistic venture capitalist's maximization problem, both stemming
from the incumbent venture capitalist's outstanding debt level. First, the debt default point,
-S
the syndicate's share of firm value when debt defaults. Both imply a higher V 1 than in the
-S
monopolistic venture capitalist scenario. Investment at date 1 occurs for V1 > V1.
Date-O:
At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his debt level KC* and the entrepreneur decides
how much effort to exert. For a given Ko, the entrepreneur's value is
NPVoM(K ) = max[O, max(EoNPV1M (xo(KoC), K) - go (xo(Ko ))] (1.84)
xo
where
oo
EoNPVl (xo(KoC), KC) foJ I1(V)f VN(o,l) 0 + dV (1.85)
Vs
V 1
00 00
-J I(V)KN(o,1) (k-2 ) dV - JI(V)gdV
-s -S
V 1 V 1
Each V1 realization implies K(V1), f (K(V 1 )), and k(V2 (K, ff )). We solve for x*(K C ) numer-
ically, exactly as in the monopolistic venture capitalist case, but using the combined debt level
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K = K + K .
The venture capitalist anticipates xO(K o) when he sets KC .
E (O, Ko(max)], where KOC(max) is such that
He restricts his search to K C
EoNPVM (x(KO(max)), Ko(max)) - go(x(K (max))) = 0
This constraint rarely binds, and KC * is chosen to maximize
NPVo C = max[O, max EoNPVC(xo(KoC), Kc ) - Io]
KC (max)>KC
Using x* from the entrepreneur's maximization, the venture capitalist's expected t = 1 value is
Eo NPVlC (x (Ko), KoC)
oo
KoCfo I(V)fK (1
v-
V 1
-VS
V 1
II(V)N(o,l)
We solve for KoC* numerically, again evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the sum-
mation at 6 standard deviations of V1. If NPVoC > 0 investment will proceed.
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(1.86)
(1.87)
(1.88)
- (01) + 2a1 dV
2I
1.9 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Example of numerical results for nine cases: (1) No cost of effort (Black-Scholes), (2)
First-best, (3) Monopoly (one investor provides all financing), (4) 100% Upfront financing, (5)
Syndicate Financing at date 1, (6) Fully Competitive financing at dates 0 and 1, (7) Monopoly
Debt Financing (investor sets date 1 debt level instead of equity share), (8) Syndicate Debt
Financing at date 1 (initial investor sets debt level and syndicate sets pari-passu debt level
at date 1) and (9) Fully Competitive Debt Financing at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur's
initial ownership share or contracted debt level, where relevant, is (M and Ko and effort is
x0. V is the minimum value necessary for investment at date 1. NPV is the net present
value at date 0, overall and for the entrepreneur (M) and initial investor (C). Potential value
is Vo = Eo(V2 ) = 150. Io and I1 denote fixed investment costs, and a is standard deviation
per period of Vt. Effort parameters are Of (value-added) and 09 (cost). Increases in Of and
09 represent increases in marginal returns and costs to effort, respectively. Projects that yield
negative net present value, at best, to at least one party will not be implemented and are
indicated with a (*).
A. Io = 50, I1 = 50, a = 0.4,
Financing Scenario
Black-Scholes
First-best
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging
Syndicate, date 1
Competitive, dates 0, 1
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt)
Of = 1.8, 09 = 0.6
cOM Ko xo
- - 00
1.00 - 2.54
- - 1.18
0.09 - 1.54
0.15 - 1.72
0.46 - 2.22
- - 0.00
- 109.31 2.27
- 76.69 2.39
V
50.00
55.35
70.84
23.77
84.93
69.10
oo
124.60
105.48
NPVM NPV C NPV
- - 50.03
37.90 - 37.90
3.43 13.58 17.01
7.53 19.36 26.89
7.05 20.50 27.55
36.02 0.00 36.02
-1.00* -50.00* -51.00*
17.80 3.92 21.72
30.47 0.00 30.47
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B. Io = 50, I1 = 50, ar = 0.8, Of = 1.8, 09 = 0.6
Financing Scenario
Black-Scholes
First-best
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging
Syndicate, date 1
Competitive, dates 0, 1
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt)
a M Ko
1.00
0.10
0.13
0.48
355.84
167.75
C. Io = 10, I = 90, a = 0.4, Of = 1.8, Og
Financing Scenario a M Ko
o0 50.00
2.52 55.37
1.17 71.14
1.55 22.97
1.64 87.28
2.21 68.83
2.02 60.22
2.08 143.77
2.29 103.12
Black-Scholes
First-best
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging
Syndicate, date 1
Competitive, dates 0, 1
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt)
1.00
0.09
0.21 -
0.82
- 91.18
- 15.00
D. Io = 10, I1 = 90, ar = 0.8, Of =
Financing Scenario coM
1.8, 09
Ko
=0.6
xo V NPVM NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes
First-best 1.00
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging 0.10
Syndicate, date 1 0.15
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.86
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) -
422.88
28.29
oo
2.46
1.18
1.55
1.63
2.40
1.97
1.94
2.42
90.00
96.63
121.54
22.97
138.44
109.85
106.86
204.69
115.86
64.09
54.44 - 54.44
1.59 37.29 38.87
8.11 19.42 27.53
5.35 40.20 45.55
53.59 0.00 53.59
6.87 45.87 52.74
9.61 29.09 38.71
53.54 0.00 53.54
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xo V NPVM NPVc
41.48
2.59
8.11
7.00
39.63
8.15
16.15
34.85
NPV
52.55
41.48
22.05
27.53
30.95
39.63
39.55
23.80
34.85
19.45
19.42
23.95
0.00
31.40
7.66
0.00
= 0.6
xO V NPVM NPVC NPV
o0
2.50
1.35
1.54
1.80
2.42
0.00
2.15
2.46
90.00
96.56
117.44
23.77
130.60
110.15
oo
154.65
108.72
40.98
2.16
7.53
5.15
39.44
-1.00*
10.39
40.34
52.19
40.98
26.71
26.89
31.49
39.44
-11.00*
28.92
40.34
24.55
19.36
26.34
0.00
-10.00*
18.52
0.00
E. Io = 10, I1 = 90, a = 0.4,
Financing Scenario
of =
M
cio
0.6, 09 = 0.6
Ko xo V NPVM NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes
First-best
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging
Syndicate, date 1
Competitive, dates 0, 1
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt)
1.00
0.22
0.51 -
0.51
- 47.39
- 30.34
c0 90.00
3.88 123.11
2.15 187.29
2.72 23.14
3.05 178.85
3.05 178.85
0.00 o0
3.30 177.18
3.54 158.73
F. Io = 10, I1 = 90, a = 0.8,
Financing Scenario
of =
M
0.6, 09 =
Ko
0.6
xo V NPVM NPVc
Black-Scholes
First-best
Monopoly
Monopoly, No Staging
Syndicate, date 1
Competitive, dates 0, 1
Monopoly (Debt)
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt)
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt)
1.00 -
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Figure 1-1: Effort functions. As effort increases, the return to effort approaches 1 (100% of
potential value). The marginal cost of effort is positive and increasing. The return and cost
curves depend on parameters B f and Bg, which are varied here between 0.2 and 2.2.
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Figure 1-2: Date-1 Net present values are plotted against VI, the date-1 realization of maximum
potential value. Potential value is Vo = EO(V2) = 150. The lognonnal probability density is
plotted for a standard deviation of 0.4. Date-1 investrnent is h = 50. With no costs of effort,
N PV1 = VI - 11. When effort is costly, the level and slope of N PV1 decline because of reduced
effort at date 0 (the optimal effort Xo is too low to attain maximurn potential value). The strike
value VI, which incorporates the cost of date-1 effort, increases frolll h to h + g(xt) = 70.84.
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Figure 1-3: Net Present Value at date 0 in the first-best scenario. N PV is shown across a
range of standard deviation (a E [0.1,1.2]) and effort return (Bf/By E [1/11,11]) parameters.
The dark surface presents date-O and date-1 investment levels 10 = h = 50 while the light
surface presents 10 = 10,h = 90. Potential value is Vo = EO(V2) = 150.
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Figure 1-4: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (1V1)and venture
capitalist (C) in the lllonopoly case in where one venture capitalist provides all stage-O and stage-
1 financing. Two curves are shown for the venture capitalist. The first a~fAX is the maximum
share at which the entrepreneur will still participate. The second a~oc is the optimal share, at
which the entrepreneur is provided with positive N PV and the incentive for continued effort.
The optinlal share is lower than the maxilllum share in the region where VI exceeds the strike
value VI. The entrepreneur's minority share aM declines as VI increases.
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Figure 1-5: Net Present Value at date 0, plotted for the Monopoly and Monopoly, No Staging
financing scenarios. N PV is shown across a range of standard deviation (0- E [0.1,1.2]) and
effort return (81/8g E [1/11,11]) parameters. The dark surface presents non-staged NPVs
while the light surface presents staged N PVs. Figure 1-5 assumes date-O and date-1 investment
levels 10 = h = 50 and potential value of Vo = EO(V2) = 150.
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Figure 1-6: Net Present Value at date 0, plotted for the Monopoly and lVlonopoly, No Staging
financing scenarios. N PV is shown across a range of standard deviation (a E [0.1,1.2]) and
effort return (()f / ()9 E [1/11, 11]) parameters. The dark surface presents non-staged N PV s
while the light surface presents staged N PVs. Figure 1-6 asSUlnesdate-O and date-l investment
levels 10 = 10, 11 = 90 and potential value of Vo = EO(V2) = 150.
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Figure 1-7: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (M), initial venture
capitalist (C) and syndicate of new investors (8) for the syndicate case. The syndicate provides
financing on competitive terms (N PV = 0) whenever VI exceeds the strike value VI, which is
higher than in the monopoly case shown in Figure 1-4. The syndicate's optimal share a~oc
is lower than the maximum share a~/ AX at which the entrepreneur would still participate.
The constrained share as declines as VI increases, while the ownership shares held by the
entrepreneur and incumbent venture capitalist increase with VI.
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Figure 1-8: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (M), initial
syndicate (81) and a second syndicate of new investors (82) for the wholly competitive case.
The second syndicate provides date 1 financing on competitive terms (N PV = 0) whenever
VI exceeds the strike value VI, which is lower than in both the syndicate and monopoly cases
shown previously. The constrained share aS2 declines as VI increases, while the ownership
shares held by the entrepreneur and incumbent investors increase with VI. The share held by
the entrepreneur (aM) is more in parity with incUIIlbent investors' shares, compared with the
syndicate case.
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Figure 1-9: Net Present Value Loss at date 0, relative to first best, expressed as a percentage of
total required investment. Potential value is Vo = EO(V2) = 150. The value loss depends on the
ratio of the return and cost of effort parameters, 8f /8g. Lost N PV is plotted for the monopoly,
syndicate, and fully competitive cases, and also for the monopoly case without staging, in
whi~h the monopolist provides upfront financing and sets a~ at time O. Figure 1-9 presents 4
assumptions on date-O and date-l investments and lognormal standard deviation. In 1-9a and
1-9b, 10 = It = 50. In 1-9c and 1-9d, 10 = 10 and It = 90. In 1-9a and 1-9c, a = 0.4 while in
1-9b and 1-9d, a = 0.8.
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Figure 1-10: Net Present Value Loss at date 0, relative to first best, expressed as a percentage of
total required investlnent. Potential value is Vo = EO(V2) = 200. The value loss depends on the
ratio of the return and cost of effort parameters, Of109. Lost N PV is plotted for the monopoly,
syndicate, and fully cOlnpetitive cases, and also for the monopoly case without staging, in
which the monopolist provides upfront financing and sets af at time O. Figure 1-10 presents
4 assumptions on date-O and date-1 investments and lognormal standard deviation. In I-lOa
and I-lOb, 10 = It = 50. In I-IOc and I-lad, 10 = 10 and h = 90. In I-lOa and I-IOc, (5 = 0.4
while in I-lOb and I-lOd, (5 = 0.8.
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Chapter 2
Manager Incentives in Collateralized
Debt Obligations: A Theoretical
Study
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates under-investment and asset substitution problems in the financial man-
agement arena, specifically in the collateralized debt obligation or "CDO" market. A fast-
growing component of financial derivatives markets, CDOs are closed-end, actively-managed,
tranched bond funds. CDOs are an excellent setting in which to study agency problems because,
while conforming very closely to the stereotypical corporate finance example of a leveraged firm,
the ex-ante riskiness of the "projects" can be assessed quantitatively from historical and cur-
rent bond market structure. The latter is something virtually impossible in corporate finance
calibrations.
As in more traditional contexts, CDO managers almost always own subordinate positions.
High leverage, in combination with extremely bad collateral performance, has led to strident
criticism of CDO structures and allegations of manager risk-shifting in recent years (as well
as two lawsuits against investment banks, privately settled). In this paper I do two things:
First, I demonstrate that over a wide range of parameterizations and effort assumptions, equity
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contracts are indeed more efficient (ex-ante) than other combinations of debt and fee contracts.
Second, however, I explore and weigh which of various proposed CDO structural modifications
are most efficient at curtailing risk-shifting while still promoting effort.
For these purposes, I develop an integrated model of manager behavior, modeling an effort
and risk-shifting choice based on corporate debt ratings and associated default rates. Using
both mean historical default parameters and those observed recently, I numerically estimate
the costs of manager actions. I differentiate the costs of financial and agency-induced stress
and weigh against effort benefits. Compared to agency cost estimates in other computational
finance papers, I find similar to higher ex-post value losses. Other agency costs such as
changes in debt default probability and implied increases in equity opportunity costs are larger
and more significant than in other contexts. However, I find that even very small value loss
assumptions can deter risk-shifting in many cases, and that for even extremely conservative
effort parameterizations, ex-ante effort benefits greatly outweigh risk-shifting costs, making
subordinated manager contracts more efficient than the debt and fee contracts considered.
Next I alter the model and repeat this procedure for a variety of proposed CDO modifica-
tions. Proposed structural features and indenture restrictions, analogous to dividend payout
policies and debt covenants in more traditional contexts, aim to allow the manager to add value
while still curtailing asset substitution. For a wide range of parameterizations, I find that ex-
cess interest diversions, contingent trading limits, and coverage test "haircuts" of lower-priced
assets add the most value.
The CDO market, witness to great controversy currently, will resume its rapid expansion
once agency problems are adequately understood and addressed. This paper provides a frame-
work in which to quantify manager behavior and tranche outcomes, allowing for more efficient
structures, behavior, and pricing. I believe that the results herein are a good indicator of the
strength of various manager motivations, and can be reliably compared to other asset markets,
both financial and corporate.
2.1.1 Overview of CDO Market and History
CDOs are closed-end, tranched bond funds that attempt to create value for equity investors
by exploiting ratings, liquidity, or funding arbitrages in financial markets. Due to recent poor
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performance, CDO structures and managers have been subject to intense scrutiny, by everyone
from disgruntled debt investors and rating agency analysts to the SEC. Market growth is
threatened by bad press and increased administrative and structuring costs.
In the prototypical CDO structure, illustrated in Figure 2-2, the manager selects an initial
portfolio of securities which collateralizes the issuance of senior and subordinate debt securities.
Debt provides leverage and risk premia benefits to equityholders and is issued to the point at
which the resulting higher default risk raises the debt credit spread enough to lower equity
returns. The manager's motivation lies in ongoing management fees, partial deal ownership,
and the chance to bolster his reputation and client list. Investors benefit from the new, alternate
supply of securities. Figure 2-3 illustrates CDOs' dramatic issuance growth. The CDO sector
first surpassed $10 billion in issuance in 1996 and grew nearly 30% annually between 1996 and
2002.
Unsurprisingly, these vehicles performed poorly as corporate default activity peaked over
the 1998-2002 period. For example, the five-year investment-grade cohort was the worst on
record, 32% worse than the next worse cohort of 1982-1986, and 328% worse than the average. 1
Resultant downgrade rates for CDOs are presented in Table 1. Through 2003, 63% of all CDO
tranches backed by high-yield bonds had been downgraded at some point, and 41% of those
backed by investment-grade bonds. Because of the option-like nature of CDO liabilities, perfor-
mance is sensitive to underlying collateral volatility and likely suffered from an underestimation
of corporate correlation.
However, there is widespread belief that equity-holding managers purposefully increased
collateral volatility, exploiting weaknesses in untested structures to the detriment of senior
investors. For instance, in an analysis of relative downgrade rates (see Table 2), Moody's
Investor Services finds that collateral held by corporate CDOs has fared worse than the overall
corporate market, at each broad rating level. Moody's finds both initial collateral selection
and ex-post trading behavior to be at fault for the riskier collateral. In a 2002 case study of a
typical 1998 high-yield bond CDO, Moody's finds that had the CDO held market collateral, 13
of 27 debt downgrades would have been avoided. Further, had the manager pursued a more
conservative trading strategy after the onset of stress, CDO investors could have avoided an
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1Source: Moody's Investors Service (2004a).
additional 8 debt downgrades (realizing just 6 of 27). After related calculations for a wider
set of CDOs, they conclude that "managers have introduced risk... beyond that justified" by
practices which "deviate from the spirit of the indenture".2
Other market participants echo Moody's findings. A director of CDO research at a major
investment bank detailed several trades by managers resulting in direct gains to equity of several
millions of dollars. A CDO performance study by the same firm cites the "great variability in
credit quality of assets with the same rating" as the opportunity for managerial mischief, and the
nature of CDO equity as a "fast-pay investment very sensitive to the amount of excess spread
flowing through the structure" as the motive. They conclude that investors and rating agencies
considered neither the possibility to game the structure nor managerial / equity incentives to do
so.3 Another investment bank cites the market's lack of emphasis on the value of an established
manager with proven track record (such managers have larger reputation concerns), noting that
"An experienced and inexperienced manager will often be subject to identical subordination
levels... rating agencies are slowly unveiling their process for rating managers." 4
Just the suspicion that managers and equityholders were "gaming" the system is enough to
jeapordize the growth of the CDO market as well as impose unnecessary costs on managers who
would otherwise refrain from risk-shifting. Unfortunately, the risk-shifting problem cannot be
completely avoided because it results directly from the tranched structure of the CDO vehicle.
'Tranching is necessary for two reasons. First, it creates low-risk assets, a primary reason for the
large growth of CDOs and other structured finance assets.5 Second, it allows the manager to be
given a cheap, effective effort incentive when he is capital constrained. That managers continue
to own equity and receive subordinated fees in newly-issued CDOs attests to the importance of
2Source: Moody's Investors Service (2002b), Moody's Investors Service (2003i). Moody's cites "aggressive
manager practices" which include the "purchase of Caa / deeply discounted securities". They note that manager
behavior was "problematic because not contemplated in initial ratings" and state that their rating approach will
move to a "more realistic modeling of manager trading strategies and reinvestment."
3Source: UBS Warburg (December 2003), UBS Warburg (2003).
4Source: Thompson, Reeves, Weaver, and Folkerts-Landau (2002).
5Risk appetite and / or regulatory constraints encourage market participants to segregate by tranche and
pay a premium for highly rated assets. This motivates less risk-averse subordinate investors to create highly
rated senior securities and keep the residual risk. For instance insurance companies and banks often require
or receive favorable capital treatment for investing in Aaa-rated assets. Table 3 presents ratings stratifications
in the corporate and structured finance markets. Most recently, approximately 50% of structured finance debt
issuance was Aaa- or Aa-rated. This contrasts to barely 12% in the corporate market. Any such "risk-arbitrage"
motivation for CDO issuance implies a non-zero equity return even in the absence of beneficial effort provision.
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the effort incentive; the amount of energy and resources devoted to the design of new trading
restrictions and cashflow diversion rules attests to the costs of risk-shifting.6 7
2.1.2 Preview of Model
This model incorporates both the positive and negative effects of active management and prices
/ sizes each component of a simplified CDO structure. Equity investors initiate the deal,
contract with the manager, and reap the gains from the project, measured in terms of their
expected rate-of-return.
At date 0 the deal is structured and a debt tranche sold. The equity price is set to cover
the cost of remaining collateral. The manager invests in debt and equity shares to the extent
of his available funds.
Collateral defaults realize at dates I and 2. After the time I default realization, the manager
provides costly effort, which allows him to identify and purchase under-valued bonds. These
bonds exhibit positive excess returns as a lower-than-priced-in default rate is realized. Though
market value increases gradually, par value increases immediately through the lower market
price.
At date 1, the manager also has an option to switch the remaining collateral portfolio into
more risky securities. Such a trade increases the portfolio default rate and increases par value
commensurately. Total CDO value is diminished by a small transactions cost.
Collateral bonds mature at date 2. Tranches share in the final cashflow according to
their seniority. Expectations of manager behavior and default rates determine date 0 tranche
valuations and sale prices.
An important assumption of my model is that the market cannot distinguish between effort-
driven and risk-shifting trades. Because an undervalued bond is identified as a low-quality bond,
an effort-driven, "value-scouting" trade can be confused for a conventional "down-in-quality"
6 Generally investors, not managers, insist on a managerial equity stake. Raising funds is a challenge for
smaller firms and frequent issuers, and some must securitize their fee stream in order to fund the purchase
(McDermott, Rajan, and Benzschawel (2004)).
7For conference proceedings and research focusing on CDO structural revisions, see Fitch Ratings (2002b),
Moody's Investors Service (2002c), Moody's Investors Service (2002d), Moody's Investors Service (2003e),
Moody's Investors Service (2003f), Moody's Investors Service (2004b), Moody's Investors Service (2004d), Stan-
dard and Poor's (2001), Standard and Poor's (2002b), McDermott, Skarabot, and Kroujiline (2004), Gibson and
Vacca (2001), UBS Warburg (March 2003), UBS Warburg (October 2003), and Ganapati (2003)
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or risk-shifting trade. Both types of trades involve the purchase of low-rated collateral and
both result in increases in portfolio par value.
I do not focus on the possibility of "credit-risk" trades. These would be when the manager
finds an over-valued bond in the portfolio and replaces it at zero market or par value loss.
Economic value is increased by avoiding a higher default rate. While such trades are certainly
an avenue by which a manager adds value, in my model they can be easily identified as value-
adding trades. I focus on trades whose motives are ambiguous and cause most of the discussion
in the CDO market.
2.1.3 Preview of Results
My primary results concern the effects of managerial ownership on effort provision and risk-
shifting. Key results are that
1) Effort varies with respect to collateral performance and the tranche the manager favors.
An equity-holding manager works when deal performance is good but underinvests when deal
performance is bad. A debt-holding manager works primarily when deal performance is bad.
2) Only if the manager owns a higher equity than bond share will he consider risk-shifting.
He will do so as the volatility gains to equity begin to outweigh the transactions cost loss. This
is when leverage is high, the par value gain from trading is large, or transactions costs are
low. Equity investors gain from ex-post risk-shifting activity while debt investors generally
lose. Even debt may gain if a higher upside restores equity's prospects and prompts higher
effort from the manager.
3) For even small postulations of effort effectiveness, managerial equity ownership is a more
efficient route to boost ex-ante CDO returns than debt or fee contracts. Higher probability is
put on good default realizations which lead to the highest effort and least risk-shifting. Debt
ownership avoids risk-shifting but leads to effort only in the least likely outcomes. Further,
the equity tranche is small relative to total deal size, making it the least expensive incentive.
4) For severe default outcomes, or misspecified collateral default rates and volatility options,
risk-shifting costs are generally modest compared with the financial stress. The bulk of bad
performance results from higher default and loss rates and lower effort gains (with exceptions
however). Risk-shifting has its largest effect on the probability of debt default, which would
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necessitate lower supported leverage and increased equity opportunity costs.
5) CDO interest distributions increase risk-shifting activity when performance is bad. Per-
formance criteria which redirect excess interest away from equityholders act as a deterrent.
They increase payments to debtholders and decrease leverage when risk-shifting is most likely
to occur. They lessen risk-shifting costs and support an increase in initial leverage but can
have a negative effect on effort.
6) Structural modifications can be effective at eliminating risk-shifting while not curtailing
effort. The most efficient are more punitive excess interest diversions, contingent trading limits,
and coverage test "haircuts" of lower-priced assets.
2.1.4 Related Literature
For an excellent overview of features of the CDO market, see Goodman and Fabozzi (2002).
Oldfield (2000), Calomiris and Mason (2003), and Donahoo and Shaffer (1991) focus on various
"arbitrage" motivations for securitized issuance. An introduction to rating agency analysis can
be found in Fitch Ratings (2003), Moody's Investors Service (1996), Moody's Investors Service
(2004c), and Standard and Poor's (2002a).
Canonical corporate finance results on agency problems apply here. Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Myers (1977) describe the effort-provision problems arising when the manager
holds fractional or equity claims. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describes the asset-substitution
problem, predicting that optimal capital structure will be determined by the trade-off between
effort provision and risk-shifting problems, with bond covenants used to reduce the cost of
risk-shifting. Both Dessi (2001) and Garvey (1995) find equity ownership to be consistent with
maximal effort provision, while acknowledging the increase in asset substitution. Ou-Yang
(2003) and Stoughton (1993) derive fixed fee contracts with a performance bonus as optimal
contracts under various agency problems and risk-aversion assumptions.
The possibility of a manager tempted to boost short-term equity returns rather than long-
term firm value is presented in Stein (1989). Such short-termism results here when the man-
ager's equity principal options become worthless and equity interest options remain valuable.
Higher debt levels or more stringent covenants (modeled here as interest-diverting coverage
tests) can alleviate these problems as in Hart and Moore (1998).
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Another strain of capital structure analysis focuses on the signaling aspect of capital struc-
ture (Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Leland and Pyle (1977)). This strain predicts
higher-quality firms to have a higher debt ratio and a higher manager equity share. Papas-
taikoudi (2004b) analyzes this idea in context of CDOs or other closed-end funds. Reputation
concerns can prevent risk-shifting or increase effort provision as in Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)
and Diamond (1989). Inspections of agency problems in the asset management arena include
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Golec (1992), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), and Huddart (1999).
Computational studies of the risk-shifting problem include Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland
(1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Ross (1997), and Ericsson (1997). Like Leland and Ross I
model manager choice over asset volatility, finding a positive relationship between agency costs
and both leverage and cashflow riskiness. The cost of risk-shifting is less in NPV-destruction
(I model only a small transactions cost) but rather in its impact on capital structure (lower
initial leverage and higher funding costs). Estimates of the ex-post costs of risk-shifting are
modest in these studies, on the order of 1% - 2.5%. I find similar to higher costs to debt
when using historical and observed default estimates. While decreases in leverage are similar
to those found in Leland, I find much larger increases in debt yields, measured either in terms
of ratings spreads or equity opportunity costs. Likewise, while Andrade and Kaplan (1998)
finds no instances of risk-shifting in a study of firms, I predict situations of frequent or constant
risk-shifting. To my knowledge the quantification of the impact of CDO covenants on asset
substitution is new, although Ross models dividend policies as a choice variable (in my model
corresponding to interest diversion features).
Modeling techniques for non-standard option valuation are discussed in Kwok (1999), while
Duffie and Garleanu (2001) and Gibson (2004) calculate the effect of volatility specifically on
CDO tranches. In the numerical analysis, deal structure is informed by Goodman and Fabozzi
(2002) while default risk is calibrated according to various Moody's Investor Services reports
(e.g. Moody's Investors Service (2004a)).
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents, and Section 3 analyzes, the
basic two-period CDO model. Section 4 presents interest distribution policies in a three-period
expansion of the basic model. Section 5 discusses proposed structural modifications and Section
6 concludes.
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2.2 Model Detail (Two-Period)
I start with a simple, stylized CDO model. There is no interest rate risk and no time-
discounting.8 Cashflows are evaluated on a risk-neutral basis.
Typically CDOs issue sequential liabilities (x1...xQ-l ) with respective coupon rates (y...yQ-1).
These tranches will be differently affected by management behavior depending upon how low in
the capital structure, i.e. how equity-like, they are (as in Duffie and Garleanu (2001)). I focus on
the combined debt tranche, X = EQ-1l xi, with weighted-average coupon Y = Q 1 l xiyi/X.
Residual risk belongs to the equity tranche, denoted by xQ. The manager participates in the
deal via debt and equity shares vX and Q.
The debt size at issuance, Xo, is limited by a default frequency target, drawn from the debt
tranche's desired rating level and assumptions about the riskiness of the beginning collateral
pool. I follow rating agency criteria in proscribing no benefit to managerial effort. The size
of X0 is crucial as it determines the leverage in the CDO.
Debt is collateralized by a portfolio of bonds with initial par value F. There are two
types of collateral, "good" (G) and "bad" (B) bonds, distinguished solely by their probability
of default. The observed types determine market prices b, which are used to price trades.
Bonds make interest payments at the periodic rate of c. This pays for debt interest at rate
8There are two complications resulting from interest rate risk. First, if defaults occur faster than expected,
CDOs may become overhedged with respect to their fixed-rate collateral and floating-rate liabilities. This
accentuates loss in a declining rate environment but can be captured through a higher default rate. Second, the
manager can exploit coupon differences in favor of equity. See Section 2.4, Prop. 7 for an discussion of this.
Since deals possess unequal levels of interest rate risk but share default risk, I focus on the latter.
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Y. As in all debt markets, interest distributions are made on the basis of face value rather
than market value.
I reduce the CDO time frame considerably. CDO tranches are long-dated instruments whose
periodic interest payments and interest diversion features make them a complicated time-series
of options on the collateral pool. For illustration I reduce to a 2-period model where the
manager has one decision-making period. 9
In what follows superscript X, Q, C, and M refer to the debt tranche, equity tranche, entire
CDO, and CDO manager, respectively.
2.2.1 Time t = O
At date 0, the deal is structured and brought to market backed entirely by generic, high-quality
collateral of type N = G. The debt price is set off the assumption of a static collateral portfolio,
that is no effort-based or risk-shifting trades, meaning debtholders will in actuality get a non-
:zero return. Let Vti represent the cumulative expected value stream to each CDO participant i
at time t (after current cashflows have been distributed), Bo the initial dollar price of a tranche,
and Ri the rate of appreciation, or for simplicity the expected return, to tranche i. Then the
tranche price and return to debt investors is
BoX = VX /XBX =VONT/XO (2.1)
RX = V X /V oX NT -1
where VOXNT is the static pricing assumption valuation and VOX the valuation based on the
manager's actual behavior.10
The amount equity must contribute is the difference between the capital raised from debthold-
9In Section 2.4 I model an expanded 3-period model with two decision-making periods.
10 Deal structurers typically run cashflow analyses for their clients based on characteristics of the initial collateral
portfolio. Rating agencies, while not providing guidance on prices, rate and size tranches based solely on initial
collateral default assumptions. Of course, data is often available on the manager's previous default performance
relative to his peer group and rating agencies have recently begun to account for reinvestment risk. In numerical
results I relax this assumption.
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ers and the cost of collateral boGFo. This establishes the equity investment price and return
BoQ = (bFo - BoXXo)/(Fo - Xo)
(2.2)Q VQ/(b Fo - BoXo) - 1
I assume the manager is capital-constrained and limits his purchases accordingly.
The market price b of a collateral bond is determined by its default characteristics. For
tractability I approximate the binomial distribution with the Poisson distribution. Poisson
probabilities approach binomial probabilities as the number of bonds goes to infinity or the
probability of default goes to zero. The Poisson probability for the number of defaults d in a
continuous period of length t, with default intensity A > 0, is
ndI = e-At(At)dd! (2.3)
Suppose there are a large number of bonds, with total face value of 1. Since bonds are
identical and i.i.d. and participants are risk-neutral, the price of this portfolio is the unit price
of an individual bond. Also, let each default wipe out 1 - 0 percent of current collateral par,
so that the remaining par at time 1 is ed. The price of the unit portfolio weights time 1 value
by fI d , establishing the initial price of a type n bond to be
oo
b E jd Oad (bK + c) (1 + c)e2AK(l) t ce(1) (2.4)
d=O
using the time 1 collateral price b = (1+ c)e- ( 1- 0) .
This price formula uses what can be considered an expected loss or depreciation rate for
the portfolio, A,(1 - ), and exponentiates it to weight due cashflows by expected remaining
portfolio par. Though a portfolio or individual bond is priced risk-neutrally, debt and equity
investors are impacted by risk. A represents the default rate in the portfolio, while k represents
the loss given default. A more concentrated portfolio is proxied by a lower 0 (assuming AK is
decreased to keep the expected loss rate constant). The lower 0, the larger the tail risk in the
portfolio, capturing a lack of diversification or systemic risk.
Date 0 tranche/cashflow valuations are simply the expectation of t = I cashflows and future
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expected cashflows. Let Nt represent the payments made to each participant i at time t
(detailed in Section 2.2.2 below). Then
vX = EoNX + EoVX
V0 = EoNQ + EoV (2.5)
VOM = EN1 M + EoVlM
2.2.2 Time t = 1
Between date 0 and 1 defaults realize. Original face value F0 adjusts to reflect new defaults by
F1 = dF (2.6)
Interest cashflows are distributed to CDO participants and subsequently the manager decides
on effort provision and risk-shifting.
Interest Payment
Each non-defaulted collateral asset makes a coupon payment at rate c. Available cashflow,
cIdlFo, is distributed amongst participants according to a set priority of payments (or "wa-
terfall" in industry parlance). The debt tranche is due a coupon payment at rate Y. Since
equityholders receive any residual interest, the interest distributions Nt' are expressed as op-
tions. The manager's total time I payment consists of his shares of the debt and equity
payments:
NX = cF1 - max (0, cF1 - XoY)
NQ = max (0, cF1 - XoY) (2.7)
NM = vXNX + vQNfQ
If there is insufficient collateral interest to make the debt interest payment, equityholders
receive no cash and the debt level is increased ("PIK'ed" or "Paid-In-Kind") to reflect the
unpaid interest. New debt accrues interest at the same interest rate Y and is carried forward
tlo the next period according to
X = Xo(l + Y)- NX (2.8)
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Effort and Risk-Shifting Decision
First I examine the manager's effort choice. The manager's effort level is unobservable and
expressed through trading.11 While available collateral bonds fall into two distinct types,
good and bad, these bonds may become misclassified. Misvaluation occurs if a bond is priced
according to its identified type but the actual, underlying default process is not supportive of
that type. Value-adding trades result from finding under-valued bonds in the market universe.
An under-valued bond is identified as low-quality but is actually high-quality.
The manager chooses a continuous effort level with cost E(e). Effort takes effect through
a function (e) having the following attributes: 1) it represents the fractional portion of the
collateral which is traded for good but misclassified bonds, building par; 2) boundaries are
E(0) = 0 and (oo) = 1 with /O > 0; and 3) effort exhibits decreasing marginal re-
turns or 02~/Oe2 < 0. As usual the cost function (e) is increasing and convex in effort
0aE>, aE >0 )
The gain from expending effort is dependent upon the market value ratio : of the two types
of collateral, as well as the transactions costs loss in trading I - I. High-quality collateral
is sold at the t = 1 market price bG and reinvested into misclassified bonds at the low-quality
market price bB. However a transactions cost 1 - T is incurred making the par value gain
on the exchanged portion of the portfolio, (e)F1, equal to BiE - 1.12 After effort par value
increases to Ff, defined as
F = PI(e)F 1 + (1 - ())F1 (2.9)
Collateral market prices b and bB are determined by the default process in Eq. (2.3) estab-
lishing
b = d=-o nad (1 + c) = (1 + c)e- A ( 1- ) (2.10)
bA (2.10)d -- = e(1- 0)(AB-AG)
The larger the gap in default expectations, that is the larger AB -AG, the more the manager
gains from effort provision. Likewise, the larger the transactions costs loss, that is the further
1l From a practical standpoint, a portfolio manager can only affect returns through trading. Whatever research,
surveillance, or analytics he does translates to gains only when acted upon.
12Obviously if fi is so negligible or T costs are so prohibitive as to make I < 1, there is no benefit from effort.
I concentrate on the relevant instances where the reverse holds true.
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I from 1, the lower the manager's incentive to provide effort. The maximum par the manager
can deliver is /3'F 1, obtained when ((e) = 1, while F1 remains at F1 if he provides zero effort.
After effort-driven trades the manager chooses whether to risk-shift. This is modeled as an
option to switch the remaining portion of the collateral into truly bad collateral with default
intensity AB. The par value gain is still given by the market value ratio /3. However, risk-
shifting trades do not lead to any economic value gain, as the higher default rate counterbalances
the par gain. If the manager chooses to remain invested in good bonds (NS) the collateral par
and default rate remain at
F1,NS = F1 = F1 (1 + (()(3' - 1)) (2.11)
A1,NS = AG
On the other hand, risk-shifting or switching in my terminology (SW) produces the maximum
par value gain and an increase in portfolio default intensity to13
F1,sw = -
ln3 + ln(1 + ~()( - 1)) - ln(1 + (±) (2.12)(2.12)A1,SW = Asw1 - + AG
Alsw is derived from a no-arbitrage equation, ensuring that the remaining collateral (1 - (e))Fl
is switched on a value-neutral basis. Specifically, expected cashflow for both the beginning
:portfolio F1 and the post-switch portfolio Flsw are equivalent, when the remaining portfolio is
switched with no transactions costs. In actuality, expected cashflow from Flsw is lower due to
the transactions cost loss of (1 - I)F. 14 In the special case where effort is zero, Asw reduces
to AB and expected portfolio par becomes EiF2,sw = e-AG(1-)JF1.
The manager decides on his optimal effort level and switching behavior jointly. To identify
'
3The one observible aspect of the manager's risk-shifting is the larger traded volume. This suggests one
could limit risk-shifting by limiting the allowed amount of par-increasing trades. Although I explore this as an
extension in Section 2.5, initially I model what is effectively a 100% par-increasing limit. This is useful because:
1) Cost estimates are based on the maximum traded volume, providing an upper bound and 2) Over a 6-year
period, this translates into 16 2/3% turnover annually, while typically CDOs allow 15%-25% annual discretionary
trading. That is, effort can be reasonably considered as more of a continuous process than the binary approach
I take here for simplicity.
14The expression for Asw is an approximation chosen to keep the default distribution univariate. This
approximation posits a switch to a bond of type K = SW, with default intensity Asw, rather than having a
bi-modal portfolio composed of both high and low-default-intensity bonds.
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his payout, the manager looks ahead to date 2 cashflows, identifies both eCw and e*S, and
evaluates his maximal switching policy. That is,
ViM* = max ax (EN w ()) max (E1NM- ())]
ViTM2,SW - 1 2,NS
e* = argmax [V] (2.13)(2.13)
G if e* = NS
SW if e* = ew
His effort level and switching decision are used in the calculation of date I valuations
V1X(dl) = ElN2X (*(dl), p*(dl), dl)
vIQ(dl) = E1N 2 (*(di), *(di), d) (2.14)
VM(dl) = vXVX(dl) + ,QVQ(dl)- -(E*(dl) )
2.2.3 Time t = 2
At date 2, non-defaulted bonds mature, paying back their par value and making their final
coupon payment. The final principal amount of
F2 = Od2F;,n (2.15)
generates cash at rate 1 + c which goes towards debt redemption and equity residual. Date 2
distributions are
N2X = (1 + c)F2 - max (0, (1 + c)F 2 - X1 (1 +- Y))
N2- max (0, (1+ c)F2 - X1 (1+ Y)) (2.16)
N-A = vXN2X + vQNQ
2.2.4 Solution and Calibration
The standard approach of backwards induction is used to solve for expected cashflows, optimal
manager behavior, and tranche rates-of-return. I take the initial CDO capital structure and
intensity parameters and project each possible t = 1 default realization. The default realization
determines intermediate cashflows and the manager's joint effort and trading decision, which
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then implies expected tranche payouts at t = 2. Tranche values at t = 0 are the probability-
weighted average of the future expected cashflows.
Thus, at t = 0, given initial face value Fo, let d1 identify the point at which the equity
tranche begins to receive residual interest at t = 1. Above this default point, the debt tranche
receives all interest cashflow; below, the debt tranche receives XoY while equity receives the
residual. Setting cFl = XoY yields
dl ( (2.17)
lnq
Then t = 1 cashflow expectations are
Eo NX = ce-AG(1-)F- E IAd [ckdFo- XoY]
d<d
EoN - , ZIAG - XoY] (2.18)
d<dl
EoN M = Xce-AG(1-+)Fo + (Q - vX) E dAG [cOdFo - XoY]
d<dl
Cashflows at t = 2 are determined similarly. At t = 1, given X1 and F' ,, let d2,, identify
the point at which the equity tranche finishes in-the-money. This is solved for as before yielding
n (X(1 Y))
d2,, = ( (2.19)
In q
Then time 2 cashflow expectations are
E1NX _Hd x(1 ( Y) A (1 + ± ¢FC)SdFK
d<d 2 ,, d>d 2,,K
E1NQ= _Hd [(1 + c)qdF F - X 1(1 + Y)]
d<d2,,
E1NM = VX (1 + c) e-An(l-0)F1, + (Q - vX) E I [(1 d + C)dF - X1 (1 + Y)]-- 2A, [(A c) i n-Xi(1 q- )]
d<d2,,
(2.20)
For both n = NS and n, = SW the manager maximizes E 1N M over e,. The first-order2, ovr .Tefis-re
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condition for effort when the manager does not switch is
Inda (1 + c) ( - 1)e-AG(1)F1 (eVS)(2.21)
(2.21)
The first-order condition for effort when switching is15
= OAsw O 
e-Asw(l1-)/3F1 (VX (1 + C)
+ n sw (AW 1) [vQ(1 
d<d2,wAsw AS - d d
-DA: = nd 
OA, OA AK
(2.22)
E nd sw ( d
- c)/34dF 1 - (Q _ VX) X1(1 + Y)]
(2.23)
The manager's gain from risk-shifting (holding effort constant, or sw = NS = ) is
=x (1 + c) (P - 1) (1 - (e)) e-Asw(l-)F1
d2,sw
HG [(1 + C) N FNS
- XI (1 + Y)]
- X(1 + Y)]
This is a good indicator of the manager's switching policy, although technically he chooses for
eS < ew. The manager's effort and switching policy is solved for each possible dl realization.
This determines t = 1 values in Eq. (2.14) and hence t = 0 valuations in Eq. (2.5).
I compute managerial effort choices, risk-shifting decisions, and ultimate tranche returns
numerically. The majority of deal parameters are set by outside sources, mainly Moody's
15The NS and SW FOCs are not universally correct, since the value functions are only stepwise concave.
The summation term in the manager's NPV is defined over integer default levels whereas effort raises F,,, and
hence d2,,i continuously. Usually marginal effort does not increase d2,, enough to surpass the next d2 integer.
However when d2,, rises above the next highest integer value there will be a jump in marginal effort return,
possibly generating multiple roots. These non-concavities gradually smooth out with the diminishing returns to
higher effort.
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( x
d>d2,NS
IIAG + V
d<d2,NS
- (W )
using
ivM (2.24)
I
OE *s> 
- 1
-)
Research Services and Goodman and Fabozzi (2002). Default and leverage parameters are
calibrated for a six-year total deal time frame, using Moody's default statistics and CDO rating
methodologies. Default intensities A, represent six-year cumulative default rates. Along with
b, they are based off the six-year collateral loss rate for their targeted rating level, assumed
recovery rate level, and choice of deal concentration level. A debt default limit of 0.25% is
imposed, corresponding to the six-year cumulative default rate for Aaa-rated securities. The
initial collateral level is scaled to F0 = 10. These parameters establish the maximum support-
able debt level X0.
Managerial ownership shares are informed by current CDO market structure. It is common
for managers to own up to 33% of the equity tranche. I explore debt ownership shares equivalent
in terms of total deal ownership.
The main choice parameters are effort parameterization and level of transactions cost.
Transactions costs are informed by common bid-ask spreads in asset markets and scaled to
a small but reasonable cost of 0.50%. Clearly, the higher transactions costs, the lower the
value added by effort and the higher the cost of would-be risk-shifting. Effort parameters are
chosen to provide a reasonable level of effort and a range of first-best CDO excess returns. As
discussed in Proposition 5, for even extremely conservative assumptions on effort effectiveness,
the results in this paper hold true.
Results presented in the text encompass three different deal characteristics, four effort as-
sumptions, and various mispricing scenarios. The deal characteristics are level of portfolio
concentration, level of transactions cost, and volatility option. The baseline is a deal with
2.5% asset concentration (loss given default is approximately 1.5% factoring in recovery rates),
a transactions cost loss of 0.50%, and an option to switch into Ba-rated collateral. Variations
on this are no transactions cost loss, 5% asset concentration, and the option to switch into
B-rated collateral. Deal parameters are ranged across four effort parameterizations ( = 0,
weak, medium, and strong). I also consider certain mispricing possibilities: mainly the use of
observed or amplified default rates from recent years, rather than mean historical rates, and
for instance the unanticipated option to switch into C-rated collateral.
Appendix I presents further details and lists of parameterizations referenced in the text.
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2.3 Model Results (Two-Period)
This section analyzes the efficiency implications of a positive equity ownership scheme (PEC).
There are two conflicting agency problems, the manager's disinclination towards effort and eq-
uity's benefit from volatility. The compensation scheme which produces the highest expected
equity return is necessarily a constrained maximizer and will be sub-optimal in some contin-
gencies. The PEC is the cheapest contract and does the best job of promoting effort and
minimizing risk-shifting in the most probable outcomes (good performance). The byproduct
of this is that it may do the worst job in poor performance outcomes. I start with a cursory
look at the first-best case in order to provide a frame of reference. Away from first-best the
overall cost-benefit analysis to PEC is decided by measuring the equity rate-of-return.
Proposition 1 In the first-best case, in which v x = vQ = 1, the manager provides optimal
effort and never switches into low-quality collateral.
The no-switch result is easily established by comparing NPVs. Whenever vX = vQ = v,
the probability sum term in the manager's NPV (Eq. (2.20)) drops out, leaving
V1 ,= v (1 + c) e-A(l-)FF, (2.25)
Plugging in the F,K and A, terms from Eqs. (2.11)-(2.12) establish an NPV ratio of (for
eSW -- eNS = e)
VM S = e(AswAG)() 1 1) > 1 (2.26)
For every possible effort level e his value from not switching is higher, by the transactions costs
loss saved on the non-switched portion of the portfolio. Since the manager's debt and equity
interests balance out, he maximizes deal cashflow without regard to tranche.
Effort is provided according to first-best marginal benefits and costs. The first-best FOC
is
= (1 + c) e-AG(1 ()F1I - 1)a (2.27)TIE OE
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from simplifying Eq. (2.21). The expression (1 + c) e-AG(-q)Fl is the expected cashflow from
current asset par, while P3 - 1 is the par increase on the units switched. Together the terms
express the expected cash increase from the modified par. 0e is the marginal increase in
OE
collateral switched for increases in effort, while is the marginal cost. Effort increases with
better default performance (dl ), lower transactions costs ( - 1), and higher market value
gains ( T).
Proposition 2 If the manager owns a proportionate slice of the deal (vX = vQ = v), or if the
equity tranche is completely in- or out-of-the-money, the manager provides effort proportionate
to first-best and never switches into low-quality collateral.
When vX = vQ =- v, the manager will never switch, using the same logic as before. Effort
is provided according to a FOC identical to (2.27) but reduced by his ownership share v.
The same result is obtained when the deal becomes "riskless", i.e. the equity tranche is
completely in- or out-of-the-money. For instance, if deal performance is so poor that debt
becomes the residual claimant, the manager's NPV reverts to his debt interest in the collateral
V, = vX (1 + c) e- (l-)F, (2.28)
Likewise, as equityholders becomes more certain to receive payments, d2 , - 00o and the man-
ager begins to maximize deal value without regard to the debt level. The manager's NPV
consists then of his constant debt share and his share of the equity residual or
V1M = Q (1 + c) e-A^(l-)F - (vQ - vX)X1(1 + Y) (2.29)
Both of these NPV expressions imply the no-switching result and yield effort proportionate to
first-best weighted by his debt share and equity share respectively. When there is no risk in the
deal, there is no opportunity for the manager to benefit by redistributing risk amongst tranches.
To view effort reaction to partial ownership, see Figure 2-4. The top line shows first-best
effort, while the lower straight line shows a v = 2.5% ownership share.
Proposition 3 When vX vQ, effort tilts toward default outcomes where the manager's hold-
ings receive the marginal impact. An equity-holding manager works when the equity tranche is
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in-the-money, and a debt-holding manager works when the debt tranche is in-the-money.
When the manager's debt and equity shares differ, he is sensitive to which tranche gains the
most from his actions. This intuition is evident in his NS-FOC for effort (Eq. (2.21)). It differs
from first-best through the marginal return term vX d _dN d dQ I .d<d Thisd>jd2zNS Ac ' 1 Ed<d 2,N kAG'
term is the probability each tranche finishes as the residual claimant, weighted by the manager's
ownership shares vX and vQ. Only for d2 default realizations in which equity finishes out-
of-the-money does the manager's debt share provide an incentive; only when equity finishes
in-the-money does the manager's equity share provide an incentive. The worse the time 1
default realization, the more reliant the effort incentive is on vX , and vice-versa.
Figure 2-4 illustrates effort response to performance in a no-switch setting. The top line is
first-best ownership. The two kinked lines show 33.8% equity ownership (line decreasing to the
right) and 2.7% debt ownership (line increasing to right). Each of these shares is equivalent to
2.5% deal ownership in this example. 100% equity ownership would replicate first-best effort
when performance is good, representing 7.4% deal ownership. 100% debt ownership replicates
first-best effort when performance is bad, representing 92.6% deal ownership.
Figure 2-5 illustrates each tranche's effort gains for the same deal parameters as in Figure
2-4. Total CDO gain is equal to the sum of debt and equity gains decreased by the effort
costs of the manager. In Figure 2-5-A, the manager owns a proportionate 2.5% of the deal.
Marginal benefits accrues to equityholders when time 1 defaults are low and debtholders when
defaults are high. In Figure 2-5-B, the manager owns 2.7% of the debt tranche. As the debt
payout becomes less certain the manager provides increasing levels of effort, the benefits of
which predominantly accrue to debtholders. Figure 2-5-C shows the converse, in which the
manager owns 33.8% of the equity tranche. Effort declines rapidly as performance worsens and
the vast majority of gains accrue to equity.
Proposition 4 Only if vQ > vX will the manager switch. Whether he does so depends on
the risk in the deal and the strength of transactions costs. He is most likely to risk-shift when
transactions costs are low ( - 1) or equity payouts in jeopardy (X1 - F1 while X1 < 3F 1 ).
The manager will only pursue risk-shifting trades if he owns more equity than debt. This
is because the debt tranche loses unequivocally from risk-shifting, from both extra volatility
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and the transactions cost loss. (For now I restrict effort to zero to focus on the risk-shifting
incentive).
It is not immediately obvious that the risk-shifting incentive from traditional corporate
finance literature would operate in this context. Standard agency models deal with a manager
who owns a call option on firm equity. For a mean-constant volatility increase, he receives
the greater upside of the firm but still has the same downside, and so is always risk-loving.
But bond payouts are capped - as bond market participants like to remark, "there is no upside
in bonds". Bond investors are displeased with a firm that suddenly becomes more risky and
frequently insist on leverage covenants.
However, here the manager chooses to increase the riskiness of the CDO bond collateral, and
receives a higher par value in exchange. Equity benefits from the greater upside of the portfolio
value, not of the individual firms which constitute the collateral portfolio. Bond market
investors might be content with more volatile firms if their face value (or spread) increased in
compensation - exactly what happens in the CDO when the manager switches. 16
Another way to look at this is from the CDO debtholders' perspective. Suppose there
are no transactions costs ( = 1). When the manager trades into low-quality collateral, the
higher portfolio default rate AB counteracts exactly the par value gain. Risk-neutral, pari
passu investors are indifferent to this trade. For each possible default outcome they receive
the full upside which compensates for the increased default risk. However debtholders only
receive the upside of the par value gain when equity finishes out-of-the-money. Elsewhere they
receive their capped debt level X1. So long as there is a positive possibility of equity finishing
in-the-money, the debtholders are worse off. Debt's loss is equity's gain and whenever vQ > x
the manager's equity position gains more than his debt position loses. He will always switch.1 7
16 Actually, bond investors may benefit from greater firm volatility if the firm is performing badly. A call
option on a firm's bond is a "vertical spread". This position consists of a long call on the underlying firm at
a low strike price and a short call at a higher strike price. The partial derivative of the call option value with
respect to the volatility of underlying firm returns is known as the "vega" and is always positive. The net effect
of volatility depends on the relative vega importance of the two calls. When the long call is at-the-money, vega
is higher for the long call, and the portfolio gains. Volatility is more valuable, the more equity-like the bond is,
that is, the further from full repayment it is.
'
7Note the corrolary that when a manager's ownership is tilted towards debt (v x > vQ ) he wants to reduce
volatility by trading into higher-quality investments.
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When I < 1, transactions costs offset the manager's gain from risk-shifting. Whether they
are large enough to outweigh the gain depends on the strength of the manager's tilt towards
equity and the current leverage in the deal. The higher leverage is, the more attractive limited
liability becomes, and the larger the share of transactions costs born by the debt tranche. For
instance refer to the expression for the manager's gain from switching Eq. (2.24). The first
term, -vX (1 - p) (1 + c)e- A G(1- )F 1, is negative, representing the transactions costs loss on
the manager's share of the debt tranche. As vX - 0, this term goes away. The extra
(v _- vX) (1 - I) transactions costs loss when equity finishes in-the-money is captured in the
second, bracketed term.
The main advantage to the manager from switching is his limited downside, expressed in
the second, bracketed term. The increase in collateral par value to F1,sw does not compensate
for the fact that equity finishes out-of-the-money more frequently. The only gain is that X1
is repaid with probability >d2,W Hnd rather than E d2,N d When X1 is high relative tois repaid with probability _=0 HAB d ' AG'
e-AG(1-)F1, the bracketed term is likely to be positive. What determines whether the manager
switches is whether vQ - vX weights the gain enough to overcome the broad transactions costs
loss.18
Interest arbitrage (that is, c > Y) increases the gains and losses from risk-shifting if it
supports an increase in initial leverage Xo. Higher leverage and more default risk means
higher benefits of limited liability to equity. Gains and losses grow with c - Y.
Figure 2-6 illustrates the magnitudes and frequencies of risk-shifting losses, for various para-
meter sets, assuming the manager owns equity and no debt (vX = 0, v/Q > 0). These numbers
are the expected time 2 value changes from the manager's switching decisions, measured from
a no-effort baseline. Points on the x-axis are where the gains to equity would be negative,
so the manager remains in good collateral. Points above zero show positive gains to equity,
while points below zero show losses to debt. The total CDO loss is the sum of debt and equity
gains, 1 - T of the discounted face value. Risk-shifting peaks in the middle range of default
realizations. There performance jeopardizes but does not wipe out equity.
'
8Both Ross (1997) and Leland (1998) find solitary breakpoints at which the manager begins to maximize
volatility. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) find a cutoff NPV loss which equityholders are willing to accept in
exchange for higher volatility, and that this number increases as firm leverage increases.
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Four parameter sets show different concentration levels, absence of transactions costs, and
a worse bad type collateral. With the 2.5% concentration level, risk-shifting is attractive
for time 1 defaults of dl = 4...6. With a 5% concentration level, risk-shifting occurs earlier
(di = 2, 3), is more probable, and causes greater gains and losses. As concentration increases,
tail events become more likely, and the benefit of limited liability is more significant. This
suggests that CDOs with less diversity in their holdings should have seen more disadvantageous
managerial behavior. This also highlights the nature of CDO investments as a correlation
play. Any increase in systemic risk or name-by-name correlation, whether deliberate or from
underestimation, makes risk-shifting more prevalent than anticipated.
The third parameter set presents the 2.5% concentration level with = 1, i.e. no trans-
actions costs. Risk-shifting begins immediately (d = 0) and continues until the manager's
equity option is out-of-the-money at dl = 8. Tranche changes are larger by the reduced trans-
actions costs. Here risk-shifting is a pure transfer between debtholders and equityholders. It
is interesting to note that even a small NPV loss, here a transactions costs loss of 0.50%, can
deter risk-shifting in most cases. The extra risk-shifting occurring at d = 0...3 due to no
transactions cost loss represents 99.76% of default outcomes by probability weight.
The fourth parameter set increases the volatility option of the manager. The bad type
default intensity, AB, is larger, reflecting a move to single-B rather than to double-B-rated
collateral. The manager's upside is now larger so that there are default situations where
switching brings him in-the-money but wouldn't have before. In this case the manager risk-
shifts more frequently (dl = 2...9) and with larger costs.
This suggests that managers can exploit quality and price differences in collateral rated at
the same level. Particularly in a market with rapidly deteriorating collateral, rating agencies
may not keep pace in terms of making timely downgrades. Managers can "cherrypick" assets
which are more volatile but remain highly enough rated to keep within any ratings-based trading
restrictions. Such assets produce larger risk-shifting gains to equity, across a wider range of
outcomes. This description of events meshes nicely with what occurred in the late 1990's.
Unprecedented high levels of defaults occurred in the early goings. Rating agencies were late
following through with downgrades, evidenced by the continuing high downgrade levels in 2002
and 2003 even though the bulk of credit worsening and defaults had already occurred.
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Risk-shifting gains and losses can be significant in absolute terms but are modest in per-
centage terms. Debtholders see ex-post percentage losses of between 1/2% - 2%, and equity
often increases in value by between 33% and 100% (CDO loss is simply the transactions cost
loss). Because of the low probability of realizing high levels of defaults, ex-ante losses are
minute. Table 4-A presents various cost-of-risk-shifting measures, for effort restricted to zero,
measured from a no-switch baseline. Expected losses range from about 2 to 7 basis points -
not necessarily insignificant when the typical spread on a Aaa asset ranges between 25 and 50
basis points.
Risk-shifting has a significant impact on default probability and supported leverage levels.
For instance, in 5 of the 6 cases (all but the 2.5% concentration level) risk-shifting inflates the
debt default probability dramatically, so that the implied rating on the debt tranche falls to
triple-B or below. Depending on credit yield curves, this easily represents over 200 basis points
of extra spread cost, much larger than the 40 basis point estimate found in Leland (1998). To
maintain the Aaa debt rating, leverage must decline by several percent. The opportunity cost to
equityholders of having to supply additional funds is calculated as the product of equity's rate-
of-return without risk-shifting (for the Medium effort parameterization) and the percent change
in funds supplied by debtholders due to decreased debt issuance and prices with risk-shifting. I
find increases of between 20 and 250 basis points, depending on the parameterization-dependent
3WQ used. 1 9
Proposition 5 The effort benefits of managerial equity ownership usually outweigh the risk-
shifting costs for the CDO as a whole and each tranche. The equity tranche always gains and
the net effect on the debt tranche is frequently positive. The PEC generates the highest return
for equity investors.
These results depend on parameter selection, but hold true across a wide range of reasonable
parameterizations. The two effects of equity ownership are value-adding effort when perfor-
"1Note that though senior and subordinate debt tranches are combined into one representative debt tranche
here, tranches are differently affected by their position in the capital structure. In general, subordinate tranches
bear a larger portion of the cost of the manager's risk-shifting (but also a larger portion of the gains from effort).
However, a larger increase in default probability may have a smaller effect on implied ratings, extra spread cost,
etc. due to credit / default curves' exponential shape. Modigliani-Miller doesn't hold here due to riskiness of
debt and credit spreads reflecting risk-aversion costs.
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mance is good and costly risk-shifting behavior when performance is bad. Generally the former
situation has much more probability weight on it, resulting in an overall gain.20 Further, risk-
shifting can occasionally result in gains. This stems from an increased effort incentive when
the equity tranche would otherwise be out-of-the-money.
Figure 2-7 illustrates, for a typical parameter set, tranche value changes from managerial
behavior, conditional on the time 1 default realization. Total CDO gains (solid lines) are the
sum of equity and debt gains lowered by the cost of effort. The equity tranche (dotted lines)
benefits across-the-board from both effort and risk-shifting. Debtholders (dashed lines) receive
moderate effort gains when performance is poor, outweighing their risk-shifting losses. One
default realization illustrates the possibility that debtholders can benefit from the risk-shifting
option. For dl = 6 the manager only provides effort when switching resulting in value gains to
each tranche.
In this particular case, ex-ante effort gains fully dominate risk-shifting losses. Whether
they do so in other cases depends on the effort benefit and cost functions (e) and E(e), the
strength of transactions costs, level of equity ownership, and collateral concentration. For
instance, if effort is extremely costly or ineffective, then as - 0, debt and the CDO see a net
loss. Conversely as -e oc, debt, equity, and the CDO gain from effort and risk-shifting never
occurs. Paradoxically, although a PEC leads to risk-shifting, as long as the manager holds
equity it is advantageous to have as large a share as possible. Large vQ shares lead to more
effort and less frequent risk-shifting, since effort gains bolster performance. More collateral
diversification leads to less frequent and less costly risk-shifting behavior. Lastly, as I - 1,
risk-shifting becomes inevitable but the trading loss shrinks until the only effect is redistribution
between tranches.
The PEC is the cheapest effort incentive because it translates into fairly small deal ownership
even for large equity ownership. I.e. equity leverages return by leveraging the manager's effort
incentives. Table 5 shows return numbers for various compensation schemes and parameter
sets, assuming that debt is priced and sized off a zero-effort, no risk-shifting baseline. The
PEC is clearly dominant for CDO and equity returns, and frequently debt. Due to higher effort
20 The higher the initial leverage the less likely good performance becomes. Here leverage is limited by rating
criteria, resulting in a fairly large probability of good performance.
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provision debt investors may benefit more from a PEC than from a debt-share contract (Tables
5-A, 5-C). Debt's excess return is most harmed under a weaker effort assumption (Table 5-B),
when transactions costs are low, or when deal concentration is high (Table 5-D). When the par
gain from switching is high, debt is again better off because the high gains from effort make
poor deal performance and risk-shifting less likely (also Table 5-D).21
It is important to consider whether the misspecification of pricing and parameter assump-
tions could significantly alter these estimates of risk-shifting costs. Investors allege sizable
costs imposed by managers' actions during recent years. Certainly, in high default outcomes,
the cost of risk-shifting becomes more pronounced while the benefit of effort provision becomes
less significant. A wrong belief that CDO trading limits and quality restrictions would prevent
risk-shifting may also have worsened problems. My numeric results indicate that, for the most
part, risk-shifting costs, while higher, are still small both absolutely and compared to the overall
financial stress. For instance, Table 4-A shows two cases of misspecified parameters. The first
is lower portfolio diversification (5% rather than 2.5% concentration) which could be brought
about by underestimated correlation or intentional over-concentration by the manager. If debt
is priced off an assumption of 2.5% deal concentration, ex-ante risk-shifting costs increase by
slightly over 6/10 of a basis point. With a higher volatility option (the manager can choose
to invest in triple-C-quality rather than single-B assets) risk-shifting costs to debt increase to a
higher but still modest 3/4 of a percent. Again what increases most is the probability of debt
default, over 2% and 19% respectively.
Likewise, in many cases unanticipated financial stress does not dramatically increase debtholder
losses. Table 4-B presents risk-shifting numbers based off observed default and loss rates from
the 1998-2003 period, but assuming debt was priced using lower, mean historical default rates.
In some cases (2.5%, 5%, and I = 1) risk-shifting costs increase but still remain in the 8 - 12
basis point range. As can be seen in Table 6, the fundamental economic losses dwarf the added
21The effort assumptions required to make equity ownership superior to debt ownership are very conserva-
tive. For instance, consider the five basic deal scenarios presented in Table 5 (2.5% deal concentration, 5%
deal concentration, no transactions costs loss, Single-B volatility option, and Triple-C volatility option). The
minimum assumptions on effort strength required to generate positive and superior expected CDO returns (for
vQ = 33.8%) translate into six-year cumulative first-best returns of just 0.14, 1.79, 0.0046, 6.13, and 39.42 basis
points, respectively. For debtholders to be better off with equity ownership (assuming a static pricing assump-
tion) the hurdles are much higher. However anytime CDO excess returns are positive while debt's are negative,
there is room for a transfer in the form of better initial debt pricing.
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risk-shifting costs. For instance in the 2.5% concentration case with zero effort, debt return is
-2.11%, decreasing to -2.19% on account of managerial activity.
Exceptions seem to occur mainly when the unforeseen stress interacts with a higher volatility
option. In the Single-B and misspecified triple-C scenarios in Table 4-B, the maximum ex-post
risk-shifting costs to debt are -2.15% and -4.52% of current debt value, respectively. These
are within the range of estimates found in other papers but here are large relative to the
fundamental stress. The ex-ante risk-shifting costs add over 80% and 190%, respectively, to
debt's negative return from bad default performance alone (See Table 6).
These results imply that managers do have opportunities for very costly, deleterious behav-
ior, although it often takes effect through unnecessary downgrade risk. Further, even when
risk-shifting cost estimates are minor, they can be a large component of debt's negative returns,
due to CDO leverage. Note that the higher agency costs and negative returns from observed
default rates do not reverse the PEC's desirability - the shock occurring from 1998-2003 should
be viewed as an occurrence with very low probability weight. However, CDO investors are
actively trying to diminish the possibility of any misspecification via various trading restrictions
and structural improvements.
2.4 Interest Diversion Features in Expanded Three-Period Model
In the wake of recent CDO performance problems, various structural modifications have been
proposed which aim to limit risk-shifting costs. To be able to evaluate these proposals, I begin
with the most prevalent structural feature: interest diversion tests. Such tests exist currently
in almost every CDO and form the basis for many of the proposed structural modifications. In
this section I add such tests to an expanded three-period CDO model and analyze their cashflow
and trading implications. In Section 2.5 I investigate effects of proposed modifications.
These interest diversion, or coverage tests, are par-based collateral tests which divert excess
cashflow away from equityholders. As such they are analogous to dividend policies in Ross
(1997). They are intended to protect debtholders when performance is poor by redirecting
excess interest which would otherwise go to equityholders. Coverage tests are relevant only for
105
irntermediate interest payments. To look at their effect on manager behavior it is necessary to
add a decision-making period to the basic model, one in which the manager affects intermediate
rather than final period CDO cashflows. For complete details of the three-period model setup,
see Appendix 2.
Below I evaluate whether the manager's gain from risk-shifting is larger with increased
cashflow control and whether the presence of coverage tests makes him more or less likely to
switch collateral types. Market participants have argued that managers shift into weaker
collateral in order to boost par, prevent close tests from failing, and keep residual interest
cashflow flowing to equityholders rather than paying down debt. I find that risk-shifting
occurs more frequently with the extra period. However I also find that the coverage tests work
as intended, as a deterrent to risk-shifting trades.
2.4.1 Model Set-up
The time period from t = 1 to t = 2 is subdivided into two half periods, and three things
change. First, interest payments are also made at the t = 1.5 intermediate point. Collateral
bonds make a coupon payment of c at t = 1.5 which is used to pay intermediate interest
distributions N1 5. Second, while the manager still provides effort at t = 1, he now has the
option to risk-shift at t = 1.5 if he has not done so at t = 1. (He cannot switch back).22
Third, the priority of payments at t = 1 and t = 1.5 is altered by the presence of coverage
tests. Without coverage tests, excess interest is distributed to equityholders each period.
However, the most common coverage test, the over-collateralization or OC test, mandates that
whenever the collateral-to-debt ratio falls below a certain trigger level of OC, residual cashflow
is directed towards debt paydowns, to the extent necessary to "cure" the test.
If the OC test is failing and the excess interest available is sufficient to "cure" the test,
equityholders' payout is reduced by the amount necessary but is still positive. When excess
interest is insufficient, debtholders receive all residual interest. The points at which interest is
diverted, as well as the resultant interest diversion amounts, are used in the manager's NPV
calculations. The higher OC, the more likely that interest is diverted to debtholders.2 3
22 Ross (1997) finds reversals are never optimal.
23 When OC is as low as Y/c, there is effectively no coverage test and only interest parameters are relevant.
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As before, the debt level adjusts each period to reflect either insufficient or surplus receipts.
Xt continues to increase for high defaults, when due interest exceeds the available interest
cashflow. Conversely for moderate default levels, interest diversions decrease Xt, what rating
agencies call "deleveraging".
2.4.2 Results
Two separate components have been added to the basic model: an extra decision period and
the performance-based interest diversion feature. I analyze the effects sequentially, focusing on
a manager who does not own debt (vX = 0). Prior results are supplemented by the following:
Proposition 6 For good to moderate default realizations, the manager makes the same risk-
shifting decisions as in the two-period model. However effort and efficiency are decreased by
the ability to switch later.
Neither the t = 1.5 interest distribution nor the manager's option to switch following it
changes the manager's optimal t = 1 risk-shifting policy, for good performance. Even though
the intermediate interest distribution reduces initial leverage (Xo must be reduced by approx-
imately the amount of interest released early, or (c - Y)Fo/2), the manager compares a lower
debt level owed to a lower t = 2 cashflow. Ex-post, per dl, leverage is roughly similar. He
will continue to remain in good collateral where he would have before, and continue to switch
where he would have before. (Note that the volatility benefit of risk-shifting declines as time
progresses. As default uncertainty resolves, the price differential between the collateral types,
and hence equity's upside, becomes smaller (/1.5 < l1). The manager stands only to lose by
waiting). Ex-post effort levels and valuations are roughly the same for d realizations where
the manager continues to switch.
However, wherever he chooses not to switch, he now has the option to switch later, which
he will exercise if high defaults subsequently realize. This option lessens his incentive for early
effort. Since the time period is cut in half, and he only anticipates switching for particular
d1.5 realizations, the ex-post loss from the delayed risk-shifting option is small. For instance
less than 5% of the cost earlier switching. But given the higher probability of reaching these
less severe d realizations, the delayed risk-shifting option adds approximately 12% - 25% to
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ex-ante risk-shifting costs.
In essence, a continuing subdivision of periods gives the manager more and more time
periods to act, and leads to widespread, postponed risk-shifting behavior.
Proposition 7 Equity's intermediate interest option increases the frequency of risk-shifting
when performance is poor.
For high d1 realizations, the t = 1.5 interest option may remain in-the-money even when
the manager's final t = 2 principal option is out-of-the-money. In this situation the manager
will always risk-shift in an attempt to boost his residual t = 1.5 coupon cashflow. He only
ceases risk-shifting when both options are completely out-of-the-money.
This behavior is basically short-termism on the part of the manager. Terminal default risk
factors heavily into the market price ratio /1. However the manager whose date 2 principal
option is already out-of-the-money is unconcerned with principal repayment. To him the
high-quality collateral is priced too richly. A manager with no long-term option value trades
long-term portfolio value for a higher stream of current cashflow.
Gains to equity are larger, the larger the amount of excess interest in the deal. If there is
no interest arbitrage, that is if c = Y, the manager's interest option travels almost one-for-one
with his principal option, eliminating the extra risk-shifting. As c - Y increases, the base of
cashflow which the manager can profitably divert increases. Debtholders absorb the entire
transactions cost loss on the remaining principal in addition to whatever volatility gains the
equity tranche makes. The ex-ante loss is small due to the low probability of attaining the
higher default realizations.
In terms of practical implications, debtholders should be wary of any securities with a tilt
towards interest over principal, for instance high-coupon, premium bonds, high-spread assets,
interest-only securities, or unfunded credit-default swaps. A manager may invest in such
securities in order to maximize short-term interest flows which leak out to equityholders.
The manager's behavior for a typical parameter set is illustrated in Figure 2-8 (again effort
is restricted to zero to focus on the risk-shifting incentive). The topmost figure shows ex-post
risk-shifting costs to the CDO in the two-period model. The second figure shows the new
risk-shifting for d = 7 and higher in the three-period model. For d < 6, t = 1 behavior is
108
unchanged, illustrating the result in Prop. 6. The cost from delayed risk-shifting can also be
discerned at d = 3.
Proposition 8 Interest-diverting coverage tests serve as a deterrent to risk-shifting trades by
lessening leverage as defaults realize. The contingent payments to debtholders allow initial
leverage to be increased. When initial leverage is increased, the primary effect of coverage tests
is to prevent interest-driven risk-shifting.
Coverage tests are an effective way to lessen the manager's risk-shifting incentives. When
defaults are high and the manager is most motivated to risk-shift, such tests pay down debt and
increase equity's share of the deal. This makes risk-shifting less profitable and increases the
manager's share of the transactions costs loss from risk-shifting. In addition, the manager's
equity interest options can be valuable enough that he would prefer staying in less risky collateral
to avoid possibly tripping the tests. When initial debt levels are kept constant, coverage tests
always lead to less risk-shifting.
However, the diverted interest payments alone are a large consideration to debtholders and
can significantly increase the security of debt. This increases the amount of debt a CDO can
issue, increasing equity return. Basically, diversion features allow equityholders to operate at a
higher level of leverage in good performance regimes, when the deal can support it, but decrease
leverage back to the original level in bad performance regimes.
When X0 is increased to maintain default risk, time 1 risk-shifting behavior will improve
less than before but in general will not be worse than without an OC test. The intuition is
that the amount of risk, loosely speaking, is the key to the manager's decision to risk-shift. Xo
is increased to maintain risk, so risk-shifting will not increase past where it would be without
a coverage test. Further, coverage test failures can remove interest options. This counteracts
the manager's incentive to risk-shift in cases where he is only motivated by the intermediate
interest option cashflows.
Manager behavior for a range of OC trigger levels is illustrated in Figure 2-8. The second
plot shows ex-post risk-shifting costs to the CDO in the three-period model without an OC
tlest. The next three plots add OC test levels of 100%, 102%, and 105%. Risk-shifting declines
steadily as OC increases. Even a moderate test level can eliminate much of the interest-driven
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risk-shifting; at OC = 105%, which is already failing given the initial debt level, risk-shifting
returns to roughly its level in the two-period model (top figure). In both the two-period model
and the three-period model with OC = 105%, risk-shifting is driven entirely by the manager's
t = 2 principal option, occurring at dl = 4...6.
Note that the benefit of coverage tests to detbholders comes more through diverted interest
payments than reduced risk-shifting. For instance, in the parameter set presented, there is less
than 1/5000 of a % chance that dl > 6, where risk-shifting can be curtailed. The diverted
interest payments, paid as soon as the tests break, occur with much greater frequency. The
102% test level supports a 1.75% increase in the debt ratio and begins to fail at d1 > 2 (10.37%
likelihood); the 105% test supports a 4.25% increase in the debt ratio and is already failing (i.e.
100% likelihood). Though these test levels can cut ex-post risk-shifting losses to debt by up
to 50%, the diverted interest is over 4 - 6 times the prevented risk-shifting costs. Both factors
make the gains from decreased risk-shifting less significant, in ex-ante terms, than the diverted
interest.
I find no support for the hypothesis that coverage tests induce risk-shifting in order to
prevent interest diversions. Specifically, I find no increased tendency to make risk-shifting
trades due to a desire to circumvent the test and preserve interest flows to equity. Rather,
my model predicts that coverage tests' ability to prevent risk-shifting (assuming leverage is
increased to its maximum) is precisely when interest flows alone would have prompted risk-
shifting. In situations where a coverage test is failing, the manager often wants to risk-shift
anyway, for principal considerations. The only situation in which a failing coverage test might
affect his behavior is if a test is set unreasonably high, bearing little relation to debt repayment.
However, it is unlikely that with such a high hurdle switching collateral types could restore his
interest flow, so he has little to gain from switching. The general effect is to a decline in
risk-shifting.
Proposition 9 Intermediate interest payments induce higher managerial effort when default
performance is poor. Coverage tests increase effort at moderate default levels through reductions
in leverage. However they counteract effort increases for high d, as they remove the manager's
equity interest option.
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The manager's incentive for effort in the three-period model is increased when he holds
a valuable equity interest option. Even when defaults have wiped out the equity principal
option, he remains interested in the deal's progress, as evidenced by his new risk-shifting in
this realm, and will provide positive as opposed to zero effort. The majority of the benefits
of such effort accrue to debt since the equity principal option is out-of-the-money. Whether
these benefits outweigh the costs of the new risk-shifting depends on the effort specification.
For example, in the Medium 2.5% parameterization, the manager risk-shifts at d = 7...19
where he was completely out-of-the-money before. However for each realization the benefits of
now-positive effort outweigh the costs of risk-shifting by about 5% - 10%. Conversely with the
Weak parameterization, the costs of new risk-shifting outweigh the benefits of increased effort
by about 150%. As before, the ex-ante significance is low because of the low probability of
attaining the higher default realizations.
An unambiguous benefit however of coverage tests is to boost effort early on. For moderate
d1 levels, debt paydowns restore equity's interest in the structure and prompt higher effort
levels than would otherwise result.
Figures 2-9 and 2-10 illustrate the effect of coverage tests on the manager's effort and
risk-shifting decisions, showing ex-post value changes to the CDO. In the Medium 2.5% para-
meterization (Figures 2-9), effort is sufficiently beneficial to overcome the costs of risk-shifting.
Coverage tests, beginning with OC = 100% and proceeding to OC = 105%, increasingly elim-
inate effort gains in the high d region but increase effort gains for the low d region. By
OC = 105%, manager behavior is roughly as it was in the two-period model. The most ef-
ficient test level is a quantitative trade-off of more and less probable effort gains (in this case
near OC = 100%).
In the Weak 2.5% parameterization, Figure 2-10, the risk-shifting costs in the high d1 region
outweigh the effort gains. Here coverage tests have an unambiguously positive effect since they
both eliminate risk-shifting losses for high d realizations and increase effort gains for low d1
realizations. The most efficient test level is a quantitative trade-off of more probable effort
gains and less probable risk-shifting gains (again near OC = 100%).
Proposition 10 As before, the effort benefits of the PEC generally outweigh the risk-shifting
costs for the CDO as a whole and for each tranche. CDO returns are roughly the same in the
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two- and three-period model. However, equity returns increase significantly as coverage tests
support an increase in initial leverage.
The analysis of returns for the 2-period model holds true here. That is, for most effort
parameterizations the benefits of the PEC outweigh the costs. As before the PEC becomes
more costly as concentration, transactions costs, or bad-type default risk increases.
Table 7 presents return numbers for various parameter sets and OC trigger levels, assuming
that debt is priced off a zero-effort, no risk-shifting assumption. Frequently both debt and
equity make positive returns through this pricing assumption. Uniformly, equity rate-of-return
increases in OC even if the higher hurdle produces less effort or a lower CDO return. Leverage,
at the margin, is more beneficial to equityholders than effort. Debtholders also generally benefit
from higher OC levels.
2.5 CDO Structural Modifications
Allegations of risk-shifting in CDOs have led to a search for effective structural alterations and
indenture restrictions. Investment banks, rating agencies, and managers have worked to design
new features that are administratively reasonable and make CDO structures more tamper-proof.
Proposed modifications include various manager compensation schemes, alternate interest di-
version features, restrictions on low-priced or low-rated assets, etc. Successful solutions will be
able to promote value-adding effort while curtailing risk-shifting trades. Managers will require
the most oversight when performance is bad.
I present six representative proposals and evaluate their efficacy in the context of my model.
Tables 8A-8F present leverage and return results for all extensions, for various parameter sets.
I assume here that debt is sized and priced taking risk-shifting into account. Thus the measured
value of each proposal gives equity credit for less risk-shifting in terms of greater leverage and
debt price.2 4 Success is judged by equity and CDO rates-of-return. While equity returns
increase with leverage, CDO returns are unchanged in leverage and reflect only the net effect
of effort and risk-shifting. Section 2.5.7 compares results.
24I continue to assume rating agencies give no credit to effort, since they profess blindness with regards to talent
evaluation. However, for simplicity I assume debtholders price in the benefits of both effort and risk-shifting,
making a zero expected return. This focuses the discussion on CDO and equity returns.
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2.5.1 Extension 1: OC Whole Interest Diversions
One simple alteration which can potentially add value to CDO structures is more punitive
coverage tests. The more punitive the outcome to failing, the more effectively coverage tests
deleverage a transaction in stress. Suppose that upon a test failure, all available residual interest
is diverted, rather than the amount necessary to cure a test. This has limited applicability to
the small region where the test is failing but not badly enough to require a complete diversion.
This measure limits risk-shifting slightly through increased deleveraging in times of stress
and by occasionally removing the manager's t = 1.5 interest option. It can support increased
debt levels, generally for moderate test levels. Moderate test levels are mild enough to not
always require full interest diversion, but tight enough to still be reasonably likely to fail. The
larger the available excess interest, the larger the effect.
The effect on effort is small and generally positive. In this as in future extensions, lower
leverage usually induces greater effort. Here, by more aggressive deleveraging, the whole-
interest diversion feature prompts higher effort at low default levels. This is offset by two
potential decreases in effort: First, at moderate default levels, the higher diversions can remove
the manager's interest option completely, rather than partially, lowering effort. Second, there
may be a small decrease in effort for good performance if the more punitive diversions support
a higher initial debt level Xo. Occasionally the latter effect dominates, making the net effort
effect negative.
Equityholders benefit most from this modification if it increases initial leverage. For in-
stance, for most parameterizations equity gains the most when OC = 102%. The CDO usually
gains the most when OC = 105% as this instance generates the greatest increase in effort and
decrease in risk-shifting. Though equityholders gain less from this measure at the 105% test
level, they still prefer the higher test level absolutely, due to the greater initial leverage.
2.5.2 Extension 2: Trade-based Management Fees
Non-contingent management fees are too expensive to use as an effort incentive since they consist
largely of a debt incentive.2 5 However it is possible that contingent fees could specifically reward
25Most managers are paid senior and subordinate fees at a constant rate y on collateral face value. Subordinate
fees are paid between the debt and equity distribution and as such are similar to equity ownership in terms of effort
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the manager for not risk-shifting. I take the approach of rewarding the manager for a declining
trading volume. The deal contracts to pay a senior, contingent time 2 management fee at rate
-y based on the cumulative proportion of traded collateral.
There is always some level - which can completely curtail risk-shifting. However as a
practical matter it is useless to pay y when performance is good, as the manager is not inclined
to risk-shift then, and it may disincentivize effort. To save costs the manager will only be
paid if an OC failure has occurred in the deal, and at the lowest y which completely curtails
risk-shifting.
There is little effect on effort, because the fee is only relevant for high default levels when
OC tests are failing. In these cases, effort provision is generally small, so the trades eliminated
are the down-in-quality, risk-shifting trades. (Assuming the fee / trade schedule is not set too
restrictively). This measure almost always results in CDO gains from reduced risk-shifting,
when including the fee payments made to the manager.
However, the benefit to equityholders depends very much on the prevalence and cost of risk-
shifting. When the default risk added by risk-shifting is largest, the fee payments can support
an increase in initial leverage and improve equity returns. For instance in the Single-B cases
(Tables 8E-8F), by eliminating risk-shifting at d = 8...15 and d = 6...13, respectively, these
fees support a 2.55% (OC = 102%) and 2.00% (OC = 105%) increase in the debt ratio. In
contrast in the Medium 2.5% parameterization (Table 8A), although performance fees eliminate
risk-shifting, the initial debt level X0 must actually decline. The amount of fees paid out is
more detrimental to debtholders than the previous risk-shifting costs. Thus in Tables 8A-8D,
the 2.5% and 5% parameterizations, equity returns decline in two-thirds of the cases, whereas
in Tables 8E-8F, the Single-B parameterization, equity returns increase for all OC levels.
Clearly, for many parameterizations, contingent fees may be too costly a way of eliminating
trading in bad performance regimes. Equityholders may be able to achieve the same effects
without incurring additional cost. See Sections 2.5.4 for a non-contingent trading limit and
2.5.6 for a contingent trading prohibition.
and risk-shifting incentive. Senior fees can be exactly replicated in the two-stage model by adding v = / (1 + c)
to both vX and vQ . Insofar as proportionate ownership is overly costly with regards to effort stimulation, the
same is true of management fees. One reason to pay fees is in case of costly manager bankruptcy risk. If not
being compensated in poor performance times could lead to bankruptcy, and it is costly to the deal to replace
managers, it may be beneficial to pay subsistence level management fees.
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2.5.3 Extension 3: OC Haircuts
One criticism of coverage tests is that they rely on par values and do not reflect more gradual
declines in collateral credit quality. Theoretically managers can rapidly trade a few deterio-
rating bonds, delaying default and keeping portfolio interest flowing to equityholders. That is,
currently only realized collateral losses are factored in, not unrealized losses.
Many market participants have both suggested and begun using strengthened OC tests
which weight assets based on low ratings or market values. Unrealized losses would then
influence cash distributions and provide more protection to debtholders. These "haircuts"
take various forms, for instance carrying C-rated assets at a 50% weight, single-B assets at
80%, any assets with a dollar price < $70 at their current estimated market value, etc. I use
a simple market value weighting of 100% for assets identified as good, and 1/31.5 for assets
identified as bad. Asset haircuts have an effect only at t = 1.5 since the manager is not able
to trade prior to t = 1.
This measure tightens coverage tests equally whether the manager provides effort or risk-
shifts. Surprisingly, it has very little effect on risk-shifting. When tests are already failing,
the haircuts are superfluous. When tests are in no danger of failing, the manager is not likely
to risk-shift anyway. Haircuts occasionally lessen risk-shifting for moderately poor default
outcomes. There they can lower leverage or put a manager's t = 1.5 interest payment in
jeopardy, discouraging trades. Saved costs to debt are usually less than 5% of prior risk-
shifting costs, although for select dl realizations they can be cut by up to 30%.
The most beneficial effect is to increase interest diversions, which increase the amount of debt
that can be issued. In this respect are they similar to whole-interest diversions. Especially in
scenarios with high levels of effort, test failures are both more unavoidable and engender larger
interest diversion payments to debtholders. For instance haircuts increase the supportable debt
ratio by 0.60% (OC = 100%), 1.05% (OC = 102%), and 0.80% (OC = 105%) in the Single-B
scenarios (Tables 8E-8F) These changes are larger than occur with whole-interest diversions
(Extension 1). However haircuts don't increase leverage in the 2.5% portfolio concentration
scenarios (Tables 8A-8B), contrasting unfavorably. There whole-interest diversion tests support
a 1.00% (OC = 100%) and 1.15% (OC = 102%) increase in the debt ratio.
Haircuts have an ambiguous but potentially negative effect on effort. They penalize effort in
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that the more effort the manager provides, the more likely coverage tests are to fail. However,
increasing interest diversions lowers leverage which can yield higher effort. The net effect is
that haircuts are most valuable to equityholders when gains from effort are highest (Single-B
scenarios). Gains stem more from higher diversions and increased leverage than from higher
effort or reduced risk-shifting. CDO returns typically travel inversely with equity returns, due
to negative effort effects.26
2.5.4 Extension 4: Portfolio Turnover Limits
Currently CDOs have discretionary trading limits of typically 15% - 25% annually. However
there are no limits on credit-improved or credit-impaired sales and it is the manager who makes
this designation. As such, trading limits do not appear to limit trading in practice at all.
Trading limits would be more helpful if all trades were classified as discretionary. Here I
impose various hard trading caps (T = 25%, 50%) which are applied to all trades. Depending
on the trade cap and effort parameterization, there are occasions where such limits will prevent
effort-based trades or allow risk-shifting trades.
Frequently the manager will choose to risk-shift where he would have before, but to the
lesser extent allowed by the trade limit. However, the trade limit lessens the amount the
manager can gain from risk-shifting (lower upside). It can thereby prevent risk-shifting in
situations when the manager can no longer boost volatility enough to gain. Risk-shifting costs
to debt are now inversely related to the trade cap. They are usually cut by up to either 75% or
50%, and in some cases by nearly 100%. The decrease in risk-shifting supports a small increase
in initial leverage, but not to the extent increased interest diversions do.
This scenario is naturally very sensitive to the trade cap level. As the trade limit goes
to 0%, the CDO becomes essentially a static deal; as it approaches 100%, there is no effect
on the deal. Set too low, the trade cap blocks optimal effort, and returns will be lower for
all participants (See Table 8E). It is ideal to set T slightly above what would be the trading
26There are various complications to market-value adjustments. Since the adjustment is meant to reflect
credit risk alone, fixed asset prices must be adjusted by an agreed-upon method to eliminate the effect of interest
rate moves. (Corporate bonds are predominantly fixed while loans are generally floaters). In addition, the
reliability of prices can be an issue. Illiquidity, especially for corporate loans or high yield debt, can lead to
wide bid-ask spreads while prices obtained from monthly dealer quotes can be inaccurate if the assets are rarely
traded. Lastly, requiring market value adjustments can impose sizable administrative costs on deals.
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level (eNS) resulting from the no-switch effort choice. Effort levels are then maintained and
risk-shifting is greatly reduced in scope, boosting both equity and CDO returns simultaneously.
Even if leverage does not increase, debtholders pay more for their shares since risk-shifting costs
decline.
In general, trading limits do a better job of increasing CDO returns but a worse job than
OC-based reforms of boosting equity returns. This is particularly true when coverage test
levels are low (None, 100%) or high (105%) since OC diversions and haircuts have little effect
with such test levels. It is also true when the risk-shifting costs to debtholders are largest
(5% Concentration, Single-B scenarios). There curtailing the larger risk-shifting costs is more
beneficial. For instance, in the Medium 5% scenario with OC = 100% (Table 8C), of all
considered proposals SC is at its highest with the 50% trading cap. However RQ actually
declines since there is no increase in initial leverage. The same occurs for the weaker effort
case (Table 8D) at the 25% trading limit.
In practice certain types of CDOs are indeed static or "lightly managed". These are
frequently CMIBS (commercial real estate mortgages) or other ABS asset types (residential real
estate mortgages, securitized auto and credit card loans, etc.). Corporate loan or debt CDOs
tend to have the most lenient trading restrictions. This may attest to the type of value-added
activity investors perceive. Securitized products may be viewed as more diversified and stable,
thus benefiting less from active management. The lower trade limit may allow enough room
for any effort-driven trades the manager wants to make.27
In most cases hard trading caps are more efficient than paying the manager contingent fees
based upon trading levels (Extension 2) because of the extra cost. However in some cases the
reverse is true, especially if the caps are overly restrictive. The manager can choose to ignore
the fee if effort returns are high enough, boosting overall return.
2 7Hard trading caps can be approximated by various ratings-based limits, which are currently included in most
CDOs. Weighted-average rating limits, known as WARF tests, limit wholesale increases in risk. The manager
will either limit his low-rated purchases or be restricted to smaller changes in AB - AG. Various rating baskets
are also limited, such as below-investment-grade, single-B, and triple-C assets. This allows unlimited trading
at the initial rating level, but prevents bifurcation of the portfolio (which increases volatility). These tests,
however, do not prevent the manager from buying riskier collateral that the agencies have not yet downgraded,
and there is frequently a lag between market and agency reassessments. The efficacy of such measures clearly
depend on rating agency accuracy and timeliness, and as such may be less effective than hard trading caps.
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2.5.5 Extension 5: Collateral Purchases from Excess Interest
Another trading restriction currently in use is to require all low-rated or low-priced assets to
be purchased only from available t = 1 or t = 1.5 excess interest. The manager can choose to
divert current equity proceeds and use it for purchase of new collateral. Proceeds are pooled
and the new collateral supports debt just as original collateral does. Not surprisingly, this
measure completely eliminates risk-shifting trades. There is no value-added in buying the bad
type collateral, since they are priced fairly. A value-maximizing manager will not trade certain
equity distributions for uncertain, subordinate future distributions.28
A manager will only choose to invest equity funds if he can add value through effort. For him
to do so, the value-added would have to accrue mainly to equityholders, i.e. only when default
performance is good. Purchases are limited to the amount of available interest, indicating this
measure will allow the most effort in deals with high interest arbitrage (c > Y) or low coverage
test levels. This restriction is most advantageous, and supports the greatest increases in initial
leverage, when effort levels are not too large to begin with and the costs from risk-shifting are
large.
Indeed this restriction, of all considered, usually allows for the greatest increases in leverage
(See Tables 8C-8D, OC = None and 100% and Tables 8E-8F, all OC levels) since risk-shifting is
completely eliminated. (Recall rating agencies give no credit to managerial effort, so increases
or decreases in effort do not factor into initial leverage). However because the measure does
not distinguish among good and bad performance regimes, i.e. is overly restrictive, value is
destroyed in all effort parameterizations considered. The manager provides much less effort in
good regimes and either chooses not to, or is unable to, provide any effort or in bad regimes.
CDO and equity returns decline precipitously, more so as effort is more beneficial and coverage
levels higher.
In general this restriction should only be considered when effort benefits are low and risk-
shifting costs high, or excess interest high. Else the loss of effort in good default outcomes
outweighs the prevention of risk-shifting. See Section 2.5.6 for a comparison with a contingent
28 This measure provides an interesting way for a manager to bolster his reputation. When investing equity
interest would be basically a transfer to debtholders, the manager may choose to do so anyways out of a concern
to deliver a promised return.
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trading prohibition.
2.5.6 Extension 6: Contingent Trading Prohibition
A more targeted trading measure than in Extensions 2, 4, and 5 would be simply to eliminate
all purchases (or low-rated purchases) when coverage tests are failing. With no or low coverage
test levels, this measure has little effect. With higher test levels the constraint becomes tighter,
eliminating the most risk-shifting and supporting the greatest increases in leverage.
This measure also restricts effort, overly so when tests are extremely tight (for instance, in
all cases when OC =- 105%) but less so when test levels are moderate. For instance, in the
2.5% and 5% parameterizations (Table 8A-8D, OC = 102%), a contingent trading prohibition
yields the second highest equity return of all extensions considered, although a reduced CDO
return. At an OC test level of 105%, both CDO and equity returns decline drastically from
reduced effort; provision.
On the whole such a restriction is beneficial in eliminating risk-shifting but may be too
onerous in not allowing effort. It will work best if it has its own supplemental trigger level not
coinciding with OC.
2.5.7 Discussion
On the whole, the most effective and widely applicable measures are Extensions 1 and 4, which
succeed in boosting both CDO and equity returns. Whole-interest diversions are very effective
when the coverage levels are moderate (otherwise they add little in severity to the current test
level). Trading caps are extremely effective across all coverage levels but only when the trade
cap is not set too restrictively. Contingent trading restrictions (Extension 6) are effective at
boosting equity returns by increasing initial leverage. However they can be costly in terms of
restricting effort, particularly when coverage test levels are high, and CDO returns frequently
decline.
When there are large gains to both effort and risk-shifting (Single-B and sometimes 5%
scenarios) Extension 2 and Extension 3 are sometimes preferable to stricter trading caps. Both
allow the manager discretion in deciding whether potential effort gains are worth foregoing
payments - the contingent trading fee and more certain interest receipts, respectively. Extension
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5, allowing trades out of excess interest only, is too restrictive for most environments.
Clearly some of these ideas work better in conjunction. Whole-interest diversions, with OC
haircuts and a contingent trade cap (a combination of Extensions 4 and 6) may be the most
effective combination. They both combat risk-shifting as well as increase profitability.
Lastly, note that many of the above proposals struggle to distinguish between effort-driven
and risk-shifting trades. However they all allow (or can be rewritten to allow) unlimited
"credit-risk" sales, in which a manager sells a deteriorating bond before the market prices in its
greater default risk. Proceeds from such sales can be unambiguously reinvested in good type
collateral. This type of effort-driven trade is not modeled in my paper but is clearly an avenue
by which managers add value in the real world. The greater the proportion of such trades in
the universe of effort-driven trades, the less costly it becomes to strictly restrict purchases of
lower-rated collateral.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a simple model of CDO management which relies on familiar principal-
agent incentive problems. I find that ex-post, debt investors are warranted in complaints about
managerial misbehavior. In periods of poor performance, equity-holding managers slack off and
risk-shift to the detriment of debt investors. However, ex-ante debtholders are often advantaged
by the manager's incentives. For even conservative assumptions on the capabilities of the
manager, the benefits of higher effort outweigh the costs of risk-shifting. In fact debtholders
may have a larger ex-ante excess return when the manager's incentives are aligned with equity
rather than debt. Due to the low cost of equity, it is the most efficient incentive to give
the manager. It yields a higher return to equity investors even when debt investors price in
anticipated risk-shifting costs.
There is always the possibility of parameter misjudgment. If deal or default parameters
are misspecified, the costs of risk-shifting and effort-shirking can grow. However an analysis
using recent default parameters indicates that in all but a few scenarios, financial stress, rather
than risk-shifting-induced stress, would have accounted for the bulk of debt and CDO losses.
The numerical results for risk-shifting in this financial context are consistent with those
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found in more traditional corporate contexts, in that ex-post risk-shifting costs are modest.
However, I find substantially larger increases in debt yields or equity opportunity costs and
significant decreases in initial leverage. Perhaps in contrast to corporate firms, in CDOs even
a few points of leverage is of paramount importance. CDOs' raison d'etre is value creation
through risk-tranching and less tranching implies smaller equity returns. The proliferation of
proposed remedies attests to the desire to control risk-shifting. My numerical analysis provides
a flexible framework in which to evaluate these proposals' ability to add value.
There are several features potentially of relevance to managerial behavior and contract
optimality which I have not explored. The most obvious is debtholder risk aversion. Explicit
risk aversion costs would increase the costs of equity contracts. When risk-shifting diminishes
debt value the most, it always increases volatility the most. A compensatory lower initial debt
level or price would require more upfront funds from equity investors.
Risk-aversion on the part of the manager could deter non-value adding trades, making the
need for structural improvements less pressing. Risk aversion can exist through a concave
objective function brought about by reputational concerns (for both a firm's CDOs and its
traditional asset management business) or company and personal investments. If so, larger in-
stitutional managers, or those CDOs whose managers invested personally, should have delivered
better debt and collateral performance and less turnover. To the extent that the recent stress
period has winnowed out weaker performers, it may have left only CDO shops with significant
franchise value and already curtailed the risk-shifting problem.
A last consideration is contingent contracts. One can imagine managerial contracts which
fluctuate with collateral performance. However, there are both verifiability and coordination
issues. As a practical matter, credit deterioration is not a binary event, but rather a gradual
process which may be difficult to measure. Even portfolio market value would require strict
rules and oversight over the obtainment of bids and pricing assumptions, particularly in less
liquid or assumption-dependent sectors. Credit or trade classifications would inevitably be to
the detriment of certain parties and likely engender protracted, expensive legal negotiations.
This model makes specific predictions about trading activity, trading returns, and collateral
performance. As performance worsens managers are predicted to add volatility, either through
default risk or sectoral concentration, and interest-heavy assets which convert deal principal
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into interest cashflow. In a related paper I test empirically for the strength of these managerial
risk-shifting incentives.
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2.7 Appendix 1: Calibration Detail
2.7.1 Description
In all cases, the initial collateral level is scaled to F0 = 10 and deal parameters scaled to a six-
year time frame. Default parameters are from Moody's Research Services. Default intensities
A, represent six-year cumulative default rates. Along with 0, they are based off the six-year
collateral loss rate for their rating level, assumed recovery rate, and choice of concentration
level. The "good" type collateral is based off Baa-rated collateral. The debt default limit of
0.25% is taken from Moody's six-year cumulative default rate for Aaa-rated collateral. 2 9
I take two approaches to the default calibration. In the first, or "average" approach, I
use average historical default rates from the 1970-2003 period, as well as the average historical
corporate recovery rate of 40%. This is appropriate for new deals since rating agencies evaluate
based on historical outcomes.
In the second, or "amplified" approach, I magnify certain factors to mimic what took place
during recent years. This gives an indication of the observed costs of risk-shifting. I use higher
default rates from the 1998-2003 period, which I further magnify to account for the disparity
between dollar-volume weighted default rates and issuer-weighted default rates. Dollar-volume
weighted default rates more accurately describe actual CDO collateral losses and were several
times higher.30 I also use lower, observed corporate recovery rates for the 1998-2003 period. 31
In addition I increase loss severities to reflect hedging losses that can result from early
defaults and declining interest rates. Corporate bonds are fixed-rate assets, and CDOs generally
hedge their floating-rate liabilities by entering into a fixed-floating swap. As defaults mount,
the deal has less fixed-rated collateral generating cashflow to cover the fixed payment, and the
swap contract becomes more onerous as LIBOR declines (over 5% in this period). I assume
associated hedge costs increased collateral losses by 33%.32
29I use corporate default statistics given their longer history. Moody's stated policy on loan and structured
finance assets is to make their ratings equal to corporate ratings, in terms of default risk and recovery rate. To
the extent performance bears this out, the results suggested by my numerical analysis are applicable to CDOs
of all collateral types.
3 0On average dollar-weighted defaults match issuer-weighted default rates. However the late 1990's saw many
high-volume defaults which skewed the ratio. Dollar-volume weighted statistics are only available going back to
1994. Source: Moody's Investors Service (2004a).
3"Source: Moody's Investors Service (2004a).
32See, for instance, Fitch Ratings (2002a).
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Compensation parameters vX and vQ are varied in the text and figures. Ownership shares
are informed by current CDO market structure. Managers commonly own up to 33% of the
equity tranche, and I explore debt ownership shares equivalent in terms of total deal ownership.
Transactions costs are scaled to a cost of 0.50%, which translates to $50,000 on a $10 million
dollar trade. This figure is roughly consistent with observed bid-ask spreads in various asset
markets.
Interest parameters c, Y, and OC are also varied in the text and figures. The spread
between collateral asset coupons c and liability coupon Y is reasonably between 1% and 5% for
most collateral types. The debt tranche X0 is sized per rating agency assumptions off either
a static portfolio assumption ( = 0, no trading) or one acknowledging risk-shifting ( = 0,
risk-shifting).
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2.7.2 Default Parameters
Parameterizations listed below are the basis for many examples and figures referenced in the
text. The interest parameters shown are c = 0.05, Y = 0.02, and no coverage test. Supported
debt levels shown for a static portfolio assumption (XO,NT) and one that accounts for risk-
shifting (Xo). Amplified scenarios apply higher default rates according to the discussion in
Section 2.7.1. Deviations in the text are noted.
Parameter Set
Variable 2.5% · = 1 5% Single-B Triple-C
A. Average Default Rate Parameterizations
XO,NT (2-pd) 9.540 9.540 9.390 9.540 9.540
XO,NT (3-pd) 9.405 9.405 9.255 9.405 9.405
Xo (2-pd) 9.540 9.150 9.105 9.345 9.095
Xo (3-pd) 9.405 9.015 8.975 9.210 8.945
0.5437 0.5437 0.2719 0.5437 0.5437
(Baa) (Baa) (Baa) (Baa) (Baa)
2.8194 2.8194 1.4097 8.1504 16.5053
(Ba) (Ba) (Ba) (B) (Caa - C)
0.9849 0.9849 0.9699 0.9849 0.9849
(2.5%) (2.5%) (5%) (2.5%) (2.5%)
'1' 0.9950 1.0000 0.9950 0.9950 0.9950
P31 (2-pd) 1.0349 1.0349 1.0349 1.1214 1.2718
P1 (3-pd) 1.0344 1.0344 1.0344 1.1198 1.2679
I1.5 (3-pd) 1.0173 1.0173 1.0173 1.0590 1.1277
B. Amplified Default Rates 1998-2003
1.8092 1.8092 0.9046 1.8092 1.8092
(Baa) (Baa) (Baa) (Baa) (Baa)
2.2731 2.2731 1.1366 10.5846 34.91676
(Ba) (Ba) (Ba) (B) (Caa - C)
0.9768 0.9768 0.9536 0.9768 0.9768
(2.5%) (2.5%) (5%) (2.5%) (2.5%)
]31 (2-pd) 1.0108 1.0108 1.0108 1.2256 2.1543
/31 (3-pd) 1.0107 1.0107 1.0107 1.2224 2.1301
/31.5 (3-pd) 1.0054 1.0054 1.0054 1.1071 1.4678
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2.7.3 Effort Parameters and Returns
Effort strength is the primary unknown in the model. I vary effort parameters to generate a
range of first-best CDO returns and calculate efficiency results for each case. As presented
in Proposition 5, to establish that subordinated manager contracts are preferable to senior
contracts, the assumptions on effort effectiveness are extremely conservative.
The effort return function is ((e) = 1 -e - 1l e , ranging between 0 and 1. The cost function is
E(e) = (2E ¢3. Values for C1, C2, and C3 imply six-year cumulative first-best CDO excess returns
RFB and combine with ownership shares and default parameters in Section 2.7.2 to generate
manager behavior and tranche valuations.
Parameter Set
Return 2.5% = 1 5% Single-B Triple-C
A. Zero Effort: (e = 0): 1 = 0.0, C2 = 3 = °
CFB (2-pd) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RFB (3-pd) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B. Weak Effort Strength: 1 = 0.5, C2 = 0.0750, C3 = 4
RFB (2-pd) 0.6707 0.8213 0.6706 3.6705 10.1332
RFB (3-pd) 0.6586 0.8087 0.6585 3.6092 9.9553
C. Medium Effort Strength: 1 = 0.5, 2 = 0.0025, 3 = 4
RCB (2-pd) 1.4396 1.7395 1.4394 6.9843 17.8175
RFB (3-pd) 1.4153 1.7145 1.4152 6.8764 17.5291
D. Strong Effort Strength: C1 = 1.0, 2 = 0.0005, 3 = 4
SFB (2-pd) | 2.4232 2.8738 2.4229 10.1249 23.8672
RcB (3-pd) 2.3863 2.8365 2.3860 9.9822 23.5112
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2.8 Appendix 2: Expanded (Three-Period) Model Detail
The two additions to the basic model are an extra decision period and a performance-based
interest diversion feature.
The time period from t = 1 to t = 2 is subdivided into two half periods. Interest payments
are now made at both t = 1 and t = 1.5. The manager still provides effort at t = 1 but now
has the option to risk-shift at t = 1.5 if he has not done so at t = 1. He cannot switch back if
he switched earlier.
In addition, certain performance criteria ("coverage" tests) regulate the flow of excess in-
terest each period. As in the two-period model, excess interest cash is paid out each period
to equityholders. However, if performance criteria fail, excess interest is used to redeem debt
early, decreasing CDO leverage. The calculation of these tests is detailed below.33
2.8.1 Time t = 0
The deal is structured and priced as before. Vt' represents the cumulative value of anticipated
cash distributions at time t. Bo3 and i remain the initial dollar price and rate of appreciation,
or expected return of a tranche. Collateral market prices now factor in half coupon payments
at t = 1.5 and t = 2. This implies an initial market price for a type r, bond of
¢tx
O= UN: (cl+ b) = ceA( + Ce1_0) ) e 2A(1-) (2.30)2 2
d=O
using the t = 1 collateral price b: e- (1- ) + (1 + ) e -AK(l- )
2.8.2 Time t 1
Interest Payment
After the d default realization, full payment of c and Y occurs as before. Equityholders
continue to collect residual interest, however now certain performance tests regulate the dis-
tribution of excess interest. A variety of "coverage" tests quantify the ratio of excess par or
33The subdivision of the final period and restriction of effort to time 1 keep the effect of effort constant across
the two- and three-period models. Additional effort at t = 1.5, or extra periods over which t = 1 effort operates,
would distort numerical comparisons.
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collateral interest to the amount of liability debt or liability interest due. Most deals have
several tests with various provisos. I focus on the most simple "over-collateralization" or OC
test. This test mandates that whenever the collateral-to-debt ratio falls below a trigger level
of OC, residual interest cashflow is directed towards debt paydowns, to the extent necessary to
"cure" the test.
The OC test is failing at time 1 if F- < OC. The amount of principal reduction required
to cure the test, A 1, can be solved for as
0O if F > XoOCAl - (2.31)
Xo - F1/OC if F < XoOC
The t = I intermediate distribution is now
NX = cF - max (0, cF - XoY- Al)
NQ = max (0, cF - XoY - A1) (2.32)
N = XNX + 1,QN?
With the possibility of interest diversion the debt level changes to reflect either insufficient
or surplus receipts according to
X1 = Xo(1 + Y)- N (2.33)
Xt increases for high defaults, when due interest exceeds the available interest cashflow. Con-
versely interest diversions decrease Xt. The higher OC, the more likely interest is diverted
to debtholders. When OC is as low as Y/c, there is effectively no coverage test and interest
parameters alone are used in determining intermediate distributions.
Effort and Risk-Shifting Decision
At t = 1 the manager has the exact same effort and risk-shifting decisions as in the two-period
model. But if he does not switch at t = 1 he has the option to do so at t = 1.5. He cannot
switch back.3 4
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34Ross (1997) finds reversals are never optimal.
Collateral market prices reflect the new half-coupon payments. Using the t = 1.5 collateral
price from (2.44), the t = 1 collateral price and market value ratio are
be -E 2 (1-) + (1 + 2) e-A,(1-)
= = 2(1- ) + (1 + ) e-AG(l-) (2.34)
b/l 1 A (1) + (1 + c) e-AB(1-0)
If the manager decides not to switch after providing effort, portfolio face value and default
intensity remain at F,NS 1 (E) and AG as before. If he decides to switch, portfolio face value
becomes F1swl = 1TF1 as before however the resultant portfolio default intensity must be
solved for numerically. Let Ffsw 1 (4=1) be the hypothetical par value which would result if
the manager switched without incurring transactions costs, that is
F1,SW(=1() = 31 F1 (1 - (e) + ((e)@)
The portfolio default rate, A1,sw1, is such that
( exp (1-) + (1 + ) e)) F,sW(=l) = b F,NS (2.35)
Al,swl is again derived from a no-arbitrage equation, ensuring that the remaining collateral
is switched on a value-neutral basis. Note that the parenthesis term in (2.35) is the market
price of a hypothetical asset of type = SW 1. For any effort level , bSWl (Al,,l) equates
the market value of the non-switched and switched portfolios, when remaining transactions
costs are zero. For positive transactions costs, Ai,swl is too high, and the manager's behavior
imposes a loss on the portfolio.35
35As before the Al,sw, approximation is chosen to keep the default distribution univariate. This approxima-
tion posits a switch to a bond of type K = SW, rather than having a bi-modal portfolio composed of both high
and low-default-intensity bonds.
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The manager's NPV and maximal switching policy is
VlM* = max [max (EN1.5,sw1 + V.5,sw -()), max (EN5 + E -( = arg ? max _1 ]
E* =: arg max V1M]
= {G if e* = vs
SW1 if * = E*SW
(2.36)
His effort level and switching decision are used in the calculation of date I valuations
Vx(dl) = ElNIX5 (E*(dl), i6(dl), dl) + E1 V1l5 (~*(di), (di), dl)
VQ(d1) = EiNiQ5 (*(di), ,1(d), dl) + E1V1?5 (*(di), t(dl), dl)
VIM(dl) = vXVlX(dl) + vQVQ(d1) - (*(dl))
2.8.3 Time t= 1.5
At t = 1.5 there is a new default realization, pay period, and decision period.
Interest Payment
Current face value is adjusted to reflect new defaults d1 .5
As bt= d.5e iit
As before if the OC test is passing (F- > OC), equity receives all residual interest.
(2.37)
(2.38)
Otherwise,
excess interest pays down debt principal. The amount of principal reduction necessary to "cure"
the test is
0
X1 - F1.5/OC
if F1.5 > X1OC
if F1 .5 < X 1 0C
The t = 1.5 intermediate distribution is then
NX5 = F1 .5 -max (0, F1 .5 - X1 Y - A1.5)
Nl5 = max (0, 2F1.5
NM = XNX + QN
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(2.39)
- X1 Y- A1.5) (2.40)
and the debt level adjusts to
X 1.5 = X 1 1 + )-N1 5 (2.41)
Risk-Shifting Decision
The manager can choose to risk-shift if he has not already. If Et = SW1, he has no decision to
make; let
sF1.5,iSW1 = d,,FiswJ (2.42)
A1.5,SW1 = AI,SW 1(EW)
with e*W taken from the manager's optimal effort choice in (2.36) and Ai,sw1 taken from the
no-arbitrage condition in (2.35).
Otherwise if r~ = G the manager may elect to switch the remaining good collateral, (1 -
,(e*vs)) dl 5F1, into bad collateral. If he remains invested in good bonds the collateral par and
default rate remain at
F1.5,NS15 = dFl'1NS (2.43)
A1.5,NS1 .5 = AG
If he switches he does so at the same transactions cost loss of I - 1 but at lower par gain. The
t = 1.5 collateral price and market value ratio are
b1.5 =G1+2 ) (2.44)
~ 1.5 = -= e(1-)(AB-AG)/2
Portfolio par value and default intensity then increase to
F1.5,SW 1 5 = 'F 1 (31.5 + (E(NS) - /31.5))
. = 21n 15 + (EvS)(/31'I' - 15)/ + AG (2.45)
As usual, A1.5,SW1.5 is derived to ensure that remaining collateral is switched on a value-neutral
basis, when remaining transactions costs are zero.
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The manager's NPV and maximal switching policy are
EN2sw1 if K* = SW
- max [EN2M .EN2MN1. if G
SW1 if KT = SW (2.46)
K1.5 = G elseif EN2MN$1 > EN2,SWl. 5
SW1 .5 elseif EN2,MNi. < EN2,SW. 5
His effort level and switching decision are used in the calculation of time 1.5 valuations
V1 5(dl. 5 ) = E1 .5N2X (/. 5 (dl. 5 ), di. 5 )
V1(dl.5) = E1 .5 N2Q (ET.5(dl.5), d1 .5) (2.47)
VlM(dl.5) = vXV X5(dl. 5) + QvlQ(di.5)
2.8.4 Time t = 2
At date 2, non-defaulted bonds mature, making a principal and half-coupon payment. The
final principal amount is
F2 = d2 F1.5,. 1 5 (2.48)
Date 2 distributions are not influenced by any coverage tests since it is the final period. They
are
NX(d 2 ) = (1+ 2) F2 (d2)- max (0, (1+ 2) F2(d2) - X1.5 (1 + Y))
NQ(d2) = max (0, (1 + 2) F2(d2) - X1 .5 (1 + x)) (2.49)
N2M (d 2) =X V2X (d 2) + vQVQ(d 2 )
2.8.5 Solution
The model is solved as before (backwards induction). The first difference is that participants
must take into account the possibility of interest diversion at t = 1 and t = 1.5. In the
two-period model one solves for d1 and d2,K, points at which the equity tranche finishes out-
of-the-money. Now one solves for d1 and d1.5,,l on the basis of OC test failures, not interest
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defaults. This yields equity breakpoints of
d = In XO/ In 
dl.5,r = n xi--/ n b (2.50)1,~1
d2,nl.5= In X1 .5(1+Y/2) / In /
As before, changing Xt levels must be accounted for in all NPV calculations.
Second, the manager now anticipates his possibility of switching later when evaluating his
switching decision at t = 1. He looks ahead to each d = 1.5 realization to ascertain whether
he would switch or remain and his resultant NPV. Value expectations and effort first-order
conditions are similar once the optimal t = 1.5 switching policy has been calculated.
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2.9 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: U.S. CDO Tranche Downgrade Rates, by Vintage, Cumulative To 2003. Shown in
Percent*
Year of Issue
Underlying Collateral 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Investment Grade Bonds -- 10 55 32 52 41
High Yield Bonds 83 95 86 79 60 16 63
High Yield Loans 80 56 49 4 9 4 15
Emerging Market Debt 50 33 40 0 0 0 15
Synthetic (Credit Default Swap) - 100 72 33 57 80 63
*Source: UBS Warburg (2003)
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Table 2.2: Average 1-Year Downgrade Rates
1996-2002. Shown in Percent*
For CDO Collateral, by Type and Rating Level,
Rating Level
Underlying Collateral Aaa Aa2 Baa2 Baa3 Ba2 Ba3
Corporate Bonds 7 16.3 20.5 21.8 36.6 19.8
High Yield Loans 0.4 6 3.6 10.7 10.5 5.8
Emerging Market Debt 0 9.3 3.7 17.2 9.1 14.3
Synthetic (Credit Default Swap) 8.8 6.7 26.7 37.5 31.3 50
All 5.2 13.4 14.3 17.5 20.4 16.8
Corporate Bond Market 6 13.5 17.1 14.3 26.2 24.1
*Source: Moody's Investors Service (2003a)
'Table 2.3: Distribution of Structured Finance and Corporate Ratings, 1985-2002. Shown in
Percent / Number*
STRUCTURED FINANCE CORPORATE
Rating Level / Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
Aaa 91.7 36.4 41.5 35.4 33.2 3.5 3.7 2.5 1.4 1.5
Aa 0 58.2 28.2 16.9 16.2 17.4 10 10.1 8.3 10.3
A 8.3 1.8 13.7 20 20.3 31.2 24.4 27.6 21.9 22.4
Baa 0 2.9 10.9 16.2 17.4 17.1 15.1 18.6 22.1 24.3
Ba 0 0.5 3.7 6.2 7.7 18 22.1 17 11.9 11.5
.B 0 0 1.7 3.7 3.7 9.8 19.6 18.8 25.2 19.6
Caa-C 0 0.2 0.3 1.6 1.6 3 5.2 5.4 9.3 10.4
Investment Grade 100 99.4 94.3 88.6 87.1 69.2 53.1 58.8 53.7 58.5
High Yield 0 0.6 5.7 11.4 12.9 30.8 46.9 41.2 46.3 41.5
Ratings Outstanding 12 649 3325 8201 12296 1585 2119 2200 3149 2950
*Source: Moody's Investors Service (2003g)
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Table 2.4: Various Costs of Risk-shifting to the Debt Tranche (X) and CDO (C), by Parameter
Set in the Two-period Model with Zero Effort. The debt tranche is sized and priced off a
static portfolio assumption (NT) using average default parameters; costs are measured for
both A) average and B) amplified default parameters. The inability to prevent managerial
risk-shifting imposes (maximum) ex-post and ex-ante costs to each tranche i, where AV1 is
the ex-post cost V ~ - V1,NT and AVO' the ex-ante cost Vo - VdoNT. Also shown is the increased
default risk and ratings degradation to the debt tranche, the resultant decrease in supported
debt ratio (AXo = Xo - XO,NT), and the opportunity cost to equityholders of having to supply
additional funds, measured from equity return in the relevant parameterization with Medium
effort strength.
in percent.
The manager owns equity (vQ > 0) and no debt (vX = 0). All numbers shown
A. AVERAGE DEFAULT RATES
Parameter Set / Alternate Pricing
Risk-Shifting
Cost
Max A V1 X/V, N T
Max AVlC /VlNT
AVOX /VOXNT
AVO /VONT
XO,NT Def. Prob.
Implied NT Rating
Xo Def. Prob.
Implied Rating
AXo/Fo
Opportunity Cost
2.5% T = 1 5% 5% Single-B Tripl
2.5% Singl
-0.9121
-0.5000
-0.0017
-0.0011
0.09
Aaa
0.19
Aaa
0.00
0.00002
-0.6283
0.0000
-0.0383
0.0000
0.09
Aaa
2.18
Baa2
-3.90
0.83485
-1.2219
-0.5000
-0.0214
-0.0139
0.24
Aaa
1.44
Baal
-2.85
0.43586
-0.9369
-0.5000
-0.0278
-0.0139
0.19
Aaa
2.22
Baa2
-4.35
0.76959
-1.6110
-0.5000
-0.0712
-0.0483
0.09
Aaa
2.29
Baa2
-1.95
1.69147
-2.3310
-0.5000
-0.7208
-0.4770
0.09
Aaa
19.79
Ba3
-4.45
3.86034
B. AMPLIFIED DEFAULT RATES
Parameter Set / Alternate Pricing
Risk-Shifting 2.5% Amp I = 1 Amp 5% Amp 5% Amp Single-B Amp Triple-C Amp
Cost 2.5% = 1 5% 2.5% Single-B Single-B
Max AVlX/VlXNT -0.5262 -0.1566 -0.5918 0.0000 -2.0483 -4.5155
Max AVC/V cNT -0.5000 0.0000 -0.5000 0.0000 -0.5000 -0.5000
AVOx /VONT -0.0821 -0.1162 -0.0938 0.0000 -1.7593 -4.0970
AVOC/VOC, NT -0.0748 0.0000 -0.0748 0.0000 -0.4764 -0.4764
XO,NT Def. Prob. 48.87 48.87 53.99 53.99 48.87 48.87
Implied NT Rating B3 B3 Caa Caa B3 B3
Xo Def. Prob. 49.85 58.24 48.67 53.99 58.26 56.97
Implied Rating B3 Caa B3 Caa Caa Caa
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Table 2.5: Returns to Tranches by Manager Compensation and Parameter Set in the Two-
period Model. Showing first-best, flat, debt, and equity ownership across various parameter
sets, all modeled for no interest (c = Y = 0). Returns Ri based on a static portfolio pricing
and sizing assumption (zero effort, no trading) for the debt tranche and shown in percent,
cumulative over a six-year period. CDO return reduced by effort costs.
A. Medium Effort Strength, 2.5% Deal
Return / Compensation vi = 100%
Concentration
vi = 2.5% v x = 2.7% v Q = 33.8%
0.0013 0.0007 0.0003 0.0011
30.0728 13.8769 0.9212 24.8991
1.4955 0.8113 0.0544 1.3769
B. Weak Effort Strength, 2.5% Deal Concentration
Return / Compensation vi = 100% vi = 2.5% vX = 2.7% v Q = 33.8%
RX 0.0008 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0005
WQ 14.9218 5.3011 0.3016 11.2477
Xc 0.6939 0.3097 0.0178 0.611
C. Strong Effort Strength, 2.5% Deal Concentration
Return / Compensation vi = 100% vi = 2.5% VX = 2.7% vQ = 33.8%
x -0.0014 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014
RQ 42.8861 33.3018 3.6796 43.1934
Rc 2.4552 1.9501 0.2169 2.4675
D. Various Medium Parameter Sets: v X = 0%, vQ = 33.8%
Return / Parameter Set '= 1 5% Single-B Triple-C
Rx -0.0012 0.0087 0.0015 0.0016
RQ 30.1367 24.4050 122.3795 316.9965
RC 1.6663 1.3643 6.8284 17.6440
E. Various Weak Parameter Sets: vX = 0%, vQ = 33.8%
Return / Parameter Set
Rc
I = 1 5% Single-B Triple-C
-0.0132
14.0665
0.7480
-0.0115
11.1022
0.5967
0.0013
62.2946
3.4053
0.0016
174.8593
9.5125
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Table 2.6: Tranche Returns by Parameter Set in the Two-period Model with Amplified Default
Rates. The debt tranche is sized off a static portfolio assumption (zero effort, no trading) and
priced off a positive effort, no-switch assumption, using average default parameters. Returns
to tranche i are shown for optimal manager behavior (i) as well as when restricted to no-
switching (NS) for amplified default rates. Shown in percent, cumulative over a six-year
period. CDO return is reduced by effort costs. The manager owns equity (vQ = 33.8%) and
no debt (vX = 0).
Parameter Set / Alternate Pricing
2.5% Amp '- =1 Amp 5% Amp 5% Amp Single-B Amp Triple-C Amp
Return 2.5% = 5% 2.5% Single-B Single-B
A. e = 0 Scenarios
Rx s -2.1117 -2.1117 -2.0672 -2.8716 -2.1117 -2.1117
Rx -2.1921 -2.2254 -2.1591 -2.8716 -3.8338 -6.1222
-53.2321 -53.2321 -46.0892 -44.8785 -53.2321 -53.2321NS
RQ -53.1890 -51.9835 -45.9580 -44.8785 -39.6702 -14.5531
CNRs -6.3802 -6.3802 -6.3799 -6.3798 -6.3802 -6.3802
RSC -6.4503 -6.3802 -6.4500 -6.3798 -6.8262 -6.8262
B. Weak Effort Scenarios
xs -2.0895 -2.0499 -2.0354 -9.0730 -0.4443 0.0002
Rx -2.1651 -2.1506 -2.1192 -9.0730 -0.7948 0.0002
RNQS -52.8310 -52.3870 -45.8366 -64.9294 10.4151 552.1965NS
RQ -52.7945 -51.4334 -45.7040 -64.9294 11.7964 552.1965
RNCS -6.3293 -6.2649 -6.3338 -13.7372 0.0262 43.0792
RC -6.3955 -6.2756 -6.3964 -13.7372 -0.1294 43.0792
C. Medium Effort Scenarios
RX -2.0565 -1.9893 -2.0196 -2.8246 -0.0218 0.0000
Rx -2.1229 -2.0688 -2.0882 -2.8246 -0.0528 0.0000
RNQ -52.2004 -50.9924 -45.2740 -43.9223 82.3890 910.4141NS
RQ -52.1741 -50.3934 -45.1383 -43.9223 82.3076 910.4141
RCs -6.2488 -6.0928 -6.2614 -6.2612 6.2580 73.2752
RC -6.3074 -6.1125 -6.3100 -6.2612 6.2290 73.2752
138
Table 2.7: Returns to Tranches for Varying Coverage Test Hurdles, by Parameter Set in the
Three-period Model. The initial debt level XO,NT and returns i are based on a static portfolio
pricing and sizing assumption (zero effort, no trading). Returns shown in percent, cumulative
over a six-year period. CDO return reduced by effort costs. The manager owns equity
(vQ = 33.8%) and no debt (vX = 0).
Parameter Set
Medium Weak Medium Weak Medium Weak
OC Tranche 2.5% 2.5% 5% 5% Single-B Single-B
None XO,NT 9.4050 9.4050 9.2550 9.2550 9.4050 9.4050
XRZX 0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0048 0.0015 0.0013
RQ 14.3351 6.495 12.4508 5.6578 70.4262 35.9682
RC 1.3037 0.5798 1.3009 0.5776 6.4627 3.2333
100% XO,NT 9.4050 9.4050 9.2550 9.2550 9.4050 9.4050
RX 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0033 0.0008 0.0007
R Q 14.3424 6.4983 12.4675 5.6538 70.4382 35.9776
RC 1.3038 0.5811 1.3015 0.5781 6.4627 3.2334
102% XO,NT 9.6750 9.6750 9.2550 9.2550 9.6750 9.6750
0.0039 0.0015 0.0019 0.0008 0.0049 0.0047
sQ 19.5399 8.8444 12.462 5.6451 96.1417 49.0791
RC 1.3037 0.5803 1.3034 0.5808 6.4627 3.2333
:105% XO,NT 9.8250 9.8250 9.3950 9.3950 9.8250 9.8250
WX 0.0058 0.0013 0.0026 -0.0003 0.0096 0.0079
R Q 24.259 10.9882 14.1582 6.4153 119.5102 60.9706
1.3031 0.5795 1.3032 0.5796 6.4627 3.2322
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Table 2.8: Return Comparison for Various Structural Modifications, by Parameter Set in the Three-
period Model (See Section 2.5 for details). Initial debt level X0 is sized off a zero-effort, positive
risk-shifting assumption, and priced off a positive effort, positive risk-shifting assumption. Returns Ri
shown in percent, cumulative over a six-year period. The debt pricing assumption implies RX = 0.
CDO return reduced by effort costs and includes any fees paid to the management. The manager owns
equity (Q = 33.8%) and no debt (vX = 0).
A. Medium 2.5% Extension Results
OC Ri BASE EXT1 EXT2 35bp EXT3 EXT4 25% EXT45o% EXT5 EXT6
None Xo 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050
RQ 14.3464 14.3464 14.3464 14.3464 7.2318 14.3474 1.0121 14.3464
Rc 1.3037 1.3037 1.3037 1.3037 0.6957 1.3037 0.0977 1.3037
100% Xo 9.4050 9.5050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050
RQ 14.3490 15.9337 14.3385 14.3490 7.2322 14.3490 1.0141 14.3487
jc 1.3038 1.3038 1.3038 1.3038 0.6957 1.3038 0.0979 1.3038
102% Xo 9.5800 9.6950 9.4750 9.5800 9.6000 9.6000 9.6750 9.6750
RQ 17.3689 20.0995 15.2676 17.3682 8.9698 17.7967 1.2488 19.2672
Xc 1.3038 1.3038 1.3039 1.3038 0.6957 1.3038 0.0882 1.2814
105% Xo 9.8250 9.8250 9.7600 9.8250 9.8300 9.8250 9.8250 9.8250
RQ 24.3790 24.3737 11.7242 24.3773 12.3951 24.3805 0.0075 14.2889
Xc 1.3031 1.3037 1.3033 1.3035 0.6957 1.3032 0.0004 0.7643
B. Weak 2.5% Extension Results
OC Ri BASE EXT1 EXT21obp EXT3 EXT425 % EXT4 50% EXT5 EXT6
None Xo 9.4050 9.4050 9.4050
RQ 6.5006 6.4861 6.4861
RjC 0.5798 0.5798 0.5798
100% Xo 9.4050 9.5050 9.4050
RQ 6.5006 7.2134 6.4981
Rc 0.5811 0.5807 0.5811
102% Xo 9.5800 9.6950 9.6550
RQ 7.8653 9.1028 8.1405
Rc 0.5809 0.5809 0.5808
105% Xo 9.8250 9.8250 9.8050
RQ 11.0124 11.0176 7.5340
Rc 0.5795 0.5798 0.5807
9.4050
6.4861
0.5798
9.4050
6.5006
0.5811
9.5800
7.8659
0.5809
9.8250
11.0158
0.5797
9.4050
6.4987
0.5810
9.4050
6.5012
0.5811
9.6000
8.0607
0.5810
9.8300
11.1277
0.5806
9.4050
6.4974
0.5808
9.4050
6.5010
0.5811
9.6000
8.0606
0.5810
9.8250
11.0326
0.5805
9.4050
1.0121
0.0977
9.4050
1.0141
0.0979
9.6750
1.2488
0.0882
9.8250
0.0075
0.0004
9.4050
6.4861
0.5798
9.4050
6.5010
0.5811
9.6750
8.7236
0.5709
9.8250
6.4769
0.3408
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C. Medium 5% Extension Results
OC Ri BASE
None Xo 8.9750
RQ 10.0462
Rc 1.3035
100% Xo 9.0900
RQ 10.9163
Rc 1.3029
102% Xo 9.2450
RQ 12.3729
Rc 1.3035
105% Xo 9.3950
RQ 14.1853
Rc 1.3032
EXT1
8.9750
10.0462
1.3035
9.0900
10.9161
1.3029
9.2550
12.4795
1.3035
9.4000
14.2488
1.3033
EXT235bp
8.9750
10.0462
1.3035
9.2550
12.4269
1.3032
9.2200
12.0651
1.3035
9.2350
11.9028
1.3036
EXT3 EXT4 25%
8.9750 9.0500
10.0462 5.3432
1.3035 0.6956
9.1000 9.0750
11.0054 5.4436
1.3035 0.6956
9.2450 9.2550
12.3729 6.2909
1.3035 0.6956
9.3950 9.4000
14.1858 7.1876
1.3033 0.6956
EXT4 50%
9.0850
10.8804
1.3035
9.0850
10.8822
1.3037
9.2550
12.4806
1.3035
9.3950
14.1883
1.3034
EXT5 EXT6
9.2550
0.8888
0.0986
9.2550
0.8889
0.0986
9.2550
0.8863
0.0983
9.3950
0.8689
0.0848
8.9750
10.0462
1.3035
9.1100
11.0806
1.3026
9.2550
12.4501
1.3004
9.3950
13.7791
1.2659
D. Weak 5% Extension Results
EXT3 EXT4 25% EXT45 0%
8.9750
4.5502
0.5808
9.1000
4.9829
0.5807
9.2450
5.6032
0.5807
9.3950
6.4131
0.5797
9.0500
4.8007
0.5808
9.0750
4.8916
0.5809
9.2550
5.6532
0.5809
9.4000
6.4567
0.5807
9.0850
4.9240
0.5804
9.0850
4.9279
0.5808
9.2550
5.6531
0.5809
9.3950
6.4208
0.5804
EXT5 EXT6
9.2550
0.8888
0.0986
9.2550
0.8889
0.0986
9.2550
0.8863
0.0983
9.3950
0.8689
0.0848
8.9750
4.5502
0.5808
9.1100
5.0134
0.5798
9.2550
5.6396
0.5795
9.3950
6.2421
0.5642
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OC R ?
None Xo
RQ
arc
100% Xo
RQ
Rc
102% Xo
1 Q
Rc
105% Xo
RQ
Rc
BASE
8.9750
4.5502
0.5808
9.0900
4.9374
0.5798
9.2450
5.6032
0.5807
9.3950
6.4124
0.5796
EXT1
8.9750
4.5502
0.5808
9.0900
4.9374
0.5798
9.2550
5.6534
0.5809
9.4000
6.4427
0.5798
EXT21obp
8.9750
4.5502
0.5808
9.2550
5.6394
0.5809
9.2550
5.5983
0.5809
9.3800
5.7083
0.5808
E. Medium Single-B Extension Results
EXT2 35bp EXT3 EXT4 25% EXT4 5 0o% EXT5 EXT6
None Xo 9.2100
RQ 59.0023
Rc 6.4627
100% Xo 9.2100
RQ 59.0023
~Rc 6.4627
102% Xo 9.2200
~RQ 59.4980
Rc 6.4627
105% Xo 9.5600
RQ 83.0951
fRc 6.4627
9.2100
59.0023
6.4627
9.2150
59.2491
6.4627
9.2200
59.4980
6.4627
9.5850
85.2182
6.4627
9.2100 9.2100
59.0023 59.0023
6.4627 6.4627
9.2150 9.2700
59.2490 62.1077
6.4627 6.4627
9.4750 9.3250
75.5929 65.2558
6.4627 6.4627
9.7600 9.6400
97.8189 91.5406
6.4627 6.4627
F. Weak Single-B Extension Results
OC Ri BASE
None Xo 9.2100
RQ 30.1393
Rc 3.2335
100% Xo 9.2100
3RQ 30.1395
Rc 3.2335
102% Xo 9.2200
RQ 30.3928
Rc 3.2335
105% Xo 9.5600
RQ 42.4459
ZRc 3.2335
EXT1
9.2100
30.1393
3.2335
9.2150
30.2656
3.2335
9.2200
30.3928
3.2335
9.5850
43.5304
3.2335
EXT2 35bp
9.2100
30.1393
3.2335
9.2150
30.2654
3.2335
9.4750
38.5489
3.2335
9.7600
44.9340
3.2333
EXT3 EXT4 25%
9.2100 9.2950
30.1393 25.4374
3.2335 2.6486
9.2700 9.3200
31.7259 26.0208
3.2335 2.6486
9.3250 9.5500
33.3339 32.9749
3.2335 2.6486
9.6400 9.7200
46.7543 40.8325
3.2333 2.6486
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OC Ri BASE EXT1
9.2950
25.4374
2.7220
9.3200
26.0208
2.7220
9.5500
32.9749
2.7220
9.7200
40.8325
2.7220
9.2600
49.3264
5.3637
9.2700
49.7591
5.3637
9.2900
50.6475
5.3637
9.6700
76.2480
5.3637
9.4050
3.5278
0.3406
9.4050
3.5282
0.3406
9.6750
4.3440
0.3069
9.8250
0.0261
0.0015
9.2100
59.0023
6.4627
9.2100
59.0022
6.4627
9.2200
59.4980
6.4627
9.8250
70.1579
3.7879
EXT4 50%
9.2600
31.4496
3.2335
9.2700
31.7255
3.2335
9.2900
32.2920
3.2335
9.6700
48.6127
3.2334
EXT5
9.4050
3.5278
0.3406
9.4050
3.5282
0.3406
9.6750
4.3440
0.3069
9.8250
0.0261
0.0015
EXT6
9.2100
30.1393
3.2335
9.2100
30.1395
3.2335
9.2200
30.3928
3.2335
9.8250
35.8655
1.8966
-
-
Figure 2-2: Typical CDO Legal Structure. Issuance-related fees are paid upfront when the
deal closes. Periodic payments include (in order of priority) hedge fees, trustee administration
fees, deal expenses, manager fees, debt interest, and equity residual. The manager participates
in tranche distributions to the extent of his ownership shares. Source: McDermott (2000).
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Figure 2-3: Growth in the Structured Finance (SF) and Corporate (CORP) Bond Nlarket
1985-2003. Source: Nloody's Investors Service (2003d), Nloody's Investors Service (2003h).
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Figure 2-4: Effort Provision at Time 1 by Manager Compensation and Collateral Performance
in Two-period Model. Showing first-best, flat, debt, and equity ownership for parameter set
Medium 2.5% (no interest).
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Figure 2-5: Ex-post Effort Gains to Tranches by lVianager Compensation in Two-period lViodel
(NS). The following illustrates gains frOln t = 1 effort to the CDO as a whole and to the debt
and equity tranches, assuming switching is restricted, conditional on d1. CDO gain is equal to
debt and equity gain minus effort costs :=:( c). Showing flat, debt, and equity ownership for the
parameter set IVIedium2.5% (no interest). Units are dollar gains on a CDO of size 10.
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Figure 2-6: Ex-post Risk-Shifting Gains to Tranches in Two-period Model with Zero Effort.
Expected gains from the manager's t = 1 risk-shifting decision are shown conditional on d1
and assuming equity ownership (vx = 0, vQ > 0). Not shown are CDO gains, equal to the
sum of debt (~VIX) and equity gains (~VIQ). Parameter sets presented are (1) 2.5% deal
concentration 2) 5% deal concentration 3) W= 1 (no transactions costs) and 4) Single-B bad
type collateral. Units are dollar gains on a CDO of size 10.
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Figure 2-7: Ex-post Effort and Risk-Shifting Gains to Tranches in Two-period lVlodel. Expected
gains from the manager's t = 1 effort and risk-shifting decisions are shown conditional on d1
and assuming equity ownership (vX = 0, vQ = 33.8%). Effort gains rneasured frOln a static
baseline and risk-shifting gains rneasured from the no-switch effort solution. Total CDO gain
(solid) is equal to the sum of debt and equity gains (dashed, dotted) minus effort costs 2(E).
Pararneter set is lVlediurn 2.5% (no interest). Units are dollar gains on a CDO of size 10.
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Figure 2-9: Ex-post Effort and Risk-Shifting Gains to CDO in Two- and Three-period Models
over Range of Coverage Test Levels. Effort gains (solid lines) are shown from a static portfolio
baseline. Risk-shifting gains (dotted lines) are shown from the no-switch effort solution. Plots
1 and 2 present the two- and three-period models without coverage tests. Plots 3 - 5 show the
three-period model with coverage test levels of OC = 100%, 102%, and 105%. Units are dollar
gains on a CDO of size 10; Parameter set is 1/ledium effort, 2.5% portfolio concentration. The
manager owns equity (vQ = 33.8%) and no debt (vX = 0).
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Figure 2-10: Ex-post Effort and Risk-Shifting Gains to CDO in Two- and Three-period Models
over Range of Coverage Test Levels. Effort gains (solid lines) are shown from a static portfolio
baseline. Risk-shifting gains (dotted lines) are shown from the no-switch effort solution. Plots
1 and 2 present the two- and three-period models without coverage tests. Plots 3 - 5 show the
three-period model with coverage test levels of OC = 100%, 102%, and 105%. Units are dollar
gains on a CDO of size 10; Parameter set is Weak effort, 2.5% portfolio concentration. The
manager owns equity (vQ = 33.8%) and no debt (vX = 0).
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Figure 2-10: Ex-post Effort and Risk-Shifting Gains to CDO in Two- and Three-period Models
over Range of Coverage Test Levels. Effort gains (solid lines) are shown from a static portfolio
baseline. Risk-shifting gains (dotted lines) are shown from the no-switch effort solution. Plots
1 and 2 present the two- and three-period models without coverage tests. Plots 3 - 5 show the
three-period model with coverage test levels of OC = 100%, 102%, and 105%. Units are dollar
gains on a CDO of size 10; Parameter set is Weak effort, 2.5% portfolio concentration. The
manager owns equity (Q = 33.8%) and no debt (X = 0).
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Chapter 3
Bad Luck or Bad Incentives? An
Empirical Investigation into CDO
Manager Trading Behavior
3.1 Introduction
'The recent spell of "irrational exuberance" saw questionable and occasionally criminal decision-
making on the part of many professional investors. Investor dissatisfaction has extended to
the relatively young CDO market, a rapidly growing offshoot of the structured finance market.
These new and highly leveraged investment vehicles were designed to take advantage of ratings
and funding arbitrages in corporate credit markets, but experienced disastrous performance
from 1998 to 2003. Many large and well known institutional investors took heavy losses.
Recently vociferous allegations of manager misbehavior have been accompanied by lawsuits.
Barclays and Bank of America announced settlements in the spring of 2005, both accused of
insufficiently revealing risk factors. 1
Though no one has yet prosecuted a CDO management team, several market participants
'Insurance companies were among the largest early investors in the CDO market, both as investors and
guarantors. For instance, Financial Security Assurance (FSA) took large charges on its $78 billion CDO
exposure in August 2002. On MBIA's $66 billion CDO exposure in early 2003, outside investors calculated
the mark-to-market loss as between $5.3 billion and $7.7 billion. Other large insurers with significant exposure
included Conseco and AIG. Source: Weil and Sender (2003), Moody's Investors Service (2003c).
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have accused them of having had conflicts of interest which led to deleterious trading decisions.
Moody's Investors Services, for instance, identifies managers' "aggressive... practices" which
"deviate from the spirit of the indenture" as a significant factor in collateral losses.2 Others have
claimed specifically that managers' subordinated compensation structure led them to reinvest
into more volatile securities. 3 This strategy, "risk-shifting", is aimed to benefit subordinate
investors and equityholders to the detriment of senior investors.
It is not surprising that fund managers may have been motivated by their compensation
structure in a situation of delegated management. As Chevalier and Ellison (1999) note,
the Investment Co. Act of 1940 was amended to outlaw option-like incentive schemes for
retail mutual funds precisely to avoid undesirable manager behavior. However, in private and
institutional vehicles such as CDOs, managers are given all manner of incentive fees. The
situation is compounded by the highly complex structure of CDOs, their relative novelty, and
the extreme credit stress which occurred from 1998 to 2003. If, as Moody's states, rating
agencies did not properly acknowledge, understand, and model manager risk, investors may be
justified in their complaints.4
Prior theory on principal agent problems in the investment management arena includes
Modigliani and Pogue (1975), Holmstrom (1999), Starks (1987), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994),
Narayanaswamy, Schirm, and Shukla (2001), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), and Papastaikoudi
(2004b). The risk-shifting problem in particular is discussed theoretically in Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), Myers (1977), and Hart and Moore (1998) and computationally in Leland (1998),
Parrino and Weisbach (1999), and Ross (1997). These risk-shifting studies focus mainly on
traditional firm settings and conclude that managerial risk-shifting is a minor problem relative
to the benefits of leverage. I argue that the CDO context differs, due to the much higher
leverage typically observed in CDOs, and that in fact CDOs are an ideal situation in which to
study risk-shifting. There are clear measures of volatility (asset prices or ratings) as well as
trading and compensation data which are fairly easy to interpret. For a theoretical exposition
2Source: Moody's Investors Service (2003i). In a 2002 study of high yield CDOs, they conclude that CDO
"downgrades are not solely explained by high-yield stress" and that "managers have introduced risk... beyond
that justified". The aggressive practices include the "purchase of Caa / deeply discounted securities".
3See, e.g., Thompson, Reeves, Weaver, and Folkerts-Landau (2002) and UBS Warburg (2003).
4 Source: Moody's Investors Service (2003i). Moody's notes that managers' behavior was "problematic
because not contemplated in initial ratings" and state that their rating approach will move to a "more realistic
modeling of manager trading strategies and reinvestment."
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and calibration of the risk-shifting problem in CDOs, see the second chapter of this thesis, as
well as Duffie and Garleanu (2001) and Gibson (2004) who quantify by simulation the effect of
volatility on CDO tranches.
In this paper I look for empirical evidence of risk-shifting in CDOs. I attempt to dis-
cern whether CDO debt investors were simply the victims of bad timing, whether managers
succumbed to general overconfidence, or whether managers were in fact motivated by their
subordinate incentive claims to make value-shifting decisions. I use a unique and newly avail-
able panel data set to study the actions of CDO managers across a wide range of CDO types.
Data includes performance statistics, compensation parameters, and trading decisions during
the time period 2001-2004. In particular I am looking for any evidence that managers sought
to add risk to the portfolio or to manipulate certain deal features which would have protected
senior investors. If managers were motivated by subordinate interests to shift value from se-
nior to junior investors, then such activities should have increased in the size and probability
of receiving incentive fees or equity distributions.
In the regression analysis I find a statistically significant link between performance prob-
lems, manager compensation, and risk-shifting behavior in CDO deals. Managers' tendencies
to make discount purchases and premium sales are highly and significantly correlated with
collateralization levels and fee structure. Both discount purchases and premium sales are a
way to add volatility to a portfolio by selling higher-quality, lower-risk assets and reinvesting
in lower-quality, higher-risk assets. In addition, they subvert specific deal features known as
coverage tests which are meant to protect senior debtholders. When coverage tests are failing,
interest which would go to subordinate and equity investors is instead paid to senior debtholders
as early principal paydowns. But because coverage tests are based on par, not market value,
making par gains improves this metric of deal performance, however cosmetically. The benefit
of this is that it keeps interest flowing to equityholders.
The relationship is highly non-linear in performance. If performance is so bad as to eliminate
any prospect of the manager receiving junior and incentive fees, manager activity declines.
When deal performance is marginal the manager is most active. When performance is good
and manager cashflows are fairly secure, there is less activity. I also find a significant tendency
to group premium and distressed sales together, a strategy which minimizes par erosion but
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also increases collateral volatility by removing higher quality assets unnecessarily.
Manager reputation is considered, using assets-under-management as a proxy for reputa-
tional concerns. The influence of reputation on manager decisions has been developed in
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Diamond (1989), and Huddart (1999). I find that in deals with
bad performance, manager size decreases par-building trades. This suggests that managers
with a large client base were less willing to jeopardize goodwill by angering clients.
For empirical studies of investment manager incentives, see work by Chevalier and Ellison
(1997), Golec (1992), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), and Roston (1997). Petersen (2005) provides
an overview of the treatment of standard errors in various financial panel data applications.
The setup of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 examines
the transactions data in more detail, while Section 4 presents the regression analysis. Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Data Description
CDOs are a new type of structured finance asset. Managers choose an initial portfolio of
collateral assets, say BBB-rated corporate debt assets. These are placed in a special purpose
vehicle which then issues debt to CDO investors at varying ratings levels. The difference
between the average collateral and liability spread is excess interest which accumulates to the
benefit of equityholders. For an overview of the CDO market, see Goodman and Fabozzi
(2002).
Deals considered for my data set are those rated by Moody's Investor Services and listed
on their "CDO Deal Score" report from March 2004. These 347 deals are issued from 1996
to 2003 and are grouped according to the collateral backing them. They fall into four broad
categories, Emerging Markets, Loan, Investment-grade and High-yield Corporate. 5 I draw
descriptive, collateral, and capital structure data from Moody's "CDO Enhanced Monitoring
5There is little or no issue of survivorship bias. Deals either mature naturally, are called early through an
optional or mandatory liquidation process (usually when collateral balance declines to 10% of initial balance),
or in some few cases can be forcefully liquidated by the controlling class upon bad performance. In general, the
deals in this sample are too young to have matured naturally or through the auction call process. Further there
do not seem to be any instances of forced early liquidation outside the sample, as only a minority of deals have
such a provision and it is generally difficult to enact.
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Service" (EMS) reports, available by subscription. This is a new and heretofore unaccessed
data set, as Moody's first began to compile, back-fill, and market their CDO data to investors
in 2003.
Descriptive information, manager compensation structure, and transactions information
is culled from Intex Solutions, Inc., a modeling service for structured finance assets. This
data source, available by subscription, is new as well. As the CDO market grew, it became
advantageous for liquidity purposes to have a standardized modeling tool available to investors.
Deal structurers began to have Intex model every deal starting around 2003. The financial data
is unique in that there is specific historical asset information on holdings and trades. Whenever
possible, data is cross-checked between Moody's and Intex. Intex models 325 of the 347 deals.
Lastly, manager size information is taken from a public Pensions & Investments, Inc. (P&I)
report for the year 2003. They list the top 500 investment firms by U.S. institutional assets-
under-management (AUM). 55 of the 129 total deal managers are included, covering 58% of
deals in the sample.6
3.2.1 Descriptive Information
Descriptive deal characteristics are taken from both Moody's and Intex. They include the deal
closing date, end reinvestment date, lead investment banker, CDO collateral manager (original
and replacement if applicable), and pay frequency. There is a wide range of deal vintages
and types which ensures a mix of performance outcomes. Deal issuance stretches from 1996
to 2003, with 41% of the deals timed to avoid the worst collateral performance (i.e. issued
between 1996-1998 and 2002-2003). Nearly half of the deals (46%) are backed by primarily
loan or emerging markets assets which had much better performance than corporate debt over
the time period studied.
The reinvestment period, normally between 4 - 7 years, is significant because after this
period ends the manager is usually restricted in his purchases. I generally confine regressions
on manager behavior to within the reinvestment period. The pay frequency is used to determine
whether a deal has primarily floating-rate or fixed-rate collateral, which is used when collateral
6I am deeply indebted to State Street Research & Management, Ltd. for access to these data sets. The
identities of all trustees, bankers, managers, investors, deals, and assets are codified so as to remain confidential.
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interest rates are included as independent variables in regressions.
Fixed effects for deal, deal type, lead banker, and collateral manager will be considered.
3.2.2 Moody's Data
EMS Data - Capital Structure
Capital structure information is provided on a snapshot basis, both original and current. Orig-
inal tranche sizes and collateral levels are used to compute the initial equity percentage of the
deal. Table 3.1 summarizes capital structure across deal types. Riskier collateral necessitates
a larger equity cushion, evident in a 4.22% average Investment-grade equity share and a 15.20%
average Emerging Markets equity share. Equity share is an important measure of how likely
a manager is to receive subordinate and incentive fees and thus is an indicator of his incentive
to risk-shift.
MDS Data
"Moody's Deal Score" or MDS is a metric quantifying the ratings changes to each deal's liability
tranches, measured cumulatively to February 2005. Scores are used to summarize a deal's
overall ratings performance and to sort deals for sub-sampling in regressions. Table 3.1 provides
a breakdown by deal type. Only 3 deals of the 347 - 2 emerging markets and 1 loan deal - have
seen net upgrades while 149 have seen net downgrades. By far the worst performers are the
Investment-grade and High-yield categories, with an average of 2.0 and 4.6 notches downgraded,
respectively, across the entire capital structure (3 notches = 1 letter grade, e.g. Baal to Bal).
As with most of the performance data, there is a great deal of dispersion in the data, enabling
efficient regression analysis.
EMS Data - Collateral
Monthly collateral data is provided for varying timeframes. The beginning point is either the
deal origin or some later point at which Moody's first began storing data on the deal; ending
point is approximately July 2004. Between 2 - 33 data points are available per deal, on average
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Table 3.1: Capital Structure and Liability Performance by Deal Type. Original deal size is the
sum of all liability and equity tranches' face value. Average notches upgraded is the deal-wide
average of rating changes to constituent tranches. It is implied by the final Moody's Deal Score
for each deal, measured from an assumed Al average initial deal rating.
percentage shows deals with positive or negative net changes.
Upgrade / downgrade
Deal St.
Type Obs. Variable Mean Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
ALL 347 Orig. Deal Size ($MM) 408.1 193.3 195.7 297.7 372.5 500.0 800.0
Orig. Equity % 9.08 3.70 3.77 7.06 8.43 10.76 16.39
Notches Upgraded -2.40 3.66 -10.04 -4.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
Upgrade / Downgrade % 0.86 / 42.94
EM 19 Orig. Deal Size ($MM) 243.5 122.8 60.0 132.8 256.8 304.2 587.1
Orig. Equity % 15.20 6.34 0.00 12.68 16.70 18.83 27.34
Notches Upgraded -0.65 1.91 -6.49 -1.38 0.00 0.00 2.75
Upgrade / Downgrade % 10.00 / 30.00
HY 156 Orig. Deal Size ($MM) 347.6 146.8 181.1 254.0 306.4 400.0 656.5
Orig. Equity % 10.21 3.25 5.41 8.27 10.04 12.29 15.85
Notches Upgraded -4.60 4.22 -11.49 -8.51 -5.00 0.00 0.00
Upgrade / Downgrade % 0.00 / 67.31
IG 32 Orig. Deal Size ($MM) 457.3 172.4 255.0 329.8 448.4 503.0 987.8
Orig. Equity % 4.22 1.07 2.23 3.65 4.14 4.97 6.00
Notches Upgraded -2.00 2.82 -7.84 -3.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
Upgrade / Downgrade % 0.00 / 46.88
LN 140 Orig. Deal Size ($MM) 486.6 214.0 273.0 350.1 421.6 527.0 1000.0
Orig. Equity % 8.10 1.99 4.86 7.29 8.00 8.90 11.43
Notches Upgraded -0.27 0.87 -1.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Upgrade / Downgrade % 0.71 / 14.89
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Table 3.2: Moody's Deal Collateral Data, by Deal Type and Deal Average over Time. Vari-
ous statistics include share of defaulted securities, weighted-average rating factor and coupon
levels, and over-collateralization metrics. WARF and OC levels also shown in relation to their
respective deal limits. Closing date standard deviation in years.
St.
Obs. Variable Mean Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
All Deals
347 Closing Date May-00 1.72 Jul-97 Mar-99 Jun-00 Aug-01 Apr-03
345 Defaulted Par (%) 6.19 6.26 0.00 1.22 4.34 9.28 19.91
347 WA Rating Factor 2836 1096 919 2121 2761 3524 4742
347 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.21 0.31 0.84 0.96 1.16 1.39 1.82
325 WA Fixed Coupon (%) 9.05 1.44 7.33 8.65 9.33 9.77 10.42
284 WA Floating Spread (%) 3.16 1.12 0.99 2.96 3.24 3.50 4.44
347 Seniormost OC Ratio (%) 1.28 0.92 0.96 1.13 1.23 1.29 1.49
347 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.06 0.52 0.83 0.97 1.04 1.10 1.20
347 Juniormost OC Ratio (%) 1.00 0.12 0.76 0.95 1.02 1.06 1.17
347 Ratio to Deal Limit 0.96 0.11 0.73 0.90 1.00 1.03 1.07
347 OC Par Cushion (%) -2.43 8.36 -16.12 -1.53 0.01 0.16 0.85
Emerging Markets Deals
19 Closing Date Sep-98 1.71 May-96 Aug-97 Mar-98 Oct-99 Oct-02
19 Defaulted Par (%) 7.64 6.77 0.00 1.72 6.14 12.94 21.54
19 WA Rating Factor 2581 1043 897 1758 2558 3374 4621
19 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.24 0.37 0.68 0.93 1.21 1.48 2.08
19 OC Par Cushion (%) 1.09 7.65 -8.34 -4.56 0.24 1.76 27.39
High- Yield Deals
156 Closing Date Oct-99 1.42 Mar-97 Dec-98 Oct-99 Oct-00 Dec-01
156 Defaulted Par (%) 9.11 6.79 0.72 4.25 7.86 12.55 24.60
156 WA Rating Factor 3526 886 2200 2986 3426 4018 5286
156 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.32 0.29 0.97 1.12 1.24 1.47 1.86
156 OC Par Cushion (%) -5.49 11.31 -29.02 -4.39 -1.21 -0.04 0.47
Investment-Grade Deals
32 Closing Date Nov-00 1.14 Jul-98 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Aug-02
32 Defaulted Par (%) 1.47 0.96 0.10 0.60 1.37 2.27 3.22
32 WA Rating Factor 893 196 578 776 911 1003 1223
32 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.47 0.30 1.16 1.29 1.45 1.61 2.07
32 OC Par Cushion (%) 0.08 0.16 -0.11 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.42
Loan Deals
140 Closing Date Jan-01 1.76 Dec-97 Oct-99 Mar-01 Jul-02 Aug-03
138 Defaulted Par (%) 3.78 4.36 0.00 0.26 2.43 5.73 12.71
140 WA Rating Factor 2545 684 1921 2088 2268 2777 4227
140 Ratio to Deal Limit 1.03 0.22 0.82 0.89 0.95 1.06 1.51
140 OC Par Cushion (%) -0.07 2.12 -1.77 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.81
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24.7 Collateral data is described below and summarized in Table 3.2.
Par Information: Par information includes the face value of total collateral, assets in de-
fault, and cash. Cash is designated as either principal collections (from collateral sales, early
principal payment, or default recoveries) or interest collections. Principal cash is intended to be
reinvested if the deal is within its reinvestment period and passing all coverage tests. Interest
cash is to be distributed on the next paydate, as either fees or liability interest. All trading
statistics and other cash measures are converted into percentages of total portfolio par, defined
as the sum of collateral face value and principal cash.
Principal cash is used as an independent variable in regressions on the manager's trade
activity. Defaulted assets are used as control variables in regressions on the amount of credit-
risk sales. Over the time period studied corporate defaults hit CDOs hard, with an average
default exposure to each portfolio of 6.2%.8
Weighted Average Coupon / Spread Information: The weighted average coupon (WAC)
and spread (WAS) rates are calculated for fixed and floating-rate collateral, respectively. Col-
lateral interest levels are used as control variables in regressions on transactions volume.
Diversity Score Information: Moody's Diversity Score (DIV) is a metric meant to rep-
resent the amount of diversification in a deal. The larger the score, the more the implied
diversity in the deal. Diversity score is tested as an independent variable in regressions on
transactions volume.
7Excluding observations where portfolio par, defaulted par, rating factor, or any coverage test report is
missing.
8The five-year cohort from 1998 to 2002 had the worst issuer-weighted default performance on record. In
addition dollar-volume weighted default rates, more accurately describing actual CDO collateral losses, were
several times higher due to the large number of high-volume defaults. Familiar multi-billion dollar defaults
include, in chronological order: Russia ($42.7), Daewoo ($5.6), Ecuador ($6.6), Peru ($4.9), Southern California
Edison ($3.6), Pacific Gas & Electric ($5.0), Finova Capital ($6.3), Asia Pulp & Paper ($5.2), PSINet ($2.9),
Comdisco ($2.8), MYCAL ($3.1), Exodus Communications ($2.8), Federal-Mogul ($2.8), XO Communications
($4.9), Argentina ($82.3), Enron ($9.9), Global Crossing ($3.8), Kmart ($2.5), McleodUSA ($2.9), Nextel ($2.3),
United Pan-Europe Communications ($5.1), Metromedia Fiber ($2.6), Call-Net ($2.2), NTL Communications
($8.5), Williams Communications ($3.0), Adelphia ($6.9), Intermedia Communications ($3.1), WorldCom/MCI
($25.8), Conseco ($5.1), Marconi ($3.3), AT&T Canada ($3.0), NRG Energy ($4.0), Telewest ($5.2), Genuity
($2.0), TXU ($2.3), Qwest ($12.9), United Air Lines ($3.6), Healthsouth ($3.4), and Mirant ($4.6). Source: e.g.
Moody's Investors Service (2004a).
161
Weighted Average Rating Information: Moody's assigns numeric "rating factors" to its
ratings meant to correspond to ten-year cumulative default rates. The par-weighted average
of these rating factors is reported by the trustee each month as the deal WARF. The average
level is 2836, corresponding to a B2 portfolio. A more informative statistic is the ratio to the
maximum test limit. The average is 1.21, indicating that the average deal is 21% past its
rating limit. When the test is failing, the manager is typically not allowed to make any trades
which worsen the test.
As with most performance metrics during this time period, WARF levels are highly skewed.
At the fifth percentile, there is a 16% cushion to the deal limit while the 95th percentile is over
by 82%. The wide dispersion of ratings performance persists even when parsing the sample by
deal type.
Ratings levels are a significant control variable in regressions on transactions volumes. Ad-
ditionally I divide the sample by WARF failure since the manager faces reinvest constraints if
the test is failing.
Coverage Test Information: Over-collateralization (OC) and interest coverage (IC) ratios
measure the amount of principal par or interest in the deal, relative to the liability par or liability
interest due at a particular rating level. That is, five OC and five IC ratios are listed, "Senior
1", "Senior 2", "Mezzanine 1", "Mezzanine 2", and "Subordinate", corresponding to liability
ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, and Ba or below, respectively. For example, the "Mezzanine 2"
OC ratio is defined as the ratio of total portfolio par to the amount of outstanding debt rated
Baa or higher at deal issuance.
OC and IC levels are key variables in regressions, for two reasons. First, if reported monthly
levels are below their trigger level, the manager is typically not allowed to make trades which
worsen the test. I control for test failures in regressions as well as parse the sample by OC and
IC failures. However, as explored in Section 3.3, this may not be a tightly binding constraint,
since managers are usually allowed to worsen coverage levels when selling distressed assets.
Second, OC / IC levels indicate whether subordinate investors are receiving cashflow or
not. If tests are failing, on paydates interest and principal cash will be redirected to senior
debtholders (away from subordinate investors and reinvestment collateral) in order to delever
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the deal. Thus near a coverage test failure, managers may have more incentive to trade into
weaker collateral and boost par levels. Alternatively, when deals are performing so poorly that
equity investors may never receive any more cashflow, managers may have little incentive to
risk-shift.
I construct a variable called the "OC Par Cushion", defined as the amount of collateral par
losses the deal would have to sustain in order to make any of the five OC tests fail. The cushion
is negative if tests are already failing. The aim is to convert different levels of coverage ratios
into a single deal performance metric that is comparable across deals with different capital
structures. This number expresses, in percentage format, how close a deal is to OC failure and
resultant interest diversions.9 It is an estimate since it is based on original rather than current
tranche sizes.
The median deal is just passing all coverage tests. For instance, looking at the most junior
OC test in Table 3.2, the ratio of level to test limit is exactly 1 at the median. But again the
sample is highly skewed - the average OC par cushion is -2.43% per deal, ranging from -37.18%
to 6.57% at the P(1) and P(99) levels, respectively. I.e., though half the deals are passing all
OC tests, the average deal would have to increase par by 2.43% to restore test passage.
3.2.3 Intex Data
Fee Schedules
CDO managers are paid with some combination of senior, subordinate, and incentive fees. In
addition, it is common practice (almost universal during the time period studied) to require
an equity purchase in order to incentivize effort. Though compensation information is rarely
specified, it is possible to glean fee information from Intex. Fee data, interacted with measures
of collateral performance or capital structure, are then used in regressions to capture the size
of a manager's cashflow incentive and the probability of achieving such distributions. His
subordinated interests are a primary measure of his incentive to risk-shift. While I have no
information on managerial equity ownership, I consider various other measures as a proxy in
9I focus on OC tests rather than IC tests since OC tests are almost universally tighter. In only 34 instances
out of 9571 observations is an IC test failing without an OC test failing, compared to 2924 instances of the
reverse.
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regressions, including lead banker dummies and the ratio of senior to subordinated fees.
To estimate manager fee rates I run cashflow analyses on manager fees and divide the output
cashflow stream by the collateral par value. (Intex models a variety of CDO deal features,
including hedge schedules, trustee fees, and manager fees, in addition to tranche cashflows). I
follow the following procedure. First, fees modeled by Intex are listed and classified as senior,
subordinate, or incentive. These fee types generally have the following characteristics:
1. Senior fees: paid after deal fees and hedge costs but before liability interest, at a small
rate of collateral par
2. Subordinate fees: paid after liability interest but before equity payments, at a small rate
of collateral par
3. Incentive fees: paid after subordinate fees and before equity payments, at either a small
rate of collateral par or a sizable rate of remaining cashflow. Only paid after equityholders
have reached a specified internal-rate-of-return, known as the hurdle or target return.
I then run each fee class from deal issuance and take the second positive cashflow number.10
This is divided by the original collateral par and payperiod length to estimate the annual fee
rate. When incentive fees are defined off remaining cashflow, rather than collateral par, this
converts them into a comparable measure. 11
Fee characteristics implied by the procedure above are shown in Table 3.3. While senior fees,
averaging just over 20 basis points, are smaller than fee levels in the retail fund management
business, CDO fees compare favorably to typical institutional fee rates. In addition CDOs
offer to managers the lucrative upside potential of subordinate and incentive fees. Almost
75% of the sample pays subordinate fees, averaging a 32.77 basis point rate. Approximately
60% of the sample pays at least one incentive fee, averaging 37.67 basis points for the first
incentive fee rate. This data indicates the extreme convexity of CDO manager compensation.
'
0The second number is used to avoid the first, often uneven payperiod.
llI exercise judgment in assigning fees to categories, however names and other data provide a guide. Fee
classes are often labeled descriptively. In addition, incentive fees are usually accompanied by modeling classes
for the specified hurdle return - these will be labeled as "TARGET - IRR15%" for instance. The presence of
such classes allows one to match the right number of incentive fees. Classifications and rates are checked against
any modeling notes made by programmers.
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Table 3.3: Fee Characteristics. Includes the number of deals paying, the annualized percent-
age rates paid, and the incremental equity internal rate-of-return hurdles for the payment of
incentive fees.
No. Deals Fee % of Incremental Equity
Fee Type Paying Deal Par Return Hurdle (%)
Senior 310 0.2044 na
Subordinate 275 0.3277 na
Incentive (1) 193 0.3767 13.05
Incentive (2) 56 0.2934 6.93
Incentive (3) 7 0.3255 10.00
Compensation is potentially several times more convex than corporate executive compensation,
given CDOs' extreme leverage levels. The more convex manager compensation, the greater
the incentive to risk-shift or otherwise manipulate deals to subordinate investors' advantage.
Transactions Data
Intex has recently begun accumulating transactions data from trustee transactions files. This
data details the date of the trade, whether it was a sale or purchase, the name and market ID
of the security, the principal amount, price, and any given reason for the transaction. Data
is cumulative through approximately July 2004 with varying starting points. For most deals,
data is available for an 10 - 18 month period, with a minimum of 1 month and a maximum of
32 months. 12
Fewer deals have this information - 286 rather than 325 - and in total there are 66,211
transaction line items. I eliminate 3,218 transactions which involve money-market, commercial
paper, or Treasury placeholder securities. I eliminate 26 transactions with either garbled or
clearly incorrect dates, leaving 62,967, or 220 transactions per deal on average.
The object was to compile this data into monthly line items capturing the manager's dis-
cretionary trading decisions. The trade rationales help to spotlight which transactions the
manager most directly controlled. They are grouped into six broad categories:
1. Redeemed assets: During this time period the main source of mandatory early redemp-
12Maximum of 32 months overlapping with collateral data. Several deals go back further (up to 60 months)
however without matching EMS collateral data.
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Table 3.4: Manager-Specified Trade Rationales by Type. Trade rationales are grouped into six
categories of trades, after removing transactions involving placeholder securities, and listed by
sale and purchase volume.
Sales Purchases
No. 25,283 37,684
Pct. 40.15% 59.85%
Type Given Rationale No. No.
Redemptions Early Redemption / Call 3006 8
Refinance 14 15
Interest-Only Paydown 8 0
Exchanges Exchange Offer 951 763
Tenders 970 48
Bankruptcy Exchange 120 31
Restructuring 321 241
Other Corporate Action 311 176
Defaulted Defaulted / Deferred Interest 1389 0
Equity Equity Disposition / Equity Exchange 1033 75
Equity Security 809 944
Warrants Security 256 294
Discretionary Credit Risk 4693 0
Credit Improved 7394 0
Elective / Substitution / Replacement 1572 19
Unknown Other 174 0
12.##* 1394 0
Missing 868 35070
*such trades are labeled according to an unknown indenture classification.
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tions was the issuer calling debt in order to refinance it. Loan assets (floaters) are
always subject to refinance risk while corporate assets (fixed rate) would depend on asset
covenants.
2. Exchanged assets: Both cosmetic and distressed exchanges occur widely in the sample.
An example of a cosmetic exchange would be a corporate entity changing its name or
buying a firm and needing to reissue any outstanding debt. Alternatively, a firm in
distress might restructure its debt.
3. Defaulted assets: Defaulted assets must generally be removed from the portfolio within a
year of the date of default. Within that timeframe they are sold at the discretion of the
manager.
4. Equity transactions: All trades that are specifically denoted as equity transactions or
whose security name indicates stocks, shares, or warrants are summed separately. Not all
deals allow equity securities and their prices and par amounts would distort calculations.
5. Discretionary trades: For purchases, discretionary transactions consist of all reinvestment
decisions unrelated to redemptions, exchanges, or equity assets. For sales, they include
both credit-improved and credit-risk sales as well as those listed as elective, substitu-
tion, replacement, or optional decisions. (This latter category is collectively labeled as
"Elective" decisions). I view sales of credit-improved and credit-risk securities as being
discretionary since there is generally no obligation for a manager to make such trades and
no deal rules which clearly identify such securities.
6. Unknown: Trades whose motives are unclear are those whose rationales are left blank,
are labeled as "Other", or reference a section of the deal's indenture. For instance, 228
sales were explained as "12.1a" referring to some deal-specific definition. Approximately
10% of the sales and 93% of the purchases had unclear trade rationales. The purchases
appear to be reinvestment decisions which managers habitually did not designate. I
include all unknown transactions in the "Elective" discretionary category when compiling
trade statistics.
The approach in regressions is to test only on voluntary manager actions. I hold equity
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transactions apart, treat redemptions and exchanges as non-discretionary, test defaulted sales
as possibly discretionary, and include all other transactions as wholly discretionary. One can
argue that distressed exchanges and defaulted sales are the result of choosing not to act on
credit-risk situations earlier, and thus are in a sense discretionary. I test on both assumptions.
Table 3.4 presents a breakdown of trade rationales.
Using the trade rationales, I sort and sum all transactions over periods corresponding to a
deal's monthly collateral data. I compile the total redemption, exchange, and equity volume
bought and sold, as well as weighted-average prices when applicable. I compile the total
discretionary trade volume bought and sold, the volume sold above $100 and bought below $100,
and the sold volume breakdown between credit-improved, credit-risk, elective, and defaulted
rationales. The weighted-average sale and purchase prices for each of the preceding categories
is computed as well.
Some 4534 transactions had either zero or missing prices. I view transactions with missing
prices as legitimate trades for which the trustee did not supply price data. 13 However I treat
zero prices as an indication of some sort of exchange and include in exchange calculations.
When prices are missing, the weighted-average transaction price is calculated off the priced
volume and serves as a proxy for the total volume.
I assume Intex' transactions data is comprehensive over the timeframe provided, that is,
that there is zero trading if none is listed.
3.3 Trade Data Analysis
First I look at the trade data in more detail, for trends and to judge whether it is reliable. I
also investigate whether it is in accord with common deal restrictions, with an eye towards how
this affects regression analysis.
Table 3.5 gives an overview of Intex's monthly trading and price data. There is quite a bit
of turnover, with an average monthly volume of approximately 1.43% discretionary sales and
3.24% discretionary reinvestment (as a percentage of the prior month's portfolio par). Credit-
improved sales are the largest component of discretionary sales, at 0.65% monthly volume,
13 Missing prices most often accompanied loan securities.
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Table 3.5: Monthly Trade Volume and Price Data for Sales and Purchases across Trade Types.
Trade volumes are measured by face value, and both trade volumes and monthly par gains are
expressed as percentages of the prior month's portfolio par. Weighted-average prices (WAP)
are shown in dollars per 100 units for the months in which applicable transactions occurred.
Totals include all transactions, both sales (S) and purchases (B), both discretionary and non-
discretionary.
St.
Obs. Variable Mean Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
3351 Sales Vol. Disc. (%) 1.43 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.65 2.05 5.31
3351 Sales Vol. Disc. > $100 (%) 0.70 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 3.15
3355 Sales Vol. Credit Risk (%) 0.46 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 2.34
3355 Sales Vol. Credit Impv. (%) 0.65 1.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 3.17
3352 Sales Vol. Elective (%) 0.32 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 1.70
3353 Sales Vol. Defaulted (%) 0.21 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.43
3356 Sales Vol. Redemptions (%) 0.49 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 2.67
3356 Sales Vol. Exchanges (%) 0.53 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 2.55
3351 Sales Vol. Equity (%) 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
3356 Bought, Vol. Disc. (%) 3.24 4.43 0.00 0.00 1.81 5.30 10.63
3356 Bought Vol. < $100 (%) 1.09 2.53 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.54 4.16
3348 Total Vol. (%) 6.20 6.11 0.00 1.83 5.06 8.75 16.28
2115 WAPs Disc. ($) 92.37 17.84 51.13 89.87 98.90 101.02 108.62
1280 WAPs Credit Risk ($) 80.53 22.62 32.00 70.85 87.22 97.24 104.91
1276 WAPS Credit Improved ($) 102.63 7.33 94.03 100.28 101.63 105.61 113.26
833 WAPs Elective ($) 94.76 15.46 65.00 96.17 99.62 100.45 104.99
561 WAPs Defaulted ($) 47.55 29.37 3.00 23.72 44.90 72.00 97.13
1132 WAPS Redemptions ($) 102.88 10.78 100.23 102.86 104.09 104.98 110.00
536 WAPs Equity ($) 3600.6 14879.1 11.2 261.2 1108.9 2753.6 9735.1
2023 WAPB Disc. ($) 98.34 6.05 89.33 97.90 99.62 100.04 104.05
3351 Par Gain Disc. Sales (%) -0.08 0.32 -0.55 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12
3353 Par Gain Defaulted Sales (%) -0.12 0.48 -0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3356 Par Gain Redemptions (%) 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10
3356 Par Gain Exchanges (%) -0.27 1.08 -1.98 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.43
3356 Par Gain Equity Vol. (%) 0.04 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
3356 Par Gain Disc. Purchases (%) 0.04 0.27 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.27
3348 Total Par Gain (%) -0.38 1.52 -2.48 -0.60 0.00 0.04 0.60
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followed by credit-risk sales at 0.46% monthly volume. Sales of defaulted securities add 0.21%
to sold volume, but are sold at the largest loss, with an average sales price of $47.55. In general,
the manager reinvests at higher prices than he sells, or $98.34 versus $92.37, but still at less
than par. (All prices are expressed in dollars per 100 units).
The bottommost lines estimate par loss due to each transaction type. The largest aver-
age monthly losses stem from defaulted sales and exchanges, -0.12% and -0.27%, respectively,
although the exchange number is an estimate dependent upon the equivalence of the security
types being exchanged. The manager makes small par gains on redemptions and purchases.
Monthly defaulted and total par losses, the only two measures directly comparable with Moody's
collateral data, are significantly correlated with Moody's numbers. Despite the reduction in
data points, I use Intex transactions information in all regressions because it is less noisy and
more detailed.
It is important to see whether the data meshes with common CDO restrictions. One must
account for trading restrictions in the regression analysis or risk interpreting mandatory actions
as voluntary. Rules on the types of allowable trades (defaulted, credit-risk, credit-improved,
and elective security sales) specify when they may be made (mandatory / optional, limited
/ unlimited, before / after the reinvestment period, etc.) and how the proceeds should be
reinvested (timing, price, quality test considerations, etc.). I have little information on specific
trading restrictions, but am operating under certain assumptions.
First, there are annual limits on elective trading which I do not view as binding. This is
because typically credit-risk and credit-improved sales are allowed in unlimited quantities and
a manager can classify a sale candidate as he wishes. Indeed, analysis of the monthly trade
data, presented in Table 3.6, suggests very little elective trading, both absolutely and relatively.
This table differs from Table 3.5 in that the trade volumes are annual rather than monthly and
reported on a per deal basis rather than per observation. The median deal has just 1.15%
annualized elective trading (as a percentage of 12 month's prior portfolio par) versus 7.58%
of credit-risk or credit-improved sales trading. Indeed, just 10 deals (3.5%) have more than
15% annualized elective trading and just 1 (0.35%) has more than 25%, the two most frequent
elective trading limits.
Second, volume and price characteristics before and after the given reinvestment period
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Table 3.6: Annualized Elective Sales Trading, by Deals' Average Volume. Volumes are mea-
sured in face value, as percentages of 12 month's prior portfolio par.
Deals Sales Type Mean St. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
285 Elective (%) 3.20 4.72 0.00 0.00 1.15 4.65 12.30
285 Credit Risk, Improved (%) 11.82 13.89 0.00 2.74 7.58 15.72 38.90
285 Elective Share (%) 21.29 34.07 0.00 0.00 8.05 29.74 86.48
Table 3.7: Average Monthly Trading Frequencies and Volumes Before and After Reinvest Pe-
riod, by Trade Type. Sale (S) and purchase (B) volumes are measured by face value, and
expressed as percentages of the prior month's portfolio par. Frequency indicates the percent of
months in which a transaction of the applicable type took place, relative to the total available
observations, and prices
,dollars per 100 units.
Trade Type
(S) Credit Impv.
(S) Credit Risk
(S) Elective
(S) Defaulted
(S) Redemptions
(S) Exchanges
(S) Equity
(B) Discretionary
are conditional on a transaction taking place.
During Reinvest Period
Obs. Freq. % Mean % Price $
2656
2656
2653
2654
2657
2657
2652
2657
44.50
41.08
32.98
16.69
34.29
40.23
8.45
75.72
0.74
0.47
0.34
0.19
0.38
0.45
0.02
3.87
102.74
81.08
95.48
49.61
102.83
na
3801.71
98.47
Prices are shown in
After Reinvest Period
Obs. Freq. % Mean % Price
699
699
698
699
699
699
699
699
16.74
28.61
7.88
16.74
51.07
45.21
10.87
28.18
0.33
0.43
0.12
0.26
0.91
0.85
0.05
0.84
$
101.44
77.48
82.81
39.85
103.01
na
3171.40
96.87
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suggest that managers have some latitude but are subject to binding constraints. 14 Table 3.7
presents various trade statistics compiled during and after the reinvest period. There is an
observable fall-off in discretionary activity. For instance the average volume and frequency
of credit-improved and elective sales fall by between 55% and 77%. Distressed transactions
do not decline as much: credit-risk volume falls minutely while defaulted volume actually
increases. Redemptions and exchanged volume approximately double, likely due to aging.
Average monthly reinvest volume falls by nearly 5 times but still occurs over 28% of the time.
The main difference in prices is a general decline, with the exception that redeemed assets' prices
are static (indicating assets are called at par or at prices set by covenants). In regressions I
condition on the reinvest period so as to hone in on unconstrained managerial behavior.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, deal guidelines and test violations may play a key
role in the manager's decisions and specifically his ability to risk-shift. For instance, almost
universally, if a deal's WARF and OC tests are in compliance, the manager may reinvest freely;
when out of compliance, he must maintain or improve the test metrics. Thus if an OC test is
failing, the manager must generally reinvest at a price less than that of the removed security,
or remove a high-priced asset from the portfolio simultaneously. Likewise if the WARF test
is failing, the manager must reinvest into a security rated at least equally to the one removed
from the portfolio. 15 A breakdown of sales and purchase prices by trade type and test failure
is presented in Table 3.8.
There is mixed evidence that a failing WARF test (second section) prompts investment into
higher quality assets. I do not have data on ratings of sold and bought items but use prices as
a proxy for quality. Though the average reinvest price falls, the ratio of reinvest to sale price
increases. This indicates that on average managers are buying slightly more expensive assets
than they sell, which may be linked to higher ratings. However, the median ratio is less than 1
(and declines from the no-failure scenario), so that in over 50% of observations many managers
are apparently building par even while maintaining ratings. As participants have alleged,
this may be an indication that managers have adversely selected assets with low prices but still
14 Many deals permit reinvestment after the reinvest period has technically ended so as not to discourage
value-adding sales. The manager receives fees on portfolio assets and equityholders receive excess interest, so a
profit-maximizing manager might be disinclined to remove securities from the portfolio.
15Less common (or more varied) restrictions, for instance, deals allowing differing exposures to cheaper sectors,
would be accounted for in performance regressions by deal type, deal ID, or deal manager dummies.
172
Table 3.8: Monthly Weighted Average Discretionary Trade Prices for Coverage and Ratings
Failures. Showing breakdown between Credit-improved, Credit-risk, and Elective Sales. Price
ratio of discretionary purchases to total discretionary sales (WAPB / WAPs) shown for monthly
observations in which both occur. Prices are shown in dollars per 100 units.
No Failure WARF Fail Only OC / IC Failure
Trade Type Obs. Mean $ Med. $ Obs. Mean $ Med. $ Obs. Mean $ Med. $
(S) Credit Impv. 503 101.29 100.88 361 104.23 103.22 405 102.86 102.51
(S) Credit Risk 310 85.48 91.51 333 83.81 88.20 630 76.45 81.67
(S) Elective 388 97.21 99.75 238 95.24 99.59 199 89.61 99.06
(S) Total Disc. 706 97.58 99.91 521 96.25 99.23 876 85.87 94.81
(B) Total Disc. 731 99.54 99.82 530 98.69 99.50 749 96.98 99.17
WAPB / WAPs 665 1.0381 0.9985 471 1.0493 0.9954 587 1.2988 1.0031
equivalent ratings, and also suggests ratings may not be the best proxy for quality. I use ratings
metrics as control variables in regressions but in general it does not appear that ratings failures
would have significantly impeded a manager's ability to risk-shift. Particularly in a rapidly
worsening credit environment, rating agencies may have been slow to assess downgrades, and
managers been thus fairly free to acquire riskier assets. For the OC failure cases it is crucial
-to establish whether reinvestment into low-quality assets is forced or optional on the part of
the manager. That is, to confirm that the manager has the discretion to sell a defaulted asset
and then reinvest at par. Despite the general requirement to maintain failing OC levels, most
deals allow for a passing coverage test to fail, or a failing coverage test to worsen, after the sale
and reinvestment of credit-risk or defaulted securities. This meshes with most deals' guidelines
"recommending" 1 6 that credit-risk and defaulted sales proceeds be reinvested at any price less
than par ($100).
This latitude is indeed evidenced in the data in several ways. First, though there is a
tendency to reinvest at lower prices following credit-risk or defaulted sales, it is not a dramatic
one. The average reinvest price falls nearly a dollar ($0.88) comparing elective and credit-risk
reinvest prices. However, considering the much lower sales price ($95.34 vs. $82.77) this is a
small decline. It does not appear that managers are churning, or going from one distressed
asset to an equally distressed one, in hopes of delaying defaults. Further, average reinvest
"6That is, to the best belief and ability of the manager, in contrast to hard-and-fast restrictions.
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prices following distressed sales are significantly larger than the sold prices, at all percentile
ranges.
Additionally, in at least half the cases with OC failures, managers are on net losing par
through trades. This point is made in Table 3.8 (third section). The average reinvest price
with an OC failure is about 2.5 points lower than when passing, at $97 versus $99.5. This
could signify that managers must or wish to reinvest at lower prices in order to maintain OC
levels. However, the average ratio of reinvest to sale price increases dramatically, over 25%.
This indicates the manager, while still purchasing assets below par, is on net losing par. The
median ratio is near 1, so that in half the cases, the manager is reinvesting at a lower price,
and in half, actually higher.
I conclude that the manager has the discretion to reinvest at a higher price, and in regressions
I condition on OC failures but interpret results based on the conjecture that par-building trades
are not required. Because it appears managers are not churning, to find risk-shifting activity
one must look in the composition and timing of trades.
3.4 Regression Analysis
Because of their subordinated and incentive fees and equity ownership, managers of CDOs have
extremely convex payoffs as a function of deal performance. Essentially they own a time-series
of call options (with various strike prices) on collateral interest and principal payments. As
such, they are in the familiar position of favoring any value process which boosts the value of
equity at the expense of debt. In the regression analysis I look for evidence that managers of
badly performing deals were motivated by their subordinate interests and sought to shift value
away from more senior investors.
One way they could do this is by adding volatility to the deal, e.g. through exchanging
higher-quality for lower-quality assets. A second way is to manipulate par-based coverage tests
by boosting par levels. Building par - buying low and selling high - is an inclusive metric
for risk-shifting since it is an outcome of both methods. Primarily focusing on par-building
trades, I explore the influence of deal performance and compensation structure on managers'
trading decisions. I analyze whether regression results support the hypothesis of risk-shifting
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and attempt to disentangle the risk-shifting explanation of managerial behavior from others
(default regime, overconfidence, etc.).
Because of the optionality in managers' contracts, one would expect a greater incentive to
increase risk around strike prices. In the CDO setting there are two types of strike prices,
pertaining to the sequence of interest options and the final principal option. OC test levels
can be considered as interest strike prices, in that they control the flow of subordinated interest
and fees on every paydate. (The manager's stream of fees and equity payments are very
large incentives, since CDOs are typically issued with a large amount of excess interest flowing
through the capital structure). The final principal strike price is the total amount of liability
payments due prior to fee and equity payments.
Though it is possible interest and principal option payments could diverge, in practice they
are linked. Deals had to structure OC test levels in a certain manner, due to a common CDO
rating methodology. That was to set OC test levels such that given expected collateral defaults,
final collateral value would be sufficient to repay liabilities. Thus if collateral levels are too low
to pass OC tests, signifying the principal options might fail, interest options would also fail and
interest be diverted to senior noteholders. In regressions I focus mainly on OC test passage as
a metric for how close a manager is to his strike prices.
For the manager to be less active in risk-shifting away from strike prices, any of several
assumptions suffice. One is simply that manager activity is costly, since the potential gains
from risk-shifting are smaller when the deals' payouts are more certain. These costs could
be the time spent analyzing trade ideas, cost in implementing trades, or opportunity costs.
Managers may focus more on other portfolios from which they expect higher returns to effort
(e.g. a later-issue, better-performing CDO).
Alternately, one might postulate a ceiling on variance, given market illiquidity and CDO
deal restrictions. That is, a manager of a badly-performing deal cannot identify one risky
security and reinvest wholly into it. There may not be enough exposure available to impact a
large portfolio and furthermore CDOs generally restrict issuer exposures to no more than 1-2%.
Similarly, the manager is restricted in his choice of securities (no esoteric credit or rate options,
no defaulted securities) since CDOs also restrict collateral types. The prospect of having to
make numerous transactions to appreciably impact equity prospects may deter risk-shifting
175
activity when deal performance is bad.
Lastly, when deal performance is good, managers may be deterred from risk-shifting by
either reputation or franchise value considerations. The future stream of payments may be
valuable enough, relative to his other prospects, that the manager does not wish to increase
risk all at once and chance a blow-up in the next period. Indeed CDO fee payments are
generally larger than what managers make in other portfolio management lines.17 Likewise
for a small improvement in equity prospects, the manager may not wish to anger potential
future clients and dry up his future deal stream. In regression analysis I assume a risk-shifting
manager will be most active when deal performance is marginal (measured by OC ratios) and
less so when performance is extreme in either direction. Evidence that this is so would refute the
overconfidence argument by suggesting that managers were rationally considering a cost-benefit
analysis rather than indiscriminately believing they could pick "winners".
To analyze the relationship between trading decisions, manager incentives, and deal per-
formance, I run OLS panel regressions with fixed effects for time and specific manager or deal
ID. I consider many possible dependent variables, all some form of trading metric. In general
volume and par trading gains work better than price statistics, simply because there is more
data: if no trades were made, the volume and gains are zero whereas the price is undefined.
For regressors I consider mechanical factors such as deal age, other fixed effects such as deal
type, lead investment banker, and manager size, other simultaneous trading decisions, manager
incentive structure, and various measures of collateral performance including default levels,
rating levels, and par and interest coverage levels, particularly with respect to their test levels.
The basic equation can be expressed as
Tradeit - 1o + / lt -+ /3i2 + 3DealStatsit + 4Trade+t /35Incentiveit + / 6Perf ormanceit + eit
in which /lt and 3i2 are fixed effects on time and either deal or manager ID.
When performing panel data regressions, it is important to consider the treatment of stan-
dard errors. Correlation between observations can lead to large errors in calculating signif-
17For studies of risk-shifting in a context of franchise value, see for instance Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz
(2000), Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1997), and Gan (2004).
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icance levels. In all regressions I performed coefficients, standard errors, and adjusted R2
were markedly different when including tlt and 3i2 dummy variables, signifying the presence of
strong fixed effects. All reported regressions use fixed effects to control for any time-invariant
time-series and cross-sectional residual correlation, and are further corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity. I also consider deal- or manager-clustered standard errors to ensure unbiased estimates
when fixed effects may vary over time. 18
It is problematic to include constant independent variables (say fee rates) in a time-series
regression and not have the effect be lost in the observation's general fixed effect coefficient.
This issue is addressed by using alternate fixed effects. For instance, with deal structure
variables, manager dummies are used, while with manager variables, deal dummies are used.
In general, despite the amount of dummy variables employed, and the conditioning of the
sample on reinvest period, coverage test failure, manager switches, etc., I am able to get several
consistently significant relationships. R2 levels are high, considering that levels of 20% are not
unusual in financial regressions. Coefficients should be interpreted with care. In the fixed
effects model, one effectively looks at each observation's deviation from its mean, rather than
its absolute level.
3.4.1 Grouping Decisions
The first aspect of the manager's trading behavior I look at is any tendencies to group trades
together so as to avoid par impairment. One sign of potential risk-shifting would be a manager
lowering his reinvest price to accompany credit risk sales or raising the amount of credit-
improved sales. Evidence suggests that many managers did this - for instance though the
weighted-average sale price of credit-risk securities falls dramatically when the OC test is failing,
the credit-improved sales price actually rises. (See Table 3.8, third section).
Consider the manager's decision about when to make credit-improved and credit-risk sales,
presented in Table 3.9. The manager is not obligated to make credit-improved sales in con-
junction with credit-risk sales, even when failing coverage tests, because as discussed in Section
18 See Petersen (2005) for a discussion of optimal error treatment in panel data regressions. Using time
dummies and clustering by firms (cross-sectional) is appropriate when the time series is short and the number of
clusters are large. In simulations performed by Petersen, the error in standard error estimation fell to 1% with
100 clusters. In the CDO data set there are enough managers and deals to cluster by either.
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3.3 he is allowed to worsen par coverage in distressed sales. Note first that the later vintage
a deal was (Closing Date), the more likely it was to have credit-improved sales, controlling for
the stress located in earlier deals. Also, credit-improved sales are positively related to deal
age, since assets have more time to deviate from new-issue quality. When the manager is unre-
strained by ratings test failures, as in column (1) of Table 3.9, average monthly credit-improved
sales volume increases significantly, nearly 60%, in credit-risk sales volume. Whenever there is
a WARF failure, as in columns (2) and (4), the coefficient falls by nearly two-thirds, suggest-
ing the manager is not able to make as many credit-improved sales as he would like. Selling
high-dollar assets would tend to worsen WARF. This could indicate that there are simply
fewer high-quality assets in the portfolio to sell, given that ratings levels are low. However
this interpretation is belied by the coefficient when OC tests are failing, presented in column
(3), which is actually at its maximum. One would expect an equally, if not more, distressed
portfolio when OC tests are failing. But when the OC test is failing, selling high-dollar assets
tends to build par, improving coverage tests. That managers make credit-improved sales when
they have the discretion to do so suggests a desire to preserve par whenever permitted, not the
lack of assets to sell.
The same trend occurs with elective and defaulted sales volume although with less signifi-
cance. (There are fewer defaulted or elective sales relative to credit-improved and credit-risk
sales, increasing standard errors). The overall trend suggests that managers chose to worsen
the average quality of the portfolio in favor of maintaining par, rather than letting par decline
and keeping high-quality, low-risk assets in the portfolio. It also suggests that ratings con-
straints did bind to some extent. Note that redeemed assets and exchanged assets played
little role. That is, it appears managers specifically paired discretionary trades to avoid taking
losses, whereas with non-discretionary trades they were less able to manage timing.
I also look at another method of building par, which is to reinvest at a low dollar price.
Buying lower-quality assets adds risk to the portfolio. Par trading gains from purchases are
analyzed in equations (5) and (6) of Table 3.9. When OC tests are passing, par gains from
purchases and sales are inversely related, suggesting that managers attempt to match sales
par losses with reinvest par gains. On the other hand when coverage tests are failing, the
relationship weakens (nearly 90%). Either more distressed sales are taking place without
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Table 3.9: Relationship between Contemporaneous Sales and Purchase Decisions for Coverage
and Ratings Failures. Monthly trade volumes are measured by face value, and both monthly
trade volumes and par gains are expressed as percentages of the prior month's portfolio par. T-
stats, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are in brackets. Credit-improved sales volume is regressed
on simultaneous sales activity and presented for four scenarios: (1) both WARF and OC tests
passing (2) WARF failing (3) OC failing and (4) both WARF and OC tests failing. Purchase
par gains are regressed on simultaneous sales par gains and presented for two scenarios: (5)
both OC and IC tests passing and (6) either OC or IC test failing. Month, deal type, and
either deal (1)-(4) or manager (5)-(6) fixed effects are included in regressions but not reported.
For (1)-(4), trades are restricted to the reinvest period.
Dependent Variable:
Credit Improved Sales Purchase Par Gains
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Closing Date 0.19 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.01 -0.03
[1.35] [2.70]** [2.45]* [0.06] [1.79] [2.67]**
Deal Age 0.19 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03
[1.37] [1.65] [0.28] [0.45] [1.21] [2.64]**
Credit Risk Sales Vol. 0.59 0.22 0.62 0.24
[2.02]* [3.10]** [1.97] [2.42]*
Elective Sales Vol. 0.22 0.07 -0.03 -0.08
[3.04]** [1.09] [0.35] [0.91]
Defaulted Sales Vol. 0.70 0.33 0.04 0.02
[1.87] [2.11]* [0.10] [0.74]
Redemption Sales Vol. 0.13 -0.08 0.23 0.01
[0.79] [0.78] [1.63] [0.46]
Exchanged Sales Vol. 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.02
[1.03] [1.03] [0.87] [0.69]
Equity Sales Vol. 0.39 1.17 -11.43 0.06
[0.60] [1.39] [2.18]* [0.65]
Par Gain Disc. + Def. Sales -0.24 -0.02
[4.63]** [2.41]*
Par Gain Non-Disc. Sales 0.01 0.00
[0.83] [0.91]
Constant -99.96 -12.26 -64.03 1.72 -4.31 17.61
[1.35] [2.14]* [2.22]* [0.09] [1.83] [2.66]**
Observations 812 624 65 1149 1551 1808
Deals 96 85 22 128 73 82
Adjusted R2 0.5123 0.5101 0.8732 0.3273 0.1320 0.1333
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compensatory par reinvest gains or the manager is now seeking par gains whenever he reinvests
without regard to sales activity. As before, the discretionary reinvest par gains show little
relationship with non-discretionary reinvest par gains.
The tendency to group trades to avoid par losses is a central argument that managers were at
the very least gambling on riskier assets in lieu of keeping solid assets in the portfolio. Whether
this managerial behavior actually qualifies as risk-shifting, rather than what I will call "tactical"
behavior, is complex. One might suppose that managers had a basic preference for stability
and good appearances, and managed portfolios accordingly. For instance, managers may not
like investors to see a stream of constant losses, and view realized sales gains as more reassuring
to investors than hypothetical mark-to-market gains. As well, managers may have extreme
sensitivity to test failures. Collateral losses that cause marginal tests to fail may be more
noticeable and cause greater headaches through increased client communication, rating agency
inquiries, etc.19 These tactical preferences would lead to increased activity when incurring
credit-risk and defaulted asset losses and near test failures.
Risk-shifting is an incentive-based explanation, whereas tactical management is more a
behavioral tendency. One should note that a "managing to tests" mentality may not be
motivated by equityholders' cashflow interests but certainly benefits them. That is, it is
difficult to pinpoint the motives for par-building behavior because it is at the confluence of
manager preferences for greater volatility and "tactical" test improvement. A pattern of such
trading is suggestive but not conclusive. The smoking gun for the risk-shifting interpretation
will be in the role of compensation structure on manager behavior, analyzed in the next section.
3.4.2 Discretionary Trading and Incentive Structure
My second line of argument for risk-shifting is the influence of performance and incentive
measures on managers' trading decisions. Were managers simply prone to overconfidence, or
deals simply victims of a bad default regime, trading decisions should not be tightly linked to
manager's compensation. In addition to their economic incentives, managers have reputations
to consider. A desire to keep or attract new investors to future deals or other asset management
19See, for instance, findings in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that suggest a preference for less activity
when managers are insulated from takeover pressures.
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accounts may also have influenced manager choices. Again if manager's reputational concerns
have a demonstrable effect of trade decisions, it indicates that bad investment choices were not
simply the result of overconfidence, bad luck, or tactical style.
Par-building Sales
I look first at the discretionary volume sold above $100, that is at a par gain. Such sales can
be made because of credit improvement in the portfolio, higher interest rates in the portfolio,
or a desire to build par. Table 3.10 presents regression results from par-building sales volume
on various deal and performance parameters.
First note that generally the deal type dummies are strongly and significantly negative,
compared to the baseline Emerging Market deal type, which had very good credit performance
over the timeframe. Also, while not significant here, in a trend that is significant elsewhere,
the later the closing date, the better the overall performance, and the higher the amount of
high-dollar or credit-improved sales. Cash generally has a negative effect on any sort of sales
volume, perhaps because managers would rather reinvest cash prior to generating more. Also,
rating factor is a negative influence on high-dollar sales, simply due to poor credit quality.
The most significant performance-related variable is the level of over-collateralization. This
metric is significant in various forms, including the most senior OC level, the OC par cushion,
and the latter squared. The senior OC ratio is somewhat orthogonal to the latter two variables,
since generally junior tests have much less cushion in them. What one observes is that a larger
senior level generally has a negative effect on par-building sales. Even though deals with lower
coverage levels would tend to have worse collateral, nonetheless they sell more volume at high
prices.
Care must be taken with OC analysis because there might be endogeneity or serial correla-
tion. Roughly three things could conceivably raise OC levels relative to deal means: A) good
default performance B) mandatory principal paydowns stemming from earlier OC failures (bad
performance) or C) earlier par-building sales. It is extremely unlikely that bad performance
and subsequent mandatory paydowns are responsible for the implied marginal decline in par-
building sales. First, mandatory paydowns occur sporadically, only on paydates. Secondly
in regressions (3), (5), and (6), in which all OC tests are passing, the effect is also negative
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and strong. If OC tests are passing there are no mandatory paydowns inside the reinvestment
period.
It is also unlikely that the decline in par-building sales is due to having already previously
removed premium assets from the portfolio. This is because credit-improved sales (the only
group of sales with average price > $100) are so linked with credit-risk sales. Concomitant
credit-risk and credit-improved sales would generally accompany lower OC levels, and in future
periods reduced credit-improved sales volume would be linked with low rather than high OC
levels. In addition credit-improved sales are positively and significantly linked with three lags
of prior credit-improved sales. That is, if the OC test is high due to prior par-building or credit-
improved sales, it is more likely that credit-improved sales will continue to be high, raising OC
levels. One can conclude that the most obvious reason, good default performance, is most
responsible for high OC levels. This makes the negative marginal impact (i.e. deals with worse
OC levels making more high-dollar sales) even more striking.
The effect of the minimum OC par cushion is complex due to the squared term. In the most
general regression, (1), both coefficients are significant and positive although the squared term
is small. This implies that the larger the minimum cushion is, including as the cushion travels
from negative to positive, the manager makes more par-building sales. This could reflect that
in better performing deals, there is more good collateral to sell. But also, for badly performing
deals, it may be that an improvement in performance can increase risk-shifting behavior. The
manager is more likely to be rewarded for aggressive, par-building behavior when coverage levels
are still within range of passing.
The effects can be analyzed better by breaking down the sample into deals whose OC tests
are passing and failing. When passing, the OC par cushion is above zero by definition. The
coefficient in column (3) on the first term becomes strongly and significantly negative. The
combined numeric effect of the two coefficients depends on the cushion. When the cushion
is small, the marginal impact is generally determined by the negative term, so that activity
declines in a growing cushion. However when the deal is performing very well and the cushion
is sufficiently large, the marginal impact can become positive due to the positive coefficient
on the squared term. I speculate that in the tight range, the majority of deals' managers
react in a sit-tight manner. If deal performance is tolerable, they are less active, but as
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Figure 3-1: Regression Fit of Par-building Discretionary Sales Volume and Lagged OC Par
Cushion. Estimated coefficients on OC par cushion taken from Table 3.10, columns (3) and
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tests become endangered (cushion shrinks) they take steps to boost par, hence the negative
correlation. On the other hand deals with extremely large cushions are generally the deals
with superb performance and hence have more credit-improved securities to sell, producing a
positive combined effect. This interpretation is borne out in columns (5) and (6) in which I
break down by the magnitude of the par cushion.
An analogous effect can be discerned when OC tests are failing, as in column (4). There,
both coefficients are positive. Because the par cushion is negative, an increase decreases
the squared term, and makes the marginal impact of the squared term negative. However
the coefficient is small and the combined marginal impact of a growing cushion is generally
positive. As the cushion gets nearer to passing the pace of activity quickens. This suggests
that managers may give up on worse deals and are more motivated to build par when they have
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a chance to restore test passage. This analysis is borne out in a detailed look, columns (7) and
(8) in which I break down by the level of par cushion.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the marginal impact of growing OC par cushions, using the coefficients
from columns (3) and (4). Note that the graphed observations are in absolute terms (not de-
viations from means) and the fitted line has been shifted to reflect this. The marginal impact
is largest (and positive) at the extremes of the sample. The estimate for extremely poor per-
formance (cushions < -20%) probably reflects a very low collateral denominator, accentuating
percentage trading statistics. The upswing in par-building sales for good performance (cush-
ions > 2.5%) probably reflects better collateral from which to choose.20 In the inner region,
par-building sales activity spikes dramatically around OC test passage points, the strike levels
for subordinate interest distributions. Again, it is difficult to rule out a tactical explanation
from this alone, but it seems unlikely that there would be such heavy activity in the moderately
bad performance range (cushions < 0 but > -10%) were managers simply worried about the
bad appearance of failing tests. The trend is highly suggestive of risk-shifting, in that deals
with marginal but worsening performance begin to par-build more; while in badly performing
deals, the more hope a manager has of eventually receiving funds, the more volatility he seeks
to add.
The significant relationship between manager behavior and compensation is an important
argument for the risk-shifting explanation. I use the ratio of senior to junior fees as an indicator
of the level of the manager's subordinated interest (and perhaps also as a proxy for his equity
share). It is significantly negative, so that as a manager's interests become less subordinated
the amount of par-building sales decline. I also look at an interaction of the manager's junior
fees and equity share. As the equity share increases, the debt share decreases, and a manager is
more likely to actually receive his subordinated fees on paydates. This factor, while just below
significance in column (1), is negative and significant in other regressions (column (9)). Again,
the less subordinated the manager's interests are, the fewer sales he makes above par. This
is a key sign of risk-shifting since it suggests that it is the manager's subordinated cashflows -
junior and incentive fees, equity shares - which are influencing trading.
20 Although ratings levels are used in regressions to control for collateral quality, issuers improving in credit
quality tend to wait longer for upgrades, especially during volatile time periods.
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Another fee variable I consider in Table 3.10 is the level of incentive fee hurdles. The larger
this variable, the higher the return equityholders must receive before the manager receives his
bonus incentive fees. As expected, the coefficient is strongly positive. The higher the hurdle
rate, it seems the more the manager is inclined to boost par and take chances. In a subsection
of badly performing deals, column (2), the coefficient turns negative. I take this as more
evidence for the theory that managers give up on badly performing deals. As it becomes less
likely that managers receive any bonus, discretionary trading falls.
The effect of the IC test is an interesting proxy for whether a manager's interest are com-
pletely out-of-the-money or not. It is rare to see an IC test failing without its complementary
OC test failing, but not vice-versa. When an IC test is failing, indicating that there is not even
enough collateral interest to cover liability interest, usually the deal is hopelessly underwater
and subordinate investors are holding worthless claims. Across the board, either with an IC
failing dummy or by subdividing the sample in columns (9) and (10), par-building sales gener-
ally lessen in IC failures. The coefficient in (1) on the IC fail dummy is negative and significant.
In column (9), in which passing IC tests are sampled, the constant amount of high-dollar sales
is significantly larger than in column (10), where IC tests fail. As well the coefficients on OC
cushions are larger and more positive. This suggests the manager is more active when interest
is still flowing through the deal. If excess interest is available, the manager may still receive
subordinated fees or equity distributions in the future.
One observes that for worse performing deals, the marginal impact of a larger equity share
is positive and larger than that for well-performing deals, which is ambiguously signed. This
may be due to a larger equity share keeping a manager's subordinated interests more in-the-
money (10). When a deal is performing well, a larger equity share will absorb more bad
performance and can lessen risk-shifting as in columns (5) and (9). On the other hand, when
coverage tests are close but failing (6) a larger equity share is very conducive to increasing
risk-shifting volume. When the cushion is largely negative (7) equity share is smaller and
insignificant. This is another example of the non-linear compensation relationship. In deals
with small equity shares, bad performance will quickly wipe out subordinate investors, turn off
excess interest distributions permanently through severe coverage test failures, and in general
reduce managers' upside completely. When upside is completely gone, there is little point in
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risk-shifting activity, especially if trading imposes some cost on managers or there is a limit to
the amount of volatility managers can add.
Par-building Purchases
The results on par-building sales hold for sales par gains and prices as well, but with sales
statistics it is somewhat laborious to disentangle structural and incentive motivations from
general credit stress influences. Therefore I also look at par-building purchases which are not
as linked with credit stress in the portfolio. That is, a manager does not have to reinvest
in dubious assets at below-par prices just because the default regime is poor. One comment
rating agency analysts made is that they had expected managers to take refuge in high-quality
assets and let the deals delever naturally, to the benefit of senior debt investors. 21 Any
relationship between incentives and purchase decisions would strongly suggest that managers
were exploiting structures. Table 3.11 presents a regression of par purchase gains on various
deal parameters and coverage test scenarios. Both the closing date and age of a deal are strongly
and significantly negative, which is explained by the general credit environment. During the
wave of corporate defaults, credit spreads widened dramatically which would have resulted in
cheaper prices and earlier deals having more opportunities for par gains. Further, in 2003 and
2004 credit spreads tightened dramatically, which would correspond with younger deals (those
from 2002-2003) and older deals (1996 deals in 2002 versus 1996 deals in 1996) having less
ability to buy cheaply. Also, prior principal cash increases the amount of possible volume one
could buy and is a positive factor in all cases, significant in columns (2) and (4).
As before. the manager's fees and their subordination level play a significant role. The
more subordinated the compensation that the manager receives, the more he is inclined to
par-building purchases. The senior fee level decreases par purchase gains. In contrast, the
junior fee level, subordinate to debtholders' interest payments, has a positive effect on purchase
gains. In fact, the junior fee coefficient becomes even larger for subsets of worse performing
21Source: Moody's Investors Service (2002b). In a 2002 case study of a typical 1998 high-yield bond CDO,
Moody's finds that had the CDO held market collateral, none of the 9 senior debt downgrades and only 14 of the
18 junior debt downgrades would have occurred. Further, had the manager pursued a more conservative trading
strategy after the onset of stress, CDO investors could have avoided an additional 8 junior debt downgrades
(realizing just 6 of 18).
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Table 3.11: Relationship between Purchase Par Gains and Deal Structure and Lagged Perfor-
mance for Various Coverage Scenarios. Trades are restricted to the reinvest period. Monthly
par gains are measured as percentages of the prior month's portfolio par. T-stats, adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and intra-deal error correlation, are in brackets. The regression is presented
for four scenarios: (1) All (2) worst quartile of deals, by final MDS score (3) IC tests passing and
(4) IC tests failing. Month and deal fixed effects are included in regressions but not reported.
Dependent Variable: T+1 Par Gains Purchases
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Closing Date -0.0418 -0.0472 -0.0426 -0.0109
[4.88]** [35.72]** [5.06]** [6.09]**
Deal Age -0.0609 -0.0495 -0.0621 -0.0046
[7.18]** [35.34]** [7.48]** [2.75]**
Principal Cash 0.0067 0.0053 0.0072 0.0064
[1.30] [2.08]* [0.82] [2.70]**
Mngr Inst. AUM in $B -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0005
[1.91] [5.36]** [1.68] [334]**
WARF Test Fail 1=Y 0.0361 0.2325 0.0174 0.0821
[1.15] [6.82]** [0.55] [1.20]
Senior Fee Level -0.0118 -0.0054 -0.0135 -0.0135
[3.75]** [3.90]** [2.56]* [3.45]**
Junior Fee Level 0.0283 0.0325 0.0302 0.1062
[6.31]** [5.00]** [4.22]** [14.62]**
Senior Fee Ratio -0.1865 0.0000 -0.1590 -0.0109
[5.91]** [0.00] [3.33]** [0.37]
Junior Fee x Eq. % -0.0339 -0.0378 -0.0353 -0.1235
[6.11]** [4.69]** [4.07]** [14.50]**
Constant 23.1382 25.0129 23.5582 5.7286
[5.09]** [34.61]** [5.30]** [6.34]**
Observations 1400 368 978 419
Deals 128 33 143 58
Adjusted R2 0.3705 0.4563 0.3728 0.3486
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deals (columns (2) and (4)).22
Consistent with the previous analysis of sold volume, the ratio of senior to junior fee level has
a negative and significant impact. I take this as a proxy for the manager's level of subordinated
interest and possibly his equity share. Also as before, I run an interaction of the original equity
share and junior fee level. The larger the equity share, the less subordinated the manager's
junior fee is, and consistent with this logic there is again a significantly negative coefficient on
par-building trades.
The other interesting effect which is captured in this regression is the effect of manager
size. While not uniformly significant, the coefficient is negative and strongly significant in the
subsets of worse performing deals (columns (2) and (4)). This suggests that when deals go
bad, larger managers pursue less aggressive or risk-shifting behavior. It is also an argument for
the risk-shifting explanation of manager behavior. If managers are "managing to tests" in a
preference for stability, one would expect larger managers, i.e. those with more assets at risk and
perhaps a more sedate corporate culture, to have an even more pronounced preference. That
larger managers eschew the riskier trades suggests it is in fact an appetite for risk driving such
trades; that the par-building activity peaks around test passage points points to risk-shifting
motivations. 23
3.4.3 Non-discretionary Volume
A last argument lies in a brief look at non-discretionary sold volume (redemptions, exchanges,
and defaults). Collateral characteristics, with the exceptions of ratings levels and deal age
indicators, were insignificant factors in discretionary volume regressions. In contrast, non-
22 One might argue that some managers were intrinsically more inclined to make trades which appear as risk-
shifting trades, perhaps due to an aggressive style or over-confidence in skill. These managers might have been
more likely to accept or desire deals with subordinated cashflows, anticipating higher returns. This strategy would
not have paid off from 1998-2003 and could conceivably account for some of the coefficients on fee paramaters.
However, this problem is avoided by having multiple deal observations per manager and using manager ID
dummies. Deals' compensation structure will differ for exogenous reasons (deal type, closing date, investor
concerns, etc.). Also, the manager ID dummies allow one to focus on each managers' deviation from his own
average behavior. Thirdly, the endogeneity speculation does not explain the results on OC cushions. Trading
influenced by OC cushions indicates that it was actual cashflow implications, rather than style, motivating
managers.
23 One might think prior demonstrated good performance (skill) had led to increased AUM and future good
performance, causing the negative relationship between manager size and risk-adding trades. This is unlikely
since prior to this time period aggressive, not conservative, manager behavior would have been more rewarded
with asset inflows.
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Table 3.12: Relationship between Non-Discretionary Sales Volume and Deal Structure and
Lagged Performance. Transactions are restricted to the reinvest period. Monthly trade
volumes are measured by face value, as percentages of the prior month's portfolio par. T-stats
are in brackets, adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and intra-manager error correlation in (1)
and (2) and for heteroskedasticity alone in (3) and (4). The regression is presented for two
definitions of non-discretionary sales: (1) and (3) redemptions and exchanged volume and (2)
and (4) redemptions, exchanged, and defaulted volume. Month and manager fixed effects are
included in regressions but not reported.
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)Variable
Deal Type (HY)
Deal Type (IG)
Deal Type (LN)
Closing Date
Deal Age
Weighted Avg. Coupon
Principal Cash
Def. Securities %
Diversity Score
Incentive Fee x Eq. %
Incentive Hurdles
Constant
Observations
Managers
Adjusted R2
1.1488 1.2961
[4.41]** [4.03]**
0.5304 0.6904
[1.76] [1.99]*
0.5290 0.6295
[1.74] [1.64]
0.0362 0.0404
[3.70]** [3.19]**
0.0392 0.0436
[4.15]** [3.55]**
6.2513 6.8670
[3.28]** [3.46]**
-0.0177 -0.0106
[1.13] [0.64]
0.0548 0.0770
[4.47]** [5.65]**
-0.0206 -0.0216
[2.46]* [2.21]*
0.0015 0.0016
[0.40] [0.26]
0.5021 0.4419
[3.04]** [1.40]
-19.2762 -19.7577
[3.89]** [3.03]**
1949 1948
89 89
0.2992 0.2613
T+1 Non-discretionary Sales Volume
(3) (4)
1.1488 1.2961
[4.00]** [4.18]**
0.5304 0.6904
[1.92] [2.19]*
0.5290 0.6295
[1.78] [1.84]
0.0362 0.0404
[3.98]** [3.65]**
0.0392 0.0436
[4.39]** [4.03]**
6.2513 6.8670
[2.71]** [2.43]*
-0.0177 -0.0106
[1.33] [0.66]
0.0548 0.0770
[3.60]** [4.21]**
-0.0206 -0.0216
[3.25]** [3.01]**
0.0015 0.0016
[0.35] [0.27]
0.5021 0.4418
[2.82]** [1.46]
-19.2762 -19.7577
[4.16]** [3.47]**
1949 1948
89 89
0.2992 0.2613
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discretionary sold volume is more dependent on deal performance and less dependent on deal
structure and fee characteristics. Table 3.12 illustrates this. The best fit is heavily dependent
on collateral characteristics. Again, closing date and deal age are highly significant. In this
case, both coefficients are positive. Later vintage deals may have had more loan exposure and
therefore been more prone to calls. Likewise, older deals would experience more calls as bonds
age. Along the same lines, coupon rates were positive and highly significant. The higher the
portfolio coupon rate, the more likely assets were to be redeemed during the general decline in
interest rates and credit spreads.
Not surprisingly, the level of defaults was positive and highly significant. Interestingly, di-
versity score had a beneficial effect on exchanges and defaults, suggesting that less concentrated
portfolios (higher Diversity scores) tended to have lower turnover. Rating factor was largely
insignificant, in various forms. This makes sense since a declining rating is not likely to be
forcefully redeemed or exchanged until an asset is actually in some sort of default. Prior cash
went from being generally significant for voluntary trading to insignificant.
Coverage test parameters and most fee parameters were for the most part either incon-
sistently signed or insignificant. Some appeared as if they went in directions previously
analyzed, suggesting maybe such parameters led to riskier behavior and ultimately to more
non-discretionary turnover. One factor that remained significant was the incentive fee hurdle
rate. As before it had a positive effect, increasing turnover.
3.5 Conclusion
I[ feel this is a unique opportunity to study managerial risk-shifting in a setting in which there are
clear measures of volatility and in which both manager actions and compensation structure are
known. Prior studies of managerial behavior in more traditional firm settings have concluded
that manager risk-shifting is extremely rare or that the costs are small. In the financial arena,
in particular the CDO market, the situation is different because CDOs are so much more highly
leveraged. This makes both the costs and frequency of risk-shifting behavior likely to be larger.
In addition instead of undefined investments we have a clear idea of the manager's choice set
and can measure volatility using asset prices or ratings.
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My goal was to discern any evidence that managers with more subordinated compensation
added more volatility to the portfolios they managed. Volatility can be added by purchas-
ing discount, lower-quality securities or selling premium, higher-quality securities. I find a
significant tendency to group credit-improved with credit-risk trades, a strategy for avoiding
par erosion in badly performing deals but one which increases default volatility. I also find
that there is a strong and significant relationship between manager trading, compensation, and
deal performance. As deal performance worsens, managers become more likely to make such
par-building trades, a trend which intensifies if their subordinated fee levels or hurdle rates for
incentive fees are larger. This is what one would expect from managers' owning calls on total
portfolio value.
As one would expect given the optionality in the managers' subordinated contracts, the
relationship is highly non-linear. As deal performance worsens to the point that subordinated
investors are hopelessly underwater, manager activity declines. For badly performing deals, but
ones in which managers may still get paid, activity is highest. For marginal or well-performing
deals, managers are less inclined to par-building. It appears that managers actively seek
to add volatility the nearer they get to strike values for their various options, as proxied by
over-collateralization levels.
I find a negative correlation between manager size and risk-shifting activity, particularly in
deals with worst performance. This suggests that managers with greater reputational concerns
were less likely to add volatility in the hopes of achieving subordinated fees. Results on com-
pensation structure and manager reputation suggest that it is not regime, overconfidence, or
manager style leading to aggressive trading strategies, but rather rational risk-shifting motiva-
tions.
These findings are consistent with theoretical predictions of the principal-agent problem in
a setting of delegated management. They are also consistent with allegations from numerous
market participants to the effect that manager behavior worsened CDO performance by unnec-
essarily adding risk to portfolios. Rating agencies in particular have been frank in admissions
that they did not properly account for reinvestment risk. One important implication of this
paper is that the attention being given to revision of CDO structures in order to prevent future
manager misbehavior is well-spent. It also implies that for investors manager reputation is an
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important asset to consider.
Areas of future research include a more detailed investigation of trading activity, including
ratings and return performance. In this manner one could judge the long-term performance of
apparently risk-shifting trades. Also, it would be useful to focus on the behavior patterns of
managers who continued to issue CDOs.
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